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CHAPTER I. THE STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF ABORTION-RELATED COGNITIONS 
Abortion Cognitions: Distinguishing the Social Phenomenon 
One of the most unfortunate aspects of the abortion debate is 
that genuine moval and sooiat issues have become obscured by 
the bellicose rhetoric of zealots. Earlier this year, LAPAC's 
[Life Amendment Political Action Committee] Paul Brown made 
a vicious personal attack on NARAL's [National Abortion Rights 
Action League] Karen Bulhauser. Said he: 'I hear that Karen 
claims she was raped. Well, let me tell you, Karen is not 
the most beautiful creature in the world, so when I hear her 
say she was raped, my response is "You wish." ' Brown's com­
ment was inexcusable: Mulhauser had indeed been raped by two 
men, at gunpoint, both of whom were convicted and imprisoned 
(Isaacson, 1981:27) [italics added]. 
The topic of abortion encompasses moral, philosophical, and religious 
issues. In many cases, these issues, which are individually-held cognitive 
elements, involve an individual's mttmsohaumg. An individual may exper­
ience any disagreement with his or her position on these issues as intol­
erable threats to the moral order. The emotional intensity of the defense 
of one's position does not, however, obviate the expedient nature of the 
position adopted concerning these issues. The issues that endure, for ex­
ample, a belief in the sanctity of life, cohere to the individual's domain 
assumptions (Gouldner, 1970:31)• This does not diminish the merit of these 
issues, but it does identify the limited utility of pursuing the individu­
al's cognitive elements. Developing cognitive elements is the act of indi­
viduals and possibly more suited to the study of psychology than sociology. 
More typically, individuals adopt existing positions concerning abortion 
issues. Academic, political, and religious development of these issues, as 
well as the issues' dissemination and the organization of adherents, is an 
inherently social process. 
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Issues, as individually-developed cognitive elements, may be matters 
of morality, in which the fundamental arguments approximately balance be­
tween pro-abortion rights and anti-abortion advocates. Institutionalized 
issues, however, cannot be assumed to be motivated and advanced wholly by 
moral concerns (regardless of an individual's motivation in adopting them) 
because norms fulfill system requisites (Parsons, 1951) that may be tangen­
tial ly related to their content. Rhetoric, thus, is understood to be 
socially valuable not for its content but for its boundary maintenance 
function. Institutionalized issues must be assumed to be compatible with 
the ideological requirements of the institution. To assume otherwise re­
jects a fundamental sociological principle, specifically, that the whole 
(of social interactions) is greater than the sum of the parts. This is 
the essence of Durkheim's (1964) "social fact." 
The prerequisite for conflict concerning abortion is that there be 
social acts, and, while abortion-related issues may motivate individuals' 
involvement in those social acts, the social fact is the conflict between 
organized and/or institutionalized groups. In the abortion conflict, be­
cause the intent of the opposing groups may be categorically different, 
there is no basis for assuming that their arguments or motivations will be 
approximately equal. This is a consequence of the differences between 
moral stances and social actions. With moral issues and moral dilemmas, 
dialectic positions dominate discussion. On any issue, arguments are re­
duced to the thesis and antithesis. In contrast, with social actions the 
goal of one group is not inevitably the antithesis of a dissenting group. 
In the case of abortion, the antithesis of the position which opposes all 
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abortions is a position in which abortions are mandatory. Since this is 
not the intent of pro-abortion rights groups, there is no basis for assum­
ing that conflicting pro-abortion rights and anti-abortion groups will 
address identical issues, that their actions will be comparable, or that 
evaluative criteria will identify comparable or complementary advantages 
and disadvantages. The assumption that every issue has dialectical posi­
tions and that an objective evaluation will recognize their equal validity 
is suspected of confusing social acts with moral dilemmas. What must be 
avoided is the tendency to treat the abortion controversy as if it were a 
moral dilemma rather than the social phenomenon that it is. 
Adopting a social fact conceptualization of the abortion controversy 
focuses analysis on abortion belief systems, social movement characteris­
tics, and systemic requisites. The task is to identify the extent to 
which the present abortion controversy is a product of social and social-
psychological processes independent of moral issues concerning abortion 
per se. At present, there is an almost total absence of research into the 
abortion controversy as a social fact, and this is a failure of sociolo­
gists and social psychologists. 
The abortion controversy is a public phenomenon. Because social sci­
entists have failed to analyze objectively the social, psychological, eco­
nomic, and political components of the controversy process, the public re­
mains the de facto authority on this issue. The most fundamental abortion 
issue is the "right to life." However, if social scientists accept this 
as the fundamental concern in the abortion controversy, the topic remains 
a moral dilemma to which social scientists provide no unique contributions. 
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Rather, because abortion is viewed as a strictly moral concern, divine 
inspiration or guidance tends to have preeminent authority. 
The abortion controversy is, by definition, conflict between groups, 
most visibly "pro-life" (or anti-abortion) and "pro-choice" (or pro-abor­
tion rights) groups. It is also a conflict between economic groups, re­
ligious groups, technologies, cultures, and legal rights, and the simplis­
tic characterization of the abortion controversy as a "right to life" de­
bate precludes these concerns. In every aspect of life affected by abor­
tion decisions, there are social, psychological, medical, and technologi­
cal concerns, all with their own moral and social implications. The pub­
lic abortion debate typically ignores these concerns and the subsequent 
need for expertise about these concerns. Consequently, much of the debate 
deals with abortion in isolation from the concerns and social interrela­
tions that distinguish human situations from moralistic generalizations. 
This isolation allows absolutist moralizing and further permits anyone to 
believe his or her expertise is sufficient to identify "truth." 
To the general public, moral issues seem less ambiguous and com­
plex than other questions. More people are certain, in their 
own minds, about what is 'right' or 'wrong' on such questions 
as abortion, busing and prayer in public schools than they are 
on issues such as farm price supports or wage and price controls 
(Baron, 1980:IC). 
The isolation of abortion concerns from the social, psychological, 
economic, medical, and other implications reduces the analysis of abortion 
to individuals' personal or religious interpretations. This isolation and 
reductionism is typified by reversion to absolute moralistic doctrine when­
ever other positions become futile. Reversion to moralistic absolutes is 
particularly significant because its prevalence is an indication that other 
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issues serve only polemic and image ends, to be abandoned whenever they in­
terfere with achieving the predetermined outcome. While, at times, it may 
appear that collateral issues are included, it remains to be established 
by collateral research and experts whether or not the relevant abortion 
concerns and issues are being employed validly and as critical tests of 
the argument. The relative absence of such analysis serves to intensify 
conflict, in part, by obscuring the controversy, and. In part, by implic­
itly supporting the contention that "moral superiority" is the appropriate 
basis for claiming legitimate (i.e., legal) power. 
This does not mean that moral positions concerning abortion are 
wrong or irrelevant. However, decisions reached solely on moral grounds 
are domain assumptions that are not supportable by collateral evidence be­
cause they are not subject to rejection by the same evidence. Further, in­
dividuals' moral superiority does not preclude manipulation of those moral 
issues by others for political or economic ends. An important task of re­
search, consequently, is to identify the collateral issues and the social, 
economic, and political interests associated with the abortion controversy. 
The Abortion Controversy: Significance of Advocate Intent 
The immediate social consequences resulting from a group's achieving 
its goals typically provide insight into that group's values, priorities, 
and philosophy. The consequences are not Inherently synonymous with the 
doctrine of the group; however, as a rational assumption about a group's 
intent, they provide one criterion for group analysis. In the abortion 
controversy, pro-abortion rights and anti-abortion groups propose markedly 
different goals, resulting in completely distinct social consequences. 
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There îs an incontrovertible distinction between the individuals and 
groups attempting to prohibit or restrict abortion and those who are not. 
On the matter of abortion, including all of its social implications, anti-
abortion activists are attempting to dictate the reproductive lives of 
others. They are seeking legal authority to impose their values on others 
and coerce compliance. This is the essence of the abortion controversy 
(in spite of the fact that it is only one extension of the "right to life" 
issue). Regardless of motivation, the controversy is over the right of 
one group to force compliance from others. Moral, ethical, and social 
issues, in addition to medical and scientific evidence, may appropriately 
be employed to justify such regulation with the proviso that the refutation 
of any evidence offered in support of a position is accepted as a rejection 
of that line of defense. In many instances, the power to coerce compliance 
has been established, for example, the prohibition against killing another 
person. Uniformly, however, even when a prohibition is popularized in ab­
solutist language, its enforcement is particularized. The prohibition 
against killing another person, for Instance, makes allowances for acci­
dents, self-defense, temporary insanity, line of duty, and military actions 
including saturation bombing of civilian territory. Thus, the efforts of 
Paul Brown (of the Life Amendment Political Action Committee) and J.C. Wil-
kie (president of the National Right to Life Committee) to seek a consti­
tutional amendment flatly banning abortions represent an unusually re­
strictive prohibition, particularly since the health and life of women are 
excluded from legal consideration (Associated Press, 198la:20A). 
In both generalizations and specific expectations for pregnant women. 
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pro-abortion rights advocates do not have predetermined outcomes, in con­
trast to the predetermined prohibition of abortion by anti-abortion advo­
cates. To "know" the proper course of action without regard to circum­
stances surrounding the pregnancy requires that the decision be reached 
without regard to empirical (and, therefore, testable) phenomena. Conse­
quently, the form of information accepted as relevant by pro-abortion 
rights advocates and anti-abortion advocates, in addition to the nature of 
their theoretical justifications, can be expected to differ significantly. 
Pro-abortion rights advocates and anti-abortion advocates propose mutually-
exclusive political and legal agenda which reflect their distinct intents 
and theoretical justifications. 
Anti-abortion efforts and the "right to life" issue appear to estab­
lish the elimination of abortion as the goal. If preventing abortion is 
the ultimate concern of the abortion controversy, then it is reasonable to 
expect anti-abortion advocates to actively support every effort that can 
be made to reduce the need for abortion. This appears to logically entail 
the use of all research and evidence related to pregnancy, including sex 
education and contraceptive counseling. Specifically, because of the coun­
terproductive consequences of failing to do so, any limitation on efforts 
to prevent the need for abortion is a demonstration that concern about 
abortion per se is only a portion of the abortion controversy. Thus, it 
is not sufficient to eliminate abortion; it must be eliminated in one spe­
cific (and historically-ineffectual) way. This is to say that if there 
are any actions which could reduce the need for abortion and which anti-
abortionists refuse to take, the justification for that refusal is an 
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inseparable element of their total anti-abortion stance. Further, to 
attempt to understand their anti-abortion position without regard to these 
justifications is, at best, naive. 
Ideally, pregnancy should be avoided - there is no disagree­
ment between pro- and anti-abortion groups concerning this 
issue. There is disagreement, however, in how pregnancy is 
to be prevented. Pro-abortion supporters tend to believe 
that more effective contraception and increased knowledge 
about sexuality is the key. They generally recognize the 
profound changes in sexual behavior that have taken place 
over the last few decades. By contrast, pro-life groups op­
pose birth control devices for the young because they be­
lieve such devices encourage what they call promiscuity and 
moral decedence. Most pro-life groups oppose the use of 
contraceptive devices even among married couples. Instead, 
they urge the rhythm method or continence. (The rhythm 
method is generally ineffective and continence is difficult) 
(Strong et al., 1979:268). 
Unless one chooses to reject offhandedly the possibility of con­
founding goals and theoretical justifications in the abortion controversy. 
Strong et at. 'B contention and similar arguments show the necessity of 
expanding the analysis of the abortion controversy from individual cog­
nitions about abortion per ae to a variety of social factors. These so­
cial factors include: (1) the source of the cognitive elements and their 
importance for that originating structure, (2) the development and elabora­
tion of each element and the process whereby elements from diverse origins 
are synthesized into new theories, (3) the socialization process whereby 
the elements are internalized, including the motivation behind the indi­
vidual's commitment to these elements, and (4) the social utility of the 
elements for coordinating individuals' actions concerning matters that 
can be associated with at least some of the elements. 
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CHAPTER II. THEORETICAL ORIENTATIONS 
This chapter employs three attitude theories (social judgment, cog­
nitive dissonance, and attribution) to identify the relationships between 
the dependent variable, extremism of abortion attitudes, and three inde­
pendent variables, socialization, experience and ego-involvement with 
abortion-related decisions. Interrelationships between the three inde­
pendent variables will also be explored. The four concepts chosen for 
study have face validity. To explain extremism in a person's attitudes 
on abortion, one should identify what that person has been taught regard­
ing abortion (socialization), what experience he/she has had with abortion 
(experience), and how strongly committed she/he feels to abortion-related 
attitudes (ego-involvement). Since the emphasis of this study is on 
identifying the theory which best explains extremism in the abortion con­
troversy, the individual theories per se are not tested. Rather, the con­
cepts to be tested encompass relationships within the abortion controversy 
which the three theories attempt to predict and explain. The straightfor­
ward assumption is that, if the four concepts are relevant to the theo­
ries, then the theories should be able to predict the relationships be­
tween the concepts. At issue is whether the theories successfully explain 
public phenomena (i.e., have eoologioal validity) or whether they are ap­
plicable only when thé context and issues addressed are restricted to ac­
commodate their respective predilections. 
In addition, traditional attitude theory assumptions are evaluated 
for their ability to bridge the levels of analysis between individually-
sustained cognitions and beliefs as products of social processes. 
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including social interaction. One concern is that the attitude theories 
chosen must be able to predict extremism of abortion attitudes; to ensure 
this, the theoretical relationship between concepts is consistently tested. 
A second concern is that the three attitude theories' fundamental assump­
tions are appropriate for analyzing the abortion controversy. Typically, 
this concern is not addressed but is a significant element of this study. 
The material in this chapter is presented in the following sequence. 
First, the advantages of selecting a controversial topic with which to 
contrast the alternative theories are presented. Second, the four con­
cepts common to the alternative theories used to predict abortion atti­
tudes are defined. Third, the specific alternative theories are identi­
fied, and the relationships between the concepts are predicted. Fourth, 
the appropriateness of attitude theories for explaining phenomena such as 
the abortion controversy is discussed. 
The Utility of a Controversial Public Issue 
In a questionnaire study of attitudes, it is heuristic if the issue 
being researched is controversial. Unless the questionnaire is open-ended, 
each question provides perimeters identifying the appropriate range of 
responses. Even when these ranges do encompass the total variation in 
responses, they create a continuum that may contribute to a halo effect, 
whether it be toward a central tendency, leniency, or severity error (Ker-
linger, 1973)• More importantly, a selection from the alternatives listed 
ensures the image of a knowledgeable response and knowledgeable respondent. 
When subjects in experiments believe they can affect an interviewer's 
evaluation, they will present themselves in a favorable manner (Schneider, 
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1969); there is little reason to expect less impression management with 
questionnaires. 
Researching a controversial issue minimizes these sources of measure­
ment error. The more controversial the issue, the more likely it is that 
sample members will have some form of experience relevant to the phenome­
non. This may include personal experience, particularly with an issue like 
abortion where there is a high incidence of such events. Experience may 
also take the forms of education and socialization, as religious, educa­
tional, political, and mass media groups seek to explain and resolve the 
controversy. Motivated by the intensity of the controversy, activists are 
more likely to identify relationships between the specific issue and other 
social values and structures. This activity increases the probability that 
sample members will have some personal involvement with the issue and, con­
sequently, that they will have explicit attitudes prior to reading the 
questionnaire. Finally, with a controversial issue there is less consen­
sus on what is normative. Thus, respondents are less able to seek inter­
viewer approval by reinforcing social norms (Phillips, 1971) or respond 
with a halo effect when a wide range of responses has support (provided 
that the questionnaire is not identifiably biased). 
In researching attitude change, it Is necessary to explain theoreti­
cally why specific changes will occur, given specific conditions. Fre­
quently, a theory is adopted and tested In relation to one phenomenon and, 
if supported, applied to a wider range of phenomena. While this is gen­
erally appropriate, the result is a variety of theories, each explaining 
a phenomenon differently. When alternative theories make similar general 
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predictions, they provide no basis for identifying the most accurate ex­
planation. In a sense, an inability to empirically distinguish between 
alternative theories places the researcher in an atheoretical position, as 
if no theory had been used to predict the results. By contrast, this 
study employs a comparative analysis of three theories of attitude change, 
evaluating each theory's ability to predict attitude differences associated 
with the abortion controversy. 
Defining the Four Issue Concepts 
The four concepts are presented in two sections. First, each concept 
is defined in this section in order to identify the variable relationships 
to be predicted by the theories. Second, the relevance of each concept to 
the theories is presented in the respective theory discussions. 
Abortion-related socialization 
This concept is defined as that complex of knowledge, beliefs, norms, 
values, and sentiments directed at individuals by primary and secondary 
groups with the intent of perpetuating specific perspectives concerning 
abortion. Differences in the internalization of socialization content 
result from variations in the relative importance of socialization sources, 
in addition to variations in the specific information provided. 
Abortion-related experience 
This concept is defined as participation in a decision to have or not 
have an abortion. The critical element in this definition is participation 
in a decision and not having an abortion or being involved with the abor­
tion procedure. For to define experience as having an abortion ignores 
the effect of the decision process on attitudes as experienced by those 
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women who reject abortions. Likewise, to define experience as involvement 
with abortion procedures fails to provide insight into the attitudinal ef­
fects of evaluating one's life situation and selecting a specific action. 
For example, it is possible for medical staff to perform abortions without 
understanding the decision-making process that results in some women seek­
ing abortions and others bearing the child, and without understanding the 
effects of those decisions. 
Ego-involvement with abortion decisions 
This concept is defined as the degree to which individuals' self-con-
cepts become involved with their attitudes concerning abortion. An impor­
tant manifestation of ego-involvement is the extent to which individuals 
seek to have their attitudes of appropriate abortion behavior established 
as the standard, either legal or normative. Efforts to have social stan­
dards reflect one's own attitudes serve ego-defensive functions and mark a 
significant distinction between Tesser's (1976) attribution theory and 
attribution theory in general, along with social judgment and cognitive 
dissonance theories. 
Abort ion-related extremism 
This concept is defined as the degree of opposition to or support for 
abortion. At its most abstract, the concept is unbounded, dichotomized in­
to anti-abortion and pro-abortion attitudes. However, "abortion" is con­
textual ly vacuous, and, while some individuals' attitudes may never be 
influenced by events' contexts, most people acknowledge context-specific 
justifications for behavior. Hence, a contextually-specific definition of 
abortion-related extremism is the degree of opposition to or support for 
14 
abortion in a variety of identified situations. 
For each of the theories, abortion-related extremism is the dependent 
concept. It is not descriptive of a process or factor by which a theory 
explains an effect, but, rather, it is the effect being explained. As 
such, it is not theory-specific in the sense that it has properties unique 
to an individual theory. 
Theory Selection 
In selecting three theories, an attempt is made to achieve diversity. 
Simultaneously, the general theoretical orientations chosen should have 
reasonably widespread support, demonstrated by a history of empirical re­
search. Social judgment theory (Sherif and Hovland, 1961; Sherif, Sherif, 
and Nebergall, 1965), cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), and 
attribution theory (Schachter, 1964; Jones and Davis, 1965; Bern, 1972) 
unquestionably meet these qualifications. 
Both social judgment and attribution theories can be survey tested in 
a relatively direct manner. Present attitudes are correlated with individ­
ual and social variables to identify associations predicted by the theo­
ries. Attribution theory per se, however, is too diverse to evaluate with 
a single study. Therefore, one specific model, Tesser's (1976) attitude 
polarization theory, is employed. While not specifically identifying his 
model as attribution, Tesser clearly addresses the process by which attri­
butions about attitude objects are made. Tesser's work supports Bell et 
àl.'e (1976:316) conclusion that "[w]hen the event disconfirm[s] subjects' 
expectancies, responsibility [is] attributed to the cause about which least 
[is] known." Refining this conclusion, Tesser addresses the issues of how 
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extreme attributions are formed and how experience with an attitude object 
affects attributions. Tesser's theory is selected for this study because 
of his conceptualization of ego-defensiveness, to be discussed in the sec­
tion on attribution theory (see page 31). 
How directly cognitive dissonance theory can be tested depends, in 
part, upon whether Festinger's (1957) original conceptualization of disso­
nance is employed or more recent qualifications - (1) freedom of choice 
(Brehm and Cohen, 1959; Brock and Becker, 1967; Linder, Cooper, and Jones, 
1967), (2) public commitment (Carlsmith, Collins, and Helmreich, 1966), 
(3) self-concept involvement with the decision (Aronson, 1969), and (4) 
responsibility for the consequences (Cooper and Worchel, 1970) - are ac­
cepted. Despite these qualifications, Greenwald and Ron is (1978) support 
Festinger's initial proposition and contend that these qualifications 
change cognitive dissonance theory from the maintenance of logic-like con­
sistency to self-esteem preservation. 
Three out of four of the qualifications identified above may be rea­
sonably assumed to be fulfilled in researching the abortion controversy. 
Regardless of whether experience with abortion-related decisions is per­
sonal or secondhand, the results are public, known by the medical staff 
and/or other person if the decision is to abort, and known by more people 
if the pregnancy is carried to term. Either decision is irreversible and 
significant, involving both self-concept and responsibility. The only 
qualification not inherent in abortion decisions is freedom of choice. 
Thus, inherent characteristics of abortion decisions increase the probabil­
ity that experience with abortion decisions will result in dissonance. 
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In order to compare the predictive ability of the three theories, it 
is necessary to identify specific relationships which are germane to all 
of the theories but about which the theories make at least some different 
predictions. Relationships between the four concepts (abortion-related 
socialization, abortion-related experience, ego-involvement with abortion 
decisions, and abortion-related extremism) fulfill these requirements. 
The Alternative Theories 
The purpose of this section is to develop a set of hypotheses which 
fulfill three requirements. First, the hypotheses must be able to make 
meaningful predictions about attitude change as it relates to the abortion 
controversy. Second, the hypotheses must be based upon concepts relevant 
to all of the theories in order to provide a common test of the theories. 
Third, the hypotheses must, at some point, identify contradictory predic­
tions resulting from the theories in order to discriminate between them. 
There are six possible bivariate relationships between the four con­
cepts: 
(1) abortion-related socialization and abortion-related experience 
(2) abortion-related experience and ego-involvement with abortion 
decisions 
(3) abortion-related socialization and ego-involvement with abor­
tion decisions 
(4) abortion-related socialization and abortion-related extremism 
(5) abortion-related experience and abortion-related extremism 
(6) ego-involvement with abortion decisions and abortion-related 
extremism 
Constructing a hypothesis around each bivariate relationship results in a 
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set of hypotheses for each theory, which will provide a common test of 
the theories. Where hypotheses are contradictory, data analysis will sup­
port the hypothesis and theory which most accurately predict attitudes 
associated with the abortion controversy. Each theory will be presented 
separately, and then the results will be summarized in the form of six 
general hypotheses (Diagram 1, found on page 35» presents a summary of 
the predicted blvariate relationships for each theory). 
Social Judgment theory 
The basic tenet of social Judgment theory, as conceived by Sherif and 
Hovland (1961) and Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall (1965), Is that the or­
ganization of attitudes and circumstances promoting attitude change are 
to be understood in terms of Judgmental principles. Actually, Sherif and 
Hovland (1961) consider their work to be more of an approach to attitude 
research than a theory. Regardless, the empirical generalizations that 
serve as Sherif and Hovland's theoretical assumptions and postulates are 
presented by Klesler, Collins, and Miller (1969:241-243) in seven postu­
lates which formalize the theory. 
1. When confronted with a series of stimuli, humans tend to 
order or arrange them on a psychological dimension even 
in the absence of explicit standards (241). 
2. To the extent that explicit standards are absent, the 
ordering or judgments are less stable. That Is partic­
ularly so for stimuli that are Intermediate or between 
the extremes of a dimension (241). 
3. Both Internal factors (motivation, learning, attitude) 
and social factors (instruction, demand characteristics) 
Influence Judgments. This Influence is greater when 
objective standards for Judgments are lacking or when 
the set of stimuli do not form a well defined series 
(241). 
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4. The extreme or end stimuli serve as particularly potent 
reference points (anchors) when (a) a person has had 
little experience with an ordered stimulus series on a 
particular dimension, (b) the potential range of stimu­
lus values is unknown, or (c) no explicit standards for 
judgments are provided. 'Anchors' are strong refer­
ence points (241-242). 
5. Introducing an anchor at either end (or just beyond the 
end) of a prior series produces assimilation. Intro­
ducing a new anchor considerably distant from (beyond) 
the previous range of stimuli produces contrast (242). 
6. The respondent's own stand on an issue serves as a strong 
reference point or internal anchor for judging attitude 
statements or persuasive communications (243). 
7. When he is 'involved' in the issue, his own stand pro­
duces even stronger anchoring effects (243). 
In addition to propositions concerning attitude organization, Sherif, 
Sherif, and Nebergall (1965) identify three conceptual areas encompassing 
an attitude dimension: (1) a region of acceptable stands, which they term 
the "latitude of acceptance," (2) a region of neutral stands, or "latitude 
of noncommitment," which separates the other two latitudes, and (3) a 
region of objectionable stands, or "latitude of rejection." When individ­
uals are "involved" with an issue, their attitude dimension anchors become 
more stable, which is to say resistant to change. As initially identified 
by Sherif and Hovland (1961), involvement with an issue results in a wide 
latitude of rejection and a narrow latitude of acceptance. Sherif, Sherif, 
and Nebergall (1965) modified this position, acknowledging that an increase 
in the width of the latitude of rejection may be accounted for by a de­
crease in the width of the latitude of noncommitment, while the latitude 
of acceptance remains unchanged. However, the relative widths of the 
latitudes of rejection and acceptance do change as initially predicted. 
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As "involvement" increases, the width of the latitude of rejection in­
creases relative to the latitude of acceptance. 
In application, social judgment theory presents attitude formation 
and subsequent changes as two-step processes, the specific stability of 
which is predicted by the seven propositions. During the initial step, 
new information is judged relative to one's own position and is secondary 
to one's present beliefs, resulting in the primacy of socialization, atti­
tudes, schemata, self-image, etc. over new experiences and information. 
When individuals confront novel issues, judgment relative to self necessi­
tates the development of an attitude dimension (attitude continuum), in 
which extreme anchors are likely, as an aspect of the first step. In the 
subsequent step, individuals' attitudes change, depending upon the region 
of the attitude dimension within which the new information is perceived to 
exist. Information that falls within the latitude of acceptance may re­
sult in an attitude shift within that latitude. Information that falls 
within the latitude of noncommitment may result in an attitude shift with­
in that latitude or may promote an increase in the width of the latitude 
of acceptance to incorporate positions that had previously been encompassed 
by the latitude of noncommitment. Information that falls within the lat­
itude of rejection is discounted and does not significantly alter the lat­
itude of acceptance. 
Factors such as the credibility of the source and the degree of dis­
crepancy between one's personal position and new information qualify and 
refine social judgment theory (Aronson, Turner, and Carlsmith, 1963). 
However, in dealing with a public controversy, with diverse representatives 
20 
and varying standards of expertise, it is the basic theoretical position 
(i.e., the two-step process) which is most germane and testable. 
Concept relevance In this section, the relevance of the four is­
sue concepts for social judgment theory is identified. The specific prop­
ositions provided by Kiesler, Collins, and Miller (1969) allow considera­
ble specificity with regard to social judgment theory. 
Socialization has a significant effect upon attitudes, as identified 
by social judgment theory. According to Sherif and Hovland (1961), judg­
ments are affected by internal factors (motivation, learning, and atti­
tudes) and social factors (instructions or demand characteristics) (Prop­
osition 3). and extremes on the judgment dimension serve as strong "an­
chors" when individuals have little experience with the judgment subject 
and when no explicit criteria are provided (Proposition 4). Socialization 
establishes individuals' judgmental anchors without providing actual ex­
perience with the subject. While extremism is not an inherent consequence 
of socialization, the absence of experience increases reliance on extremes 
for judgment anchors. 
Experience may be a source of attitude change, according to social 
judgment theory; however, it does not determine attitudes. The degree of 
experience with an attitude dimension partially determines the extent to 
which individuals rely upon extreme anchors (Proposition 4). Further, 
experiences that deviate too extensively from the judgment anchors are 
discounted. Experiences that contradict past beliefs will not produce 
any attitude change, according to social judgment theory. 
According to this theory, respondents' judgments on issues are strong 
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internal anchors (Propositions 6 and 7)• When individuals' self-concepts 
are involved, personal judgments have an even stronger anchoring effect 
(Sherif and Hovland, 1961). Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall (1965:65) 
point out that involvement of the self-concept with a judgment entails 
"the individual's commitments or stands in the context of appropriate sit­
uations." When individuals' self-concepts are involved, changing a judg­
ment anchor necessitates altering their entire value system and their re­
lationships with the reference groups enforcing the judgment. 
Extremism is a consequence of limited experience and/or knowledge re­
lating to an attitude dimension (Proposition 4). Extremism may be com­
pounded by personal Involvement with an issue (Proposition 7). in which 
case the stability of the anchor, combined with the Importance of one's 
own position (Proposition 6), results in limited tolerance of positions 
other than one's own. This results In two forms of extremism; (1) dimen­
sion ends or anchors (such as, no abortion or no restrictions on abortion) 
and (2) limited tolerance of positions other than one's own (such as, ac­
cepting abortion only in cases of rape and incest), both of which are 
important for understanding the abortion controversy. The second form Is 
more useful, more consistent with the previous definition of this Issue 
concept, and does not preclude the first form of extremism. In view of 
this, the concept extremism is further differentiated In accordance with 
Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall's (1965) attitude latitudes. Extremism is 
the condition of having a relatively narrow latitude of acceptance and a 
wide latitude of rejection. While this concept Is defined In social judg­
ment theory terms, the measurement of extremism is completely consistent 
22 
with its initial, theoretically independent definition. 
Conceptual hypotheses The most significant implication of social 
judgment theory, when it is applied to abort ion-related attitudes, is that 
the effects of socialization supersede the effects of experience. Social­
ization is not related to participation in an abortion-related decision 
(Hypothesis I: abortion-related socialization and abortion-related exper­
ience are independent concepts). Further, when an abortion-related exper­
ience occurs within the latitude of rejection, it is simply discounted. 
Abortion-related experience can increase ego-involvement with abortion 
decisions, provided the experience is compatible with the latitudes of 
acceptance or noncommitment (Hypothesis II: abortion-related experience 
and ego-involvement with abortion decisions are positively related). In 
actuality, however, only experiences which do not threaten the self-con­
cept are incorporated into one's attitudes. 
Thus, experience only verifies socialization rather than maintaining 
independent relationships with other variables. The more extensive abor­
tion-related socialization is, the more important the judgment anchors be­
come as elements of the self-concept (Hypothesis III: abortion-related 
socialization and ego-involvement with abortion decisions are positively 
related). 
Since abortion-related socialization establishes judgment anchors, 
when the influence of abortion-related experience is restricted and the 
judgment dimension of abortion-related extremism is unfamiliar, socializa­
tion increases reliance upon the judgment dimension's extreme points (Hy­
pothesis IV: abortion-related socialization and abortion-related extremism 
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are positively related). 
The relationship between abortion-related experience and abortion-
related extremism is positive, not because of the relationship between 
the two concepts but because only experiences that are consistent with 
socialization are incorporated into attitudes (Hypothesis V: abortion-re­
lated experience and abortion-related extremism are positively related). 
When ego-involvement with abortion decisions is high, individuals' 
own positions serve as strong anchors, resulting in a broader latitude of 
rejection (Sherif and Hovland, I96I) (Hypothesis VI: ego-involvement with 
abortion decisions and abortion-related extremism are postively related). 
Cognitive dissonance theory 
The basic tenet of cognitive dissonance theory, as conceived by Fes-
tinger (1957:13) is that dissonance exists between two elements - X and Y -
when not-X follows from Y. Every mutually-exclusive choice and observa­
tion produces tension (dissonance) within the participant, which he/she 
will attempt to reduce by: (1) changing a cognitive element related to 
his/her behavior (either changing behavior or distorting the cognitive 
element), (2) changing a cognitive element related to the environment 
(either changing or distorting the environmental element), or (3) adding 
new cognitive elements. 
As Greenwald and Ronis (1978) point out, Festinger's initial theory 
made a claim about a fundamental characteristic of human cognizance. This 
conceptualization of cognitive dissonance results in distinct predictions 
concerning the four issue concepts. First, socialization is irrelevant to 
the experiencing of dissonance. Dissonance is a manifestation of logic 
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relationships between phenomena. Second, experience includes cognition 
and/or behavior. Dissonance exists within individuals as long as they are 
cognizant of a logically-contradictory relationship. For example, rain 
on a sunny day is a dissonant experience. Third, ego-involvement is also 
unrelated to experiencing dissonance. Finally, extremism is ostensively 
a nominal-level concept. When a logically-exclusive relationship exists, 
individuals are predicted to seek support for their choice (where this is 
relevant), in part by rejecting other alternatives. Dissonance is con­
ceptually ordinal to the degree that some issues may require greater dis­
tortion, the addition of more new cognitive elements, or the rejection of 
more alternatives than do other issues. This conceptualization of cogni­
tive dissonance provides truly unique predictions and is clearly applica­
ble anytime the well-being of the fetus and pregnant woman are at odds. 
However, cognitive dissonance theory, as it is currently accepted, 
has significantly diverged from Festinger's original conceptualization. 
Rather than dissonance theory identifying a fundamental characteristic of 
human cognizance, the current version identifies dissonance as a product 
of specific personal and situational factors. According to the qualified 
theory, dissonance will occur only when: (1) individuals have freedom of 
choice in selecting the behavior they will enact (Brehm and Cohen, 1959; 
Brock and Becker, 1967; Linder, Cooper, and Jones, 1967), (2) individuals 
make a public commitment to a course of action (Carlsmith, Collins, and 
Helmreich, 1966), (3) individuals' self-concepts are involved with the 
decision (Aronson, 1969), and (4) Individuals are responsible for the 
consequences of their behavior (Cooper and Worchel, 1970). It is in 
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respect to these qualifications that the four issue concepts are relevant. 
Concept relevance Socialization provides standards against which 
individuals evaluate their behavior. 
When a person performs an act that goes counter to his pre­
vious attitudes, beliefs, and behavior, and he cannot at­
tribute the act to external or environmental forces, he 
lacks sufficient justification for his behavior and disso­
nance is aroused (Tedeschi and Lindskold, 1976:213). 
The recognition of unexplainable contradictions between past behaviors, 
along with socialization, and present behavior arouses dissonance. Thus, 
while socialization does not directly affect attitude change, it is a 
necessary precondition and source of motivation for change in a dissonant 
situation. 
For cognitive dissonance theory, experience is a critical concept. 
In essence, cognitive dissonance theory is concerned with how behavior 
affects attitudes. Individuals act and then evaluate the act to determine 
if it is consistent with their past behavior and expectations. If the 
act is consistent, it is reinforcing. If the act is inconsistent and can­
not be justified, dissonance is aroused. 
The requirement of public commitment for the arousal of dissonance is 
an implicit acknowledgement of the ego-involvement nature of cognitive 
dissonance. Aronson (1969:27) writes: 
...at the very heart of dissonance theory...we are not 
dealing with any two cognitions; rather, we are usually 
dealing with the self-concept and cognitions about some 
behavior. If dissonance exists, it is because the indi­
vidual's behavior is inconsistent with his self-concept. 
Similarly, Greenwald and Ronis (1978) write that the assumption that dis­
sonance is aroused only when personal responsibility exists makes it 
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difficult to distinguish dissonance reduction from ego-defense. Further, 
if the nature or consequences of experience are manipulated to be consis­
tent with the self-concept structure, accepting a perception that changes 
the self-concept in a socially-approved direction is nearly as difficult 
as accepting a socially-disapproved perception. According to Greenwald 
and Ronis (1978:55)» cognitive dissonance theory "seems now to be focused 
on cognitive changes occurring in the service of ego-defense, or self-
esteem maintenance, rather than in the interest of preserving psychological 
consistency." To the degree that this is accurate, ego-involvement moti­
vates individuals to protect themselves from experiences that are incon­
sistent with their self-concept structures. 
Extremism is a consequence of the degree to which individuals' self-
concepts are involved with a dissonant situation. When individuals select 
courses of action which contradict previously important attitudes and be­
liefs without sufficient justification, their self-concepts are threatened 
more extensively than when less significant attitudes and beliefs are in­
volved. When individuals consider an issue important, a dissonance-evok­
ing act requires extensive manipulation of cognitive elements to reduce 
the tension. The greater the dissonance, the more likely individuals will 
be to reject any alternatives, in essence, the greater the dissonance, 
the narrower the latitudes of acceptance and noncommitment and the wider 
the latitude of rejection. 
Conceptual hypotheses Festinger (1957) identifies dissonance (and 
all subsequent dissonance-reducing activity) as a consequence of behavior. 
Dissonance is aroused not by choosing but by the experience of having made 
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a choice which must be endured. Socialization, even when it addresses 
the decision subject, is not related to the occurrence of a dissonance-
arousing decision (Hypothesis I: abortion-related socialization and abor­
tion-related experience are independent concepts). 
Once the dissonance-arousing experience has occurred, however, both 
abort ion-related socialization and ego-involvement with the abortion de­
cision become important factors. Whatever the decision, dissonance re­
flects an inconsistency between behavior and self-concept, increasing ego-
involvement with dissonance reduction (Hypothesis II: abortion-related 
experience and ego-involvement with abortion decisions are positively re­
lated) . 
Abortion-related socialization enables the Identification of behav­
ior-induced inconsistency by establishing the self-concept against which 
the seriousness of the Inconsistency and sufficiency of the justification 
are evaluated. The more extensive abortion-related socialization Is, the 
more important ego-involvement with abortion decisions becomes In order to 
preserve the self-concept (Hypothesis III: abortion-related socialization 
and ego-Involvement with abortion decisions are positively related). 
Further, abort ion-related socialization minimizes the latitude of 
noncommltment. Increasing abortion-related extremism (Hypothesis IV: abor­
tion-related socialization and abortion-related extremism are positively 
related). 
The relationships between abortion-related socialization and both 
ego-involvement and extremism are peripheral Issues for cognitive disso­
nance theory. The primary relationship is between abortion-related 
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experience and attitudes, specifically abort ion-related extremism. When 
the choice made is an important one, as it is with abortion, the degree of 
dissonance experienced increases (Festinger, 1957; Cooper and Worchel, 
1970). Consequently, the attitudes required to reduce dissonance are spe­
cifically those that support the dissonance-inducing behavior. The lati­
tude of rejection increases as attitudes that do not support the behavior 
are excluded, increasing abortion-related extremism (Hypothesis V: abor­
tion-related experience and abortion-related extremism are positively re­
lated) . 
Abort ion-related extremism is further supported by ego-involvement 
with abortion decisions. As the self-concept becomes more involved with 
attitudes, the range of conditions that supports self-esteem becomes more 
limited, increasing extremism (Hypothesis VI: ego-involvement with abor­
tion decisions and abort ion-related extremism are positively related). 
This relationship is also peripheral to the primary issue, the relationship 
between experience and attitudes. 
Attribution theory 
Heider's (1958) naive analysis of action is the initial statement of 
attribution theory. Heider contends that, like scientists, people seek 
to accurately identify the cause of events which they confront. Jones and 
Davis (1965) refine attribution theory by combining attributions concern­
ing intent and disposition to allow individuals to make dispositional in­
ferences about the behavior of others. Bem (1965, 1967) extends attribu­
tion theory to include the process whereby individuals infer their own in­
ternal states. According to Bem, when individuals have limited or 
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ambiguous internal cues explaining an act, they, like outsiders making at­
tributions concerning others, must analyze both the situation and their 
past behavior to determine the cause of the act. Kelley (1967) integrates 
self and other attributions into a single model, according to which indi­
viduals identify causation employing a naive analysis of variance tech­
nique. Kelley writes that a valid attribution of cause is possible when: 
(1) the event is associated distinctly with the cause, (2) there is con­
sensus concerning the attribution made to the cause, and (3) the attri­
bution is consistent over time. 
Research by Bell et al, (1976) focuses on identifying the basis where­
by individuals attribute responsibility for an act to actors or situations. 
Bell et al. found that, particularly when a behavior was unexpected, attri­
butions of responsibility were made to the source (actor or situation) 
about which least was known. By attributing the cause of unexpected be­
havior to the least-known source, individuals are able to make the fewest 
changes in cognitive linkages while explaining the event. At the same 
time, the attribution fulfills explanatory, predictive, and egocentric 
functions for the individuals involved (Forsyth, 1980). Attributions pro­
vide an understanding of the social world and enable prediction of the 
probability of similar events. Attributions also meet self-needs, includ­
ing ego-defense. 
According to Tesser's (1976) attitude polarization theory, ambiguous 
knowledge of a phenomenon allows individuals to make more extreme attribu­
tions concerning their evaluation of the phenomenon. Tesser and Cowan 
(1975) note that, when experience with a phenomenon itself is prevented. 
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thought concerning that phenomenon increases the extremism of evaluations 
of the phenomenon through the addition of cognitions consistent with the 
individual's initial perception. Thus, individuals' attributions of their 
personal affect toward a phenomenon serve to support their self-image by 
supporting their initial judgment and providing a sense of knowledge and 
control concerning the social situation. 
Tesser concludes that when individuals have experience with a phe­
nomenon, they will adopt less extreme responses. Experience provides ve-
atity constraints (Tesser, 1976:184), which include knowledge of both 
costs and rewards associated with the phenomenon. Consequently, with ex­
perience, individuals gain cognitions which both support and contradict 
their initial evaluations. They are no longer able to attribute to the 
phenomenon those characteristics which inappropriately support their bi­
ases. Further, they are no longer able to attribute to the phenomenon 
(environment) properties or benefits which one-sidedly cause them to un­
reservedly like or dislike the phenomenon. The overall effect of exper­
ience is to moderate the intensity of an individual's response toward a 
phenomenon. 
A comparison of the three theories in this study shows that all are 
characterized by a concentration on ego-defensive processes. Experience, 
especially experience which contradicts one's attitudes, is conceptualized 
as ego-threatening, and processes by which experiences may be discounted, 
manipulated, or misattributed are identified. This conception of experi­
ence may accurately account for individuals' behavior, but the theories 
do not conceptualize alternative processes whereby experience may 
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significantly and abruptly expand individuals' attitudes and alter their 
self-concepts. Ego-defensive processes preserve internal correspondence 
by ignoring the issue of external correspondence. Tesser presents an 
alternative conceptualization. Asserting that individuals also have a 
strong need for external correspondence, Tesser (1976:18'») writes: 
A number of theorists (e.g., Festinger, 1954; Byrne and 
Clore, 1967; White, 1959) have argued that the human or­
ganism has a strong need to have an accurate and correct 
picture of the world. To satisfy this need, he will 
'test reality' in an attempt to get feedback concerning 
the validity of his beliefs. While the result of this 
'reality test' or interaction with the environment is 
partially determined by one's preconceptions (i.e., as­
similation), there is a strong tendency toward adjust­
ing one's cognitions so that they provide a more ve­
ridical reflection of that environment (i.e., accommoda­
tion) . 
For Tesser's attribution theory, then, ego-involvement provides the moti­
vation to."test reality" and increase external correspondence. Rather than 
being ego-defensive, ego-involvement is ego-expansive, provided that real­
ity constraints (principally experience with the attitude object) are 
present. 
Concept relevance Socialization, particularly in the absence of 
experience with a phenomenon (i.e., in the absence of reality constraints), 
has a direct effect on attitudes, according to Tesser's attribution theory. 
If affect and cognitions are related and thought tends 
to make cognitions more consistent with the Initial af­
fect, it follows that (a) when an individual is cut off 
from external information concerning some attitude ob­
ject, his attitude (i.e., affect/evaluation) toward that 
object will tend toward greater polarization given that 
he thinks about the attitude object (Tesser and Conlee, 
1975:262) [Italics in original]. 
When individuals lack experience with a phenomenon, socialization serves 
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both to establish their initial affect and to force continued thought 
concerning the phenomenon. The effect is to polarize attitudes toward 
the extremes of the socialization content. In their conception of the ef­
fect of socialization in the absence of experience, attribution theory and 
social judgment theory are very compatible. 
Experience provides reality constraints, according to attribution 
theory. To develop an accurate picture of the world, individuals "will 
'test reality' in an attempt to get feedback concerning the validity of 
[their] beliefs" (Tesser, 1976:184). 
Therefore, if thought does induce changes in cognitions 
and those changes are subject to reality test, then any 
changes in cognitions which are not veridical reflections 
of the attitude object will not be retained. In short, 
'reality constraints' may limit the extent to which 
thought results in a more consistent set of cognitions 
and, therefore, the extent to which attitudes will polar­
ize (Tesser, 1976:184). 
According to attribution theory, experience will result in a specific form 
of attitude change, the reduction of polarization. This prediction of the 
effect of experience contradicts the predictions of social judgment theory 
and cognitive dissonance theory. 
In regard to ego-Involvement, evidence from research which tests at­
tributions supports the position that individuals make self-serving attri­
butions which protect their self-esteem (Arkin, Gleason, and Johnston, 
1976; Miller, 1976; Snyder, Stephan, and Rosenfield, 1976; Bradley, 1978). 
In contrast to cognitive dissonance and social judgment theories, attri­
bution theory predicts that shifting an ego-defensive attribution would 
not necessarily require shifting the entire self-concept structure. In 
the absence of overriding factors, however, individuals' attributions 
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reinforce initial attitudes by supporting their self-concept structures, 
resulting in increased extremism. 
According to Tesser (1976), extremism is a consequence of limited in­
volvement with a phenomenon. Unambiguous involvement with a phenomenon 
enables individuals to identify both costs and rewards with which It Is 
associated. When experience with a phenomenon is limited or nonexistent, 
however, socialization is the primary source of attitude extremism. Be­
cause socialization involves abstract information, it contains only se­
lected characteristics of the phenomenon and is vulnerable to bias and 
distortion, whether Intentional or not. Awareness of this bias, which may 
arise from experience with the phenomenon. Is more difficult to achieve 
when empirical experience is absent or restricted. 
While the concept extremism is Identical for the three theories, 
Tesser's (1976) explanation of the cause of extremism sharply contrasts 
with both social judgment and cognitive dissonance theory explanations. 
For social judgment and cognitive dissonance theories, extremism is an 
ego-defensive justification of self-concept and previous behavior. Accord­
ing to Tesser, extremism is a consequence of Insufficient experience with 
a phenomenon. 
Conceptual hypotheses According to Tesser's (1976) theory, exper­
ience has two unique properties: (1) it supersedes the influence of social­
ization and (2) it reduces extremism. Abortion-related socialization Is 
not associated with abort Ion-related experience (Hypothesis I: abortion-
related socialization and abortion-related experience are independent con­
cepts) . 
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Abortion-related experience is conceptualized as a source of reality 
constraints, which, as a consequence of increasing awareness of both costs 
and benefits for each alternative, moderates abortion-related extremism 
(Hypothesis V: abortion-related experience and abortion-related extremism 
are inversely related). 
According to Tesser (1976), abortion-related experience reduces ex­
tremism because individuals seek an accurate picture of the world. Concern 
for external correspondence rather than ego-defense results in abortion-
related experience decreasing respondents' desire to have their personal 
attitudes established as the normative standard (Hypothesis II: abortion-
related experience and ego-involvement with abortion decisions are in­
versely related). 
Abortion-related socialization, because it is unbounded by reality 
constraints, increases respondents' willingness to have their personal 
attitudes become normative (Hypothesis III: abortion-related socialization 
and ego-involvement with abortion decisions are positively related). 
Similarly, the absence of reality constraints on abortion-related 
socialization increases abortion-related extremism (Hypothesis IV: abor­
tion-related socialization and abortion-related extremism are positively 
related). 
Ego-involvement with abortion decisions increases individuals' de­
sire for external correspondence, resulting in a reduction In abortion-
related extremism (Hypothesis VI: ego-involvement with abortion decisions 
and abortion-related extremism are inversely related). 
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The General Hypotheses 
The predicted bivariate relationships for each theory are summarized 
In Diagram I. The hypotheses for the six bivariate relationships are 
Bivariate Cognitive 
Relationship Social.Judgment Dissonance Attribution 
(1) Soc. Exp. Soc. Exp. Soc. Exp. 
(2) Exp.- Ego. Exp.— — Ego. Exp.— —Ego. 
(3) Soc.— Ego. Soc.— — Ego. Soc.— — Ego. 
(4) Soc.- Ext. Soc .— — Ext. Soc.— — Ext. 
(5) Exp.- Ext. Exp.— — Ext. Exp.--
(6) Ego.- Ext. Ego.— — Ext. 
Soc. = abortion-related socialization 
Exp. = abortion-related experience 
Ego. = ego-Involvement with abortion decisions 
Ext. = abortion-related extremism 
= an Inverse relationship between concepts 
= a direct relationship between concepts 
Diagram 1. Summary of the bivariate relationships for social judgment, 
cognitive dissonance, and attribution theories 
summarized in general hypotheses I through VI. 
Hypothesis I is that abortion-related socialization and abortion-re­
lated experience are Independent concepts. All three theories make this 
prediction. 
Hypothesis II Is that abortion-related experience and ego-involvement 
with abortion decisions are positively related. Attribution theory differs 
from social judgment and cognitive dissonance theories, hypothesizing an 
inverse relationship between these two concepts. 
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Hypothesis III is that abortion-related socialization and ego-involve-
ment with abortion decisions are positively related. All three theories 
make this prediction. 
Hypothesis IV is that abortion-related socialization and abort.ion-
related extremism are positively related. Again, all three theories make 
this prediction. 
Hypothesis V is that abortion-related experience and abortion-related 
extremism are positively related. Attribution theory differs from social 
judgment and cognitive dissonance theories, hypothesizing an inverse rela­
tionship between these two concepts. 
Hypothesis VI is that ego-involvement with abortion decisions and 
abortion-related extremism are positively related. Attribution theory 
again differs from social judgment and cognitive dissonance theories, hy­
pothesizing an inverse relationship between the two concepts. 
The three theories selected for study differ significantly in their 
explanations of attitude change. These theories allow hypotheses to be 
formed based upon a common set of bivariate relationships, enabling a com­
parative test of the theories. The limitation on this theory comparison 
is that social judgment and cognitive dissonance theories are indistin­
guishable based upon tests of the bivariate relationships because they 
predict the same relationships, although for distinct reasons. 
Belief and Knowledge Systems 
There is a second area of concern in this study which, while ancillary 
to testing the theories, is critical for evaluating both the significance 
of any support for the theories and the abortion controversy per se. !n 
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essence, the concern is whether the abortion controversy and resultant at­
titudes have a social structure that is distinct from the logical rela­
tionships germane to the attitude theories. Social judgment, cognitive 
dissonance, and attribution theories explain individual attitude varia­
tion. Are there social properties In the abortion controversy which ex­
plain equally significant variations in attitude extremism? 
Works by Borhek and Curtis (1975) and Wilier (1971) identify the in­
stitutional characteristics and internal structure of cognitive systems 
respectively. Both the institutional characteristics and internal struc­
ture of abortion-related cognitions enhance understanding of the altera­
tion or mobilization of abortion issues and their advocates to create the 
abortion controversy. 
Belief systems 
Traditional attitude theories, for example, social Judgment and cog­
nitive dissonance, predominantly stress Isolated and individualized cog­
nitive processes. The existence of individuals' cognitions as social con­
structs and the utility of those constructs for achieving social organiza­
tions' purposes is underdeveloped. 
The central problem is not whether ideas are socially 
conditioned, but how humans come to be so firmly 
attached to them and how that attachment functions in 
social organization (Borhek and Curtis, I975:vlii). 
Borhek and Curtis offer an alternative approach to attitudes, which 
concentrates on the social characteristics of cognitive constructs. These 
authors Identify systems of beliefs that are external to Individuals who 
come to adopt the systems' content. According to Borhek and Curtis (1975: 
5), "[a] belief system is a set of related ideas (learned and shared) 
38 
which has some permanence, and to which individuals and/or groups exhibit 
some commitment." The theoretic foundation for belief systems is based 
upon the following five general propositions offered by Borhek and Curtis 
(1975:ix): 
1. Belief systems are cultural in nature. Belief is an 
aggregate phenomenon that requires explanation in ag­
gregate terms. 
2. Belief systems exist in two social contexts, a con­
text of meaning and a context of social organization; 
unless both of the contexts are understood, beliefs 
are not intel1igible. 
3. The explanation for the persistence of belief systems 
is that people become and remain committed to them, 
but for commitment to persist the belief must be 
validated. 
4. The explanation for the rise and change of belief 
systems lies partly in the fact that they have util­
ity in group adaptation to strain and disorder but 
also partly in the fact that, 
5. Although belief systems are preeminently social 
facts (as emphasized in the above four propositions), 
they have nonsocial aspects, such as internal logic, 
that drive them in given directions regardless of 
the wishes of the believers. 
Borhek and Curtis (1975:6) note that belief systems are not contained 
by the believer; that is, believers are, in fact, unlikely to know more 
than a small portion of a belief system and adopt the remainder (knowingly 
or unknowingly) on faith. This is a consequence of both the logic identi­
fied in the fifth proposition and the adoption or cooptation of elements 
of one belief system by a second belief system for alternate purposes. For 
example, in the area of law, few people have knowledge of the totality of 
the belief system involved. Yet, when an individual employs some elements 
of this belief system, because those beliefs come from larger systems and 
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are shared by others, these elements provide a sense of social legitimacy 
that totally autonomous action could not. 
Know!edge systems 
By expanding the analysis from simply abortion issues and individuals' 
attitudes to the abortion controversy and belief systems, social processes 
and consequences become central concerns. Knowledge systems further the 
identification of social processes, as well as philosophical concerns, 
within the abortion controversy. 
Individuals' cognitions do not require high reliability and validity. 
A variety of perceptual and psychological defenses satisfactorily assure 
the individual of his or her accuracy. However, in social interaction and 
coordinated behavior, reliability and validity do need to be established. 
A variety of factors may satisfactorily establish reliability and validity 
for specific individuals. The specific factors depend, in part, upon the 
extent to which the application of individuals' cognitions constrains 
others' behavior. (This issue is covered in greater detail in the section 
entitled "Justifications of belief system consequences.") Knowledge sys­
tems are used to identify the structure and basis for interpersonal vali­
dation of cognitive systems. 
Wilier (1971) identifies three knowledge systems relevant for social 
behavior: (1) magical, (2) religious, and (3) scientific. Magical knowl­
edge systems rely solely upon relationships between empirical variables. 
Religious knowledge systems rely solely upon logical relationships between 
theoretic concepts and then abstraction of the results to the explanation 
of empirical events, which are treated as discrete phenomena. Scientific 
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knowledge systems require relationships between empirical variables and 
logical relationships between theoretic concepts, in which the respective 
variables and concepts are complementary and isomorphic. 
lincnùLedge System: 
Magical Religious Scientific 
Comeotive Levels : 
Theoretic a---->b a<--->b 1 1 1 1 1 1 
* 
1 1 1 1 
V V 
Observational A---->B B A<—-*B 
Diagram 2. Combinations of types of thought connections in three types 
of knowledge systems (Wilier, 1971:25) 
Two principal distinctions among the three knowledge systems involve: 
(1) the significance of empirical data and (2) how the knowledge system 
can be falsified. A magical knowledge system is totally dependent upon 
and falsified by empirical data. A magical knowledge system does not have 
a theoretic structure and, consequently, is based on "what works." By 
contrast, a religious knowledge system is totally dependent upon the logi­
cal relationship between concepts and is, thus, falsifiable only by logical 
fallacy. A religious knowledge system does not have an empirical struc­
ture; theoretic conclusions are used to evaluate discrete empirical phe­
nomena. It is important to acknowledge that many religious groups and 
individuals motivated by religious concerns rely upon empirical research 
in developing their agenda. Clearly, people may use different knowledge 
systems in different circumstances; further, religious knowledge systems 
are not synonymous with religiously-motivated behavior.' An ideology of 
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racial supremacy, devoid of religious tenets, may, nonetheless, fulfill 
all of the structural requirements of a religious knowledge system. A 
scientific knowledge system incorporates both empirical and theoretic 
structures and is falsified if the empirical test fails to support the 
theoretic logic. In addition, the failure of the concepts and variables 
to be isomorphic or the existence of a logical fallacy at the theoretic 
level compromises (if not invalidates) the scientific knowledge system. 
A third distinction among the knowledge systems concerns power and 
its subsequent social organization implications, in a magical knowledge 
system, power is a quantity in people and the world and is demonstrated 
by the ability to obtain observable results (Wilier, 1971:34). In a sci­
entific knowledge system, on the other hand, power resides in the inter­
action between empirical data and theoretic prediction; it is a method 
property and not an attribute of people or objects (Wilier, 1971:37). In 
a scientific knowledge system, power is accessible to anyone able to em­
ploy the system. Finally, in a religious knowledge system, the relation­
ship between individuals and power is unique because individuals serve as 
a medium through which power is manifested. 
Power in a religious system is not held by individuals; 
they conceive of themselves as powerless and all power is 
thought to reside in a power-concept at the theoretic level .... 
It is not power which distinguishes individuals in a re­
ligious system, but cxuthorityg which is simply a position 
held by virtue of a particular relationship of an indi­
vidual to the theology. Authority may be gained through 
knowledge of the theology or through intellectual revela­
tion from the power-concept; but it may not be gained 
through empirical evidence or success in action (Wilier, 
1971:36) [italics in original]. 
The transition from individual to social cognitive systems 
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incorporates these issues of empirical data, falsifiability, and power. 
As individuals' cognitive systems come to be shared by other people, the 
development of reliable support, defenses to challenges of validity, and 
the determination of system representatives and authorities are social 
consequences. Regardless of the content of the cognitive system, the ex­
tension from individual cognition to belief and knowledge systems contrib­
utes to understanding the consequences of cognitions' social organization. 
General Factors that Structure the Abortion Controversy 
In Kuhn's (1970) analysis, new scientific discoveries and innova­
tions become belief elements (specific components of a belief system) only 
through social processes. Cognitions that alter an existing belief system 
also alter the encompassing social system. Accordingly, individuals who 
benefit from the existing social system may be expected to oppose such new 
and disruptive cognitions. In contrast, cognitions that support existing 
belief and social systems (i.e., that expand upon or provide greater de­
tail about the system) are likely to be readily accepted as relevant be­
lief system elements. Kuhn's focus in on the process whereby cognitions 
become elements of scientific knowledge-structured belief systems, scien­
tific belief systems for short. (Similarly, a religious knowledge-struc-
tured belief system is identified as a religious belief system; the knowl­
edge system identifies the structure of the cognitive organization, and 
the belief system Identifies the structure of the content.) There is no 
self-evident reason for assuming that threatened alterations to other be­
lief systems are reacted to differently or that they are somehow Isolated 
from social processes. Specific issues are likely to be dominated by a 
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single form of knowledge-belief system. This is particularly true in 
general society, where subtleties of belief elements and methodology are 
not shared or accepted, in spite of the fact that elements relevant to 
the issue are provided by each of the knowledge-belief systems. 
Religious belief systems 
A standard issue in abortion research (see Bowers and Weaver, 1979; 
Ebaugh and Haney, 1980; Finlay, 1981; Tedrow and Mahoney, 1979) is the ef­
fect of religion on individuals' attitudes. A secondary issue in this 
dissertation, then, is the possibility that the abortion controversy is 
significantly structured by religious belief systems. Religious varia­
bles, such as present church membership, childhood church membership, 
church attendance, and importance of religion, are predicted to be posi­
tively related to anti-abortion beliefs. The strength of this associa­
tion, however, is predicted to be moderate because some individuals also 
strongly motivated by religion are predicted to support pro-abortion 
rights beliefs. These relationship predictions are predicated on two 
assumptions. The first assumption is that anti-abortion and pro-abortion 
rights beliefs (along with their respective belief systems) are not polar 
opposites on a single continuum. The second assumption is that, while re­
ligious belief systems provide the structure of the controversy, they do 
not provide the content, which may be determined by associated issues. 
For example, adherents of a religious belief system may accept some sci­
entific evidence on abortion issues, while excluding scientific evidence 
from other issues which are strictly identified as part of religious 
system doctrine. 
The absence of scientific analysis Three principal arguments pro­
vide theoretic support for the contention that the abortion controversy is 
predominantly structured by religious belief systems. First, none of the 
groups involved in the abortion controversy has developed a scientific 
model of its beliefs, to be tested and rejected if unsupported. Such test 
ing is possible on some belief elements but is not performed, or, where 
such evidence exists, is not accepted as discrediting the group's initial 
position. Realistically, the evidence science is capable of providing is 
often insufficient for resolving controversies or is irrelevant to more 
human issues. This is not to say that science is irrelevant. While sci­
ence cannot resolve all problems, it can clarify issues and predict the 
consequences of proposed solutions, whatever their source. For example, 
biological life (or life processes) exist from the instant of conception, 
but is biological life (even of a potential person) synonymous with human 
life? What distinctions are to be made between the absence of brain ac­
tivity during the first seven weeks of embryonic development (Morrow, 
1977) and the absence of such activity in cases of brain death where bio­
logical life is prolonged using a respirator? Hilton (I98O) identifies 
the importance of providing answers to questions outside the domain of 
science per se. 
By the end of this century, the technology will have grown 
so much that eighty percent of all our dying will be elec­
tive. I'm not talking about suicide, I'm talking about 
ending treatment for terminally ill people. The technology 
will have grown so much that eighty percent of us will be 
lying there with these machines pumping and slushing away, 
and somebody will have to take an active step, will have to 
say this has gone far enough.... We're going to have to 
decide how you weigh the quality of life against the sanc­
tity of life (Hilton, I98O). 
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Technological innovations are creating implementation decisions that 
necessitate ethical judgments which have no precedent. Technological de­
velopments are forcing society to create new definitions of human death 
that are removed from biological processes alone. The implications for 
medical, legal, social, and human costs of failing to develop or identify 
technologically-cognizant ethics are awesome in their complexity. When 
scientific issues and debate are deemphasized, the complexity of analysis 
is minimized, and moral positions dominate substantive beliefs (the actual 
belief system's content) and prescriptions/proscriptions, which identify 
what is wrong and what is to be done (Borhek and Curtis, 1975). This dis­
plays the typical believer's knowledge most favorably. 
The individual believer is usually better able to verbalize 
substantive beliefs than he îs values, criteria, logical 
principles, or orientation [of the belief system], which 
are apt to be the unquestioned bases from which he proceeds 
(Borhek and Curtis, 1975:12). 
Social movement characteristics The second argument supporting 
the contention that the abortion controversy is structured predominantly 
by religious belief systems involves the processes whereby individuals' 
cognitions and motivations are relegated, coopted, or altered when indi­
viduals form coalitions. However beliefs may motivate, predispose, or in­
fluence behavior, they do not act in and of themselves. Beliefs become 
sociological Issues when they become sufficiently dispersed and organized 
to make the implementation of their substantive prescriptions and proscrip­
tions possible (and also when they are perpetuated by socialization or in­
stitutionalized in social structures). 
Pro-abortion rights and anti-abortion groups have sequentially sought 
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to alter the legal regulation of abortion. The National Abortion Rights 
Action League supported court challenges to abortion legislation, chal­
lenges which ultimately led to the Supreme Court's landmark decision in 
Roe V. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1972). Since that time, anti-abortion groups 
and coalitions have employed executive, legislative, and judicial channels 
in an effort to have abortions prohibited. 
The effort to legislate the behavior of all individuals, rather than 
to simply regulate their own membership, identifies factions as social 
movements rather than cults or sociable groups (Turner and Killian, 1972: 
246-247). Factions in the abortion controversy can be seen as "a collec­
tivity acting with some continuity to promote or resist a change In the 
society or group of which it is a part" (Turner and Killian, 1972:246). 
Approaches to enacting substantive beliefs and flexibility with respect to 
individual variations cocerning beliefs vary depending upon the institu­
tionalization of a belief system (Borhek and Curtis, 1975). Institution­
alized belief systems are more pragmatic, the system agents more apt to 
consider the cost to membership support of inflexibly enforcing beliefs. 
Agents of institutionalized belief systems will support more ambiguous 
goals, accepting complexity, diffused support, and compromise. "The or­
ganization and the institutional context are seen as too valuable to be 
thrown away for matters of principle" (Borhek and Curtis, 1975:75). By 
contrast, belief systems that have emerged around specific issues and are, 
at present, unlnstitutionalized are prone to hostility and confrontation 
with other belief systems, as well as to revolutionary change. 
On the other hand, extreme positions are natural outcomes 
of the structure of the unlnstitutionalized cult where 
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polarization of issues provides simplicity and where intense 
interaction under conditions of isolation makes for extreme 
and idiosyncratic perspectives.... In summary, the belief 
systems associated with uninstitutionalized cults involve 
faith that a single, simple solution (or grandiose avoid­
ance of the problem) will immediately solve everything 
(Borhek and Curtis, 1975:75). 
The social organization that develops to support and enact the agenda 
of an uninstitutionalized belief system is markedly similar to that of a 
grassroots social movement. Consequently, Turner and Killian's (1972) 
four characteristics of grassroots movements identify significant belief 
system organization properties. First, it is not the most deprived groups 
that produce social movements; the group must have some expectation of suc­
cess (Turner and Killian, 1972:247). Accordingly, members of anti-abor­
tion and pro-abortion rights groups are not predicted to be highly alien­
ated. Second, the goals of the social movement may be removed from the 
actual source of discontent (1972:248). While alienation is predicted to 
be uncorrelated with beliefs on abortion, abortion beliefs are predicted 
to be correlated with concerns that are less politically amenable than 
abortion legislation, for example, "protection" of the "traditional" fami­
ly. Divergence between individuals' personal cognitions and goals and the 
belief system's goals can also result from the formation of coalitions for 
greater influence and the dictates of internal logic. Belief systems 
serve as focal points for their supporters, who, like interest groups, 
...consider a standing issue of such general and sustained 
importance that they assimilate current issues to this 
issue, rather than treating each question as unique (Tur­
ner and Killian, 1972:204). 
Religious belief systems' inner logic can be expanded by forming new logi­
cal connections; however, the empirical referents are Increasingly likely 
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to contain mutually-exclusive concerns and consequences as the size and 
complexity of the system increases. Third, strong emotions may lead to 
demands for immediate and dramatic actions, even if those actions hinder 
the development of the organization or are ineffective (1972:249). More 
important than the strength of the supporters' emotions is the effective­
ness of the movement's organization. Strong emotional response has sur­
rounded the abortion controversy constantly; nonetheless, the visibility 
and effectiveness of the factions have varied. Mass campaigning and com­
puter fund-raising/lobbying technologies are examples of organizational 
properties that underlie the abortion controversy. Fourth, "...support 
of the movement by groups already possessing great power may have a more 
important effect than the rise and decline of grass-roots support..." 
(Turner and Killian, 1972:250). 
Grassroots movement properties are factors that affect the content 
of the abortion controversy. In addition, grassroots movement properties 
affect the intensity of confrontation and the possibility of compromise. 
In total, these are factors whereby individuals' cognitions and goals may 
be altered, coopted, or relegated during the development of social organi­
zations. Each person's specific intents are likely to be altered in the 
process of organizing to achieve social-political effectiveness. 
Justifications of belief system consequences The third argument 
supporting the contention that the abortion controversy is structured pri­
marily by religious belief systems addresses concerns that individuals must 
satisfy in order to support the behavioral consequences of enforcing a be­
lief system's substantive beliefs, prescriptions, and proscriptions. 
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Belief systems contain elements whose specific purpose is to provide the 
necessary justification. In addition to values and goals, criteria of 
validity support the behavioral consequences. 
According to what criteria is the determination of the 
validity of a statement to be made?... Outside of math­
ematics one must often rely on concrete level criteria 
(which usually come down to a matter of consensus with­
in some authoritative group) or simply keep an open 
mind concerning the validity of a cultural product (Bor-
hek and Curtis, 1975:10). 
In essence, Borhek and Curtis argue that the criteria of validity are 
typically established through social comparison (Asch, 1956; Festinger, 
1950, 1954; Moscovici and Zavalloni, 1969; Moscovici, Zavalloni, and Wein­
berger, 1972). Among a belief system's supporters (by definition, a group 
formed around shared issues), cohesive in-group identification and concur­
rence-seeking may easily dominate. This may allow critical think'ù^ to be 
replaced by "groupthink" (Janis, 1971). Direct pressures on dissenting 
individuals, an unquestioned belief in the Inherent morality of the group, 
"the emergence of self-appointed mind guards within the group," and "shared 
efforts to construct rationalizations in order to be able to ignore warn­
ings and other forms of negative feedback" are symptomatic of groupthink 
in an organization (Janis, 1971:80). Individuals may have few doubts 
about the external reality of a phenomenon; the issue for them is to de­
termine the internal reality of the group (Moscovici and Faucheux, 1972). 
Typically, the external reality is either-or (e.g., the question of life 
in the abortion controversy), but internal reality (how to relate to the 
external reality) may be negotiated (Moscovici and Nemeth, 1974). It is 
possible, however, that belief systems will be nonnegotiable. While this 
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provides the security of absolute standards for belief system adherents, 
it also forces confrontation (rather than negotiation) with nonadherents. 
The possibility of such inflexibility is greater for religious belief 
systems, which are based upon theoretic logic (the premises of which are 
either accepted or rejected) and which exclude empirical tests of the 
logic. 
The previous discussion identifies relevant social-psychological 
processes, but does not provide insight into the justification of belief 
system agenda that coerce the general public's, as well as members', be­
havior. What assures a belief system's members and agents that they have 
the knowledge and authority to impose their beliefs on nonmembers? Bor-
hek and Curtis (1975) identify a belief system element - perspective -
that provides such justification, in part through polarizing in-group/ 
out-group distinctions. 
Central in most perspectives is some statement of where the 
belief system and/or group that carries it stands in rela­
tion to other things, especially in relation to other groups 
and world views. Are we equals? Enemies? Brothers? Rulers? 
Along with this description of the external social environ­
ment is a description of the group itself, and the place of 
each individual in it. Are we children of demanding parents? 
Prophets in our own rights? Usually this includes a special 
status order, which may be totally unrelated to social rank 
in the larger society (Borhek and Curtis, 1975:11-12). 
For religious belief systems, a presumption of moral superiority, 
itself a product of the system, serves to justify intervening in others' 
lives. The combination of polarization and moral ranking results in di­
chotomizing the world into good and evil. 
Another consequence of this primitive form of splitting of 
good and evil to which Americans have been so prone is the 
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notion that the good, being good, can do no evil. Any ac­
tion taken against groups seen to be evil is justified, for 
the good can have only good ends in view. Thus in America 
the enslavement of blacks, the mass murder of Indians, the 
lynching of Negroes, the atom bombing of Japanese, and the 
massacring of Vietnamese have all had their defenders (Bel-
lah, 1971:185). 
According to Opton, Jr. (1971:51), 
The American tradition is to locate the source of evil 
deeds in evil men. We have yet to learn that the great­
est evil deeds occur when social systems give average 
men the task of rout inizing evil. 
Anti-abortion advocates are concerned about the possible routinization and 
legitimation of destructive behavior. They are concerned that abortion 
will change the social context to tolerate destructive behavior. In iden­
tifying the social context of destructive behavior, Smelser (1971:16) 
includes the institutionalization of coercive actions which offend higher 
standards of humanity or morality. For anti-abortionists, abortion ab­
solutely coerces the fetus, while violating their belief system. The ab­
sence of legal prohibitions routlnizes the practice. This presents a 
twofold threat to society. First, 
[i]f in his naive analysis of action the individual comes 
to the conclusion that most people would give in to temp­
tation in the absence of surveillance, then his own inhi­
bitions are likely to be reduced. When a person assumes 
that anyone would engage in a certain behavior, he is able 
to deny personal responsibility for his own decision to 
perform the act (Ross and Di Tecco, 1975:106). 
In essence, the anti-abortionist's concern is that the social climate will 
be altered to increase the probability that any pregnant woman will seek 
an abortion. 
Second, there is a fear that society will become indifferent to human 
existence (Powell, 1981), a fear that object-directed dehumanization 
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(Bernard, Ottenberg, and Redl, 1971) will dominate social norms to the 
extent that fetuses and possibly the imperfect will be considered expend­
able. Avoidance and denial of an issue, coupled with its visible pre­
sence, may lead to hostility toward victims (Bernard, Ottenberg, and 
Redl, 1971). In an effort to maintain a "just world" image, it may be 
easier to blame victims than accept responsibility for their victimiza­
tion (Davis and Jones, I960; Lerner and Simmons, 1966; Simmons and Pilia-
vin, 1972; Apsler and Friedman, 1975). In the abortion controversy, anti-
abortionists are concerned that the availability of abortion, combined 
with a denial of the life of the fetus, may lead people to argue that un­
wanted or imperfect fetuses do not deserve to be born. 
However, the issue of dehumanization is not determined so simply. 
The act of intervening in an abortion decision entails two manifestations 
of dehumanization. First, the woman or fetus protected is acknowledged 
to have greater priority than the counterpart. Second, the belief system 
and individuals intervening impose their dictates as superior to the judg­
ment and needs of the coerced person. While this dilemma is unavoidable, 
dehumanization may be compounded, adding to an already problematic situa­
tion. Intervening introduces one level of dehumanization. Intervening 
by decreeing a specific course of action without regard to unique individ­
ual and situational factors introduces a qualitatively distinct form of 
dehumanization. Complementing the possibility of abortion's presence de­
humanizing society is the possibility of dehumanizing women by prohibiting 
abortion. In contrast to the fear that individual evil acts will become 
routinized, pro-abortion rights advocates fear that groups legally 
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empowered to exercise coersion will exceed the legitimate limits of that 
exercise; this is another of the social contexts for destructive behavior 
identified by Smelser (1971:16). Similarly, Rubin and Peplau say that, 
...the desire for justice is a double-edged sword. People 
often exert tremendous effort in order to help right social 
wrongs and thus help restore justice in the world. At other 
times, however, people's desire to live in a just world 
leads not to justice but to justification. Secure in the 
belief that the world is a just place, we are often prone 
either to deny the existence of suffering or to conclude 
that it is in fact deserved (1975:84). 
Accepting the premises and logical connections of a belief system is a 
prerequisite for belief system membership. That, after accepting its in­
ternal reality, people believe they benefit from the religious belief 
system's goals, values, and substantive beliefs is not surprising. This 
is a reification of the religious belief system, however, and is not a 
critical evaluation. Alternative goals, means, logical relations, and 
possible compromises remain unidentified and are unlikely to be discov­
ered solely by the religious belief system's theoretic logic. 
Consequently, it is through the analysis of collateral issues that 
the implications of enacting a religious belief system's agenda become 
evident. Is preventing abortion an intrinsic or instrumental goal? What 
technologies are accepted, either as support for the belief system or in 
achieving the goal of preventing abortion? The specific social and legis­
lative proposals that pro-abortion rights and anti-abortion groups advance 
may identify contradictions between behavioral prescriptions/proscriptions 
and the stated goal. If the goal is to prevent abortion, is the group 
willing to employ every approach for preventing the need for abortion? if 
not, then the means of preventing the need for abortion is itself a goal 
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equal, if not superior, in importance to preventing abortion. Is there 
concern for the health of the fetus or is the group's goal simply to pre­
vent abortion, and not to protect prenatal health? 
Summary The three arguments supporting the proposition that the 
abortion controversy is structured primarily by religious belief systems 
identify factors that contribute to the intensity of the abortion contro­
versy. First, religious belief systems are not altered by empirical evi­
dence. A change in the entire theoretic logic is required in order to 
change even a minor religious belief system conclusion. Second, the proc­
esses involved in organizing individual cognitions into belief systems 
and individuals in organizations can alter individuals' cognitions and mo­
tivations. This can alter the religious belief system through the addition 
of theoretic linkages or result in the initial intentions being coopted 
by newly associated organizations. Third, providing justifications for 
coercing members' and nonmembers' behavior can involve: (I) dichotomizing 
the world into good and evil, (2) dehumanizing opponents and the coerced, 
and (3) developing an internal group reality that is nonnegotiable. Each 
of these actions is apt to increase the probability and intensity of con­
frontation over abortion. 
in Chapter I, the abortion controversy was identified as a social 
phenomenon. Individual cognitions and motivations are influenced by social 
and social-psychological factors in any attempt to coordinate interpersonal 
involvement. The coersion of others' behavior requires justification and 
validation provided by belief systems and knowledge systems. When justi­
fication and validation are based solely upon theoretic validity, the 
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resulting religious belief system's internal reality is likely to be un­
compromising. This inflexibility increases the extremism of beliefs and 
the possibility of confrontation. 
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CHAPTER III. METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
Population 
The population of this study is composed of the students at Iowa 
State University in Ames, Iowa. Located in central Iowa, Ames has a pop­
ulation of approximately 43,000 residents, and approximately 22,000 were 
students at Iowa State University at the time this study was conducted. 
Sample 
The sample consists of students taking Sociology 219 ~ "Courtship 
and Marriage" - and Sociology 134 - "Introduction to Sociology" - during 
Spring Quarter of I98O. These courses were selected because of their pop­
ularity among undergraduates. They are used to fulfill group require­
ments and electives by students enrolled in all of the university's col­
leges. During their four years at Iowa State University, approximately 
25 percent of the undergraduates enroll in Sociology 134 and 20 percent 
enroll in Sociology 219. 
Course enrollment, as the criterion of sample selection, avoids con­
founding the results, which may occur when the dependent variable is si­
multaneously used to select the sample. In contrast to samples that in­
clude only women with abortion experience (for example, Luker, 1975), or 
samples composed of abortion rights activists and/or anti-abortion ac­
tivists, this sample avoids unintentionally focusing on extremism of ex­
perience or beliefs. 
The use of students enrolled in sociology courses results in an acci­
dental sample. Evaluating the common practice of taking the sample at 
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hand, Kerlinger writes: 
This practice is hard to defend. Yet, used with reasonable 
knowledge and care, it is probably not as bad as it has been 
said to be. The most sensible advice seems to be: Avoid 
accidental samples unless you can get no other samples -
random samples are usually expensive and, in general, hard 
to come by - and, if you do use them, use extreme circum­
spection in analysis and interpretation of data (Kerlinger, 
1973:129). 
Since the intent of this study is not descriptive, an accidental sam­
ple is acceptable. Compensating for the restricted ability to generalize 
from the sample is the possibility of a low refusal rate. The sensitive 
nature of the subject matter is such that a less structured administra­
tion of the questionnaire was expected to result in a refusal rate suffi­
ciently high to restrict generalization. Individuals who might lack mo­
tivation to complete the questionnaire independently, however, may be en­
couraged to do so through peer pressure, if the questionnaire was admin­
istered during class. It was hoped that this strategy, if successful, 
would result in a high response rate and, concomitantly, the inclusion of 
individuals with a diversity of opinions and intensities of involvement 
with abortion issues. 
Method of Data Collection 
To administer the questionnaire, it was necessary to obtain permis­
sion from a variety of sources. First, permission from Iowa State Univer­
sity's Human Subjects Committee was obtained on the proviso that the cover 
letter be changed to include an estimation of the time required for com­
pletion. This change was made and final approval granted on April 10, 
1980. Second, approval was obtained from the Department of Sociology/ 
58 
Anthropology to ask the Sociology 134 recitation instructors and the So­
ciology 219 instructors for permission to administer the questionnaire in 
their classes. The individual Sociology 1)4 recitation instructors 
granted permission to administer the questionnaire and provided the nec­
essary class time in nine sections. The individual Sociology 219 in­
structors granted permission to administer the questionnaire, and they 
were able to provide the necessary class time in eight sections. 
The questionnaires were administered in a single week (April 21-25, 
1980) without previous announcement. In each class, copies of the ques­
tionnaire were distributed to everyone in attendance, the cover letter 
was read, and the author informed the students that, in order to preserve 
anonymity, if they chose not to participate in the study, they could 
leave their questionnaires blank or doodle on them until other students 
had completed their questionnaires and then turn them in unobtrusively. 
The author then left the classroom and returned to collect the question­
naires, which were left by the door, only after the final student had 
left the room. 
A total of 530 questionnaires were distributed. The results are as 
fol lows : 
Soc. 134 Soc. 219 Total 
Students attending class 300 230 530 
Questionnaires distributed 300 230 530 
Questionnaires returned 300 230 530 
Refusals: incomplete or unusable 
questionnai res 13 7 20 
Total questionnaires analyzed 287 223 510 
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In each class, it was the instructor's opinion that attendance was 
typical. Consequently, there was no reason to assume that foreknowledge 
of the questionnaire had altered the composition of the classes. 
Questionnaires were considered to be unusable if the questions mea­
suring abortion-related experience were not completed. The refusals re­
sulted in a usable response rate of 96.2 percent. This response rate is 
considered quite good, and, while it does not alter the limited ability to 
generalize the conclusions of this study, it does minimize the possibility 
of a self-selection bias within the sample. 
The Questionnaire 
The questionnaire employed was designed specifically for this study 
(see Appendix A). A variety of standard questions and the Srole Scale 
(Srole, 1956) were combined with unique questions addressing abortion is­
sues that have not been dealt with in other research. The questionnaire 
comprises 27 questions containing 105 items. The questions measure 10 
areas: (1) social and demographic variables, (2) religion variables, (3) 
family traditionalism and anomia, (4) abortion-related socialization, (5) 
abortion-related extremism, (6) ego-involvement with abortion decisions, 
(7) abortion-related experience, (8) life evaluation, (9) public involve­
ment in the abortion controversy, and (10) change in abortion beliefs. 
The questions were constructed to include all foreseeable alterna­
tives, even though some were unlikely to be relevant to this sample. The 
inclusion of these alternatives retains the capability of administering the 
questionnaire to a different sample and making direct comparisons with the 
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present sample. 
Social and demographic variables 
The first three questions provide information concerning respondents' 
age, gender, and marital status. The fourth question asks how many chil­
dren respondents have and the gender of each child. Questions 5 and 6 ask 
for the number of brothers and sisters in the respondents' family. By 
asking how many brothers and sisters are older, it is possible to determine 
respondents' birth order. Questions 7 and 8 measure respondents' educa­
tion by both years in school and highest degree or diploma received. 
Questions 13 and 14 identify respondents' occupation and that of their 
parents. Question 13 employs the broad occupational categories estab­
lished by the National Opinion Research Center (1972) to rank the status 
of occupations. Question 14 asks for an open-ended job title or descrip­
tion to verify Question 13. 
ReIigion variables 
Questions 9 through 12 provide four distinct measures of religious 
involvement. Question 9 asks for respondents' present religious prefer­
ence among the principal religious divisions. This question is included 
because, as Lenski (1963:326) notes, "socio-religious group membership is 
a variable comparable in importance to class...." While religion variables 
are peripheral to the test of the theories in this study, they must be in­
cluded to test for the existence of spurious or intervening relationships 
among the major variables. Question 10 asks respondents to identify the 
kind of religious instruction they received as a child. It is possible 
that initial religious socialization may supersede present religious 
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affiliation. Question 11 asks respondents to evaluate the importance of 
religion in their lives. This question is included to determine if the 
strengh of religious commitment influences the relationships between vari­
ables. Question 12 asks respondents how actively involved they are with 
organized religious services. This question is designed to differentiate 
between commitment to religious beliefs (Question 11) and socially ap­
proved behavior in a religious context. Because religion variables are 
peripheral issues and variations in religious doctrine concerning abortion 
are complex, this study makes no attempt to determine how specific relig­
ious doctrines influence abortion attitudes. Consequently, no specific 
questions are included to identify the abortion positions of the various 
religions. These religion variables are employed in the first section of 
the analysis of ancillary relationships presented in Chapter V. 
Family traditional ism and anomia 
It is possible that abortion involvement is associated with anomia. 
In order to test this possibility, an established scale, the Srole Scale, 
is used. However, it has been noted previously by Kaldenberg (1980) that 
general measures of anomia and marginalEty < ot as accurate as are mea­
sures which address specific areas salient to respondents. Accordingly, 
measures of respondents' anomia and powerlessness are included in the 
questionnaire. These measures are employed in the third ancillary section. 
Question 15 contains 12 Likert-type items. Items A, D, G, I, and K 
compose the Srole Scale (Srole, 1956). The remaining items measure re­
spondents' perceptions of powerlessness and loss of importance for the 
family in a form similar to the Srole items. Item B measures the extent 
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to which respondents believe the family is the most important group in 
creating a good society. Item C measures whether respondents believe fam­
ilies or teachers and experts know more about children's needs. Item E 
measures respondents' concern for protecting children from a breakdown in 
morals. Item F measures the extent to which respondents approve of le­
gally Imposing moral standards on other people. Item H measures respon­
dents' perceptions of the family as the last place in which the average 
person still has some control. Item J measures respondents' perceptions 
of the balance of authority between parents and the law concerning chil­
dren. Item L measures respondents' beliefs concerning whether the family 
is continuing to teach children important values. 
The seven items measuring family attitudes are intended to identify 
respondents' beliefs about the family. These include the extent to which 
they perceive the family to be threatened by external factors (legisla­
tion, moral breakdown, or expert opinions) and their perception of the 
family as the basic social unit (importance, control, importance values). 
Abort!on-related socialization 
Questions 16 and 17 identify a variety of sources of socialization 
that may be relevant to the respondents. Question 16 identifies 11 possi­
ble sources of socialization and asks respondents to evaluate the impor­
tance of each in the formation of their own abortion-related beliefs. The 
importance of the sources is measured by Likert-type items, with a scale 
ranging from "very unimportant" to "very important." An additional cate­
gory, "not relevant," was provided to minimize measurement error due either 
to misinterpreting missing responses or encouraging respondents to provide 
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answers to items that were not personally relevant. To provide a specific 
example: a spouse can only be a source of socialized abortion-related be­
liefs if one is or has been married; thus, for most college students, the 
only meaningful response is "not relevant" rather than "very unimportant." 
Question 17 asks respondents to identify how restrictive the beliefs of 
the socialization sources were. The restrictiveness of the sources is mea­
sured by Likert-type items, with a scale ranging from "totally restricted" 
to "no restrictions." The combination of Questions 16 and 17 identifies 
both sources of socialization and the extent of restrictiveness supported 
by these sources. 
Abort ion-related extremism 
Three different questions (Questions 18, 23, and 25A) measure extrem­
ism of abortion-related beliefs. Question 23 is a single-item measure of 
abortion-related extremism. This question asks respondents to indicate 
to what extent they think the government should limit abortion, using a 
continuum ranging from "totally forbidding abortion" to "having no re­
strictions." Question 25A is a Likert-type item asking how strongly re­
spondents agree or disagree with the 1973 Supreme Court decision on abor­
tion. The three trimester guideline provided by the Supreme Court is in­
cluded prior to the question; however, no information on the legal basis 
for the decision, which is a totally distinct criterion for evaluating the 
decision, is provided. Both of these measures of abortion-related extrem­
ism lack empirical referents. While they serve to identify respondents' 
general perceptions of their abortion-related beliefs, such perceptions 
are not meaningfully comparable between individuals unless empirical 
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referents are established. In order to provide empirical referents. Ques­
tion 18 Is included; it asks respondents to indicate how strongly they 
agree or disagree with women having an abortion under 14 specific circum­
stances. These circumstances include "no abortion for any reason," "if 
the mother is below age 16," "if the child is not wanted by the parents," 
and "on demand even if the government must pay." In contrast to measures 
of abortion-related beliefs that ask whether or not people approve of 
abortion. Question 18 introduces at least vague situational factors into 
consideration. Because of these situational considerations. Question 18 
is expected to provide the most significant measure of abortion-related 
extremism. 
Ego-involvement with abortion decisions 
Two questions measure ego-involvement with abortion decisions. Ques­
tion 19 measures the strength of respondents' belief that their Judgment 
about abortion should be the accepted standard of behavior. The 14 abor­
tion circumstances identified in Question 18 are employed again with Li -
kert-type items, which range from "not wanting their belief to be accepted 
as the standard" to "very strongly wanting their belief to be accepted as 
the standard." In part, this question measures how willing respondents 
are to Impose their beliefs upon others. More importantly, it is a mea­
sure of how personally committed respondents are to beliefs concerning the 
appropriateness of abortion in a variety of circumstances. 
Question 25A asks respondents to indicate how important they consider 
the Supreme Court decision on abortion to be for the United States. A 
five-interval, LIkert-type item, ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly 
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disagree," is used to measure responses to the statement: "This Supreme 
Court decision is important for the United States." This question lacks 
the individuality and specificity of Question 19, but it does provide a 
comparison measure. 
Abortion-related experience 
Three questions measure abortion-related experience. Question 20 is 
the fundamental measure of abortion-related experience. Respondents indi­
cate all of the situations in which they have made or have helped to make 
a decision either to have or to not have an abortion. The situations 
listed are abortion decisions for: (1) yourself, (2) your spouse or girl­
friend, (3) a member of your family, (4) a close friend, (5) an acquain­
tance, (6) a stranger, and (7) a counseling client. The eighth and final 
option is "never involved in an abortion decision." These options allow 
a variety of categorizations; they may be analyzed independently, they may 
be aggregated for personal abortion-related experience, involvement with 
others' abortion-related decisions, and no abortion-related experience, or 
they may be placed on a continuum ranging from highly personal to highly 
impersonal experience. 
Questions 21 and 22 provide additional information concerning the 
abortion-related decision. Question 21 asks respondents with personal ex­
perience or whose partners have had personal abortion-related experience 
if they felt pressured to reach the decision they did. For those with 
abortion-related experience, the options are "no pressure," "pressure from 
partner," "pressure from family," "pressured by health considerations," 
"pressured by money needs," and "other pressures" to be specified by the 
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respondents. Question 22 asks respondents if they have ever helped a woman 
reach a decision about abortion that would contradict the decision they 
would make for themselves. 
Life evaluation 
Question 24 contains seven Likert-type items that measure respondents' 
beliefs concerning the civil and legal rights of the fetus/newborn. This 
question expands upon the information concerning extremism of beliefs pro­
vided by Questions 18, 23, and 25A. By asking respondents for their be­
liefs about the rights of the fetus/newborn, it is possible to more accu­
rately determine if their position on abortion involves a protection of 
fetal/infant rights. Items A, C, and F measure respondents' beliefs con­
cerning the mother's legal responsibility for ensuring the life and health 
of the fetus. Item D extends the concern for responsibility for protecting 
the life of their child to both parents. Items E and G diffuse the re­
sponsibility for fetal life and health from the pregnant woman to her at­
tending physician. Item B diffuses the responsibility for fetal life and 
health more broadly to include the government's responsibility for pro­
viding for fetal nutrition. The measure of life evaluation is employed in 
the second ancillary section in Chapter V. 
Public involvement with the abortion controversy 
Question 26 includes seven Likert-type items that measure respondents' 
involvement with public manifestations of the abortion controversy. For 
each item, respondents indicate if they "have," "have not but intend to," 
"might," "are unlikely to," or "do not intend to" engage(d) in the activity 
described by each item. The items are: attend public abortion events, 
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visit an abortion group, contribute money to an abortion group, contribute 
time to an abortion group, write a Congressman or newspaper, join an abor­
tion group, and speak publicly about abortion. 
Change in abortion beliefs 
Question 27 is a three-part measure of change in respondents' beliefs 
about abortion. Part I of this question asks respondents whether their 
values have changed. If the answer is "no," respondents move directly to 
Question 28. If the answer is "yes," respondents complete Parts II and III 
of the question. Part II measures how respondents' beliefs have changed; 
the options are: "I hold the same values more strongly," "I hold the same 
values less strongly," "I do not know what my values should be now," and 
"I have reversed my position on abortion." Part III asks respondents to 
identify the cause of their belief change. The options are: "not sure 
what caused the change," "the change was gradual and not caused by speci­
fic events," "a specific event caused the change but not an event related 
to abortion," "a specific event related to abortion," and "other (please 
explain)." This question provides information about changes in individ­
uals' beliefs in terms of the frequency of changes within the sample, the 
extent of the changes, and general perceptions of the causes of these 
changes. This question incorporates an awareness of change in beliefs in­
to the study of abortion-related beliefs. 
Questionnaire Pretest 
The questionnaire was pretested on graduate students. Ten students 
completed questionnaires, which were then inspected to identify problems 
with insufficient item alternatives or questions with ambiguous wording or 
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instruction. In addition, the students were interviewed individually to 
ascertain their evaluation of the questionnaire on five issues. The first 
concern addressed was questionnaire bias, which might lead respondents to 
discount the questionnaire because it conflicted with their beliefs. 
Second, was there adequate availability of alternative answers for their 
own responses and any responses that they could anticipate? Third, was the 
general structure of the questionnaire orderly; that is, were questions 
organized in a manner that encouraged continued participation and minimized 
problems that might result from abrupt changes in train of thought? 
Fourth, was the order of alternatives in each question progressive; were 
the alternatives organized progressively, such that respondents would be 
less likely to find an acceptable answer, mark it, and miss a better alter­
native among those provided later? Fifth, were the instructions self-ex­
planatory and unambiguous? 
The use of multiple scales on the same page produced the only major 
difficulty identified by the pretest. To maintain the progression of 
questions and to ensure that both questions would be answered, the format 
was changed to list the questions at the head of the page. Then, to avoid 
confusion, the scales measuring the first of the two questions were placed 
on the righthand side of the page, and those measuring the second question 
were placed on the lefthand side. While this reverses the normal left-to-
right ordering of sequential numbers, the use of arrows and page blocking 
makes the questionnaire more effective than the original layout, which 
placed the questions side-by-side above the scales. 
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Format 
The format of the questionnaire incorporates many of Dillman's (1978) 
techniques. The layout is designed to centralize responses so that alter­
native responses will be less prone to oversight. When an item requires 
an open-ended response, the accompanying space immediately follows the 
item. In general, however, items are combined into scales by appearance, 
and the alternatives arranged uniformly (with "agree very strongly" in 
the lefthand column). 
The questionnaire, including cover letter, is ten 8 1/2-by-ll inch 
pages in length and reproduced in full size. Should this questionnaire 
be employed in a mail study, it may be appropriate to photoreduce the 
pages. In this study, however, mailing weight is not a factor. The 
greater ease of reading full-size type, large margins, and compact organ­
ization of the items in each question combine to minimize difficulty in 
completing the questionnaire. 
CHAPTER IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE 
Respondent characteristics, in conjunction with sample methods, are 
important for interpreting social science research. Respondents' charac­
teristics establish the validity of generalizing the results of a study 
to other populations, and, to a lesser degree, they influence how the data 
should be interpreted. This chapter provides the socio-demographic data 
descriptive of the sample. 
A total of 510 questionnaires were analyzed. As is shown in Table 1, 
268 of the respondents are female and 241 are male. One respondent refused 
Table 1. Gender of respondents 
Males Fema1 es Total 
N % N % N % 
241 47.3 269 52.7 510 100 
to provide this information; however, because she indicated that she had 
made a decision to have or not have an abortion for herself, it is clear 
that the respondent is female. Consequently, she was classified as female, 
increasing the number of female respondents to 269 for the subsequent anal­
ysis. Typical of a college sample, the distribution of ages among the re­
spondents is concentrated in the late teens and early twenties. Table 2 
shows that 95 percent of the respondents are 23 years old or younger. The 
age of the oldest male is 27, while nine female respondents are aged 27 
or older. Similarly, the preponderance of respondents are unmarried. 
Table 3 shows that only 38 respondents are or have ever been married. In 
addition, only 63 respondents are presently engaged. The respondents have 
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few children; 13 respondents have a total of 24 children (see Table 4). 
Table 2. Age of respondents 
Age N % cum % 
17 1 .2 .2 
18 70 13.8 14.0 
19 164 32.0 46.0 
20 98 19.3 65.2 
21 82 16.1 81.3 
22 56 11.0 92.3 
23 11 2.2 94.5 
24 7 1.4 95.9 
25 7 1.4 97.2 
26 2 .4 97.6 
27 3 .6 98.2 
28 2 .4 98.6 
30 1 .2 98.8 
33 1 .2 99.0 
41 1 .2 99.2 
42 1 .2 99.4 
51 1 .2 99.6 
Missing 2 .4 100.0 
Total 510 100.0 
X = 20.1 S.D. = 2.9 
Table 5 shows the number of siblings for the respondents; 427 respondents 
(83.7%) have two or fewer sisters, and 414 respondents (81.1%) have two 
or fewer brothers. 
The respondents average 14.2 years of formal education (see Table 6), 
and a number of respondents have degrees beyond their high school diploma. 
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Table 3> Respondents' marital status 
Marital Status N % cum % 
1. Never married 409 80.2 80.2 
2. Engaged, never married 63 12.3 92.5 
3. Married, first time 31 6.1 98.6 
4. Married and widowed --- 98.6 
5. Married and divorced 6 1.2 99.8 
6. Married, but spouse has left - ---- 99.8 
7. Remarried after death of spouse --- ---- 99.8 
8. Remarried after divorce 1 .2 100.0 
Total 510 100.0 
Table 4. Respondents' number of children and gender of children 
» of Respondents Total Children Boys Girls 
Children N % N N N 
0 497 97.4 — — — 
1 6 1.2 6 
2 4 .8 8 
3 2 .4 6 
4 _ 1 .2 4 
Total 510 100.0 24 9 15 
Table 7 shows that 13 respondents have technical school or associate of 
arts degrees, 12 respondents have bachelor's degrees, and one respondent 
(a registered nurse) has a professional degree. 
In anticipation of possible correlations between religion and abor­
tion-related variables, four measures of the respondents' religious orien­
tation were included. Table 8 reports the respondents' present religious 
preference, Table 9 reports the importance of religious beliefs to the re­
spondents, and Table 11 reports the frequency of the respondents' 
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Table 5. Number of siblings 
Sex of 
Sibling(s) N % cum % 
0 104 20.4 20.4 
1 211 41.3 61.7 
2 99 19.4 81.1 
3 52 10.2 91.4 
4 29 5.7 97.1 
Brother 5 6 1.2 98.2 
6 5 1.0 99.2 
7 2 .4 99.6 
8 1 .2 99.8 
9 1_ .2 100.0 
Total 510 100.0 
X = 1.5 S.D. = 1.3 
0 108 21 .2 21.2 
1 194 37.9 59.1 
2 125 24.6 83.7 
3 48 9.4 93.1 
Sister 4 21 4.1 97.2 
5 10 2.0 99.2 
6 2 .4 99.6 
7 2 .4 100.0 
Total 510 100.0 
II 
IX 
S.D. = 1.2 
attendance at religious services. 
Protestants (N = 33^) and Roman Catholics (N = 131) predominate among 
this sample in terms of present religious preference. When combined, these 
two groups account for more than 90 percent of the sample. Atheists/ 
74 
agnostics (N = 27) and Jewish respondents (N = 2) account for the remainder 
of those categorized. The final 10 respondents include theists and members 
of Mormon, Moslem, and Bahai faiths, present in the sample in some cases 
because of the university's foreign student population. A similar 
Table 6. Number of years of education 
Years of 
Education N % cum % 
Missing 7 1.4 1.4 
11 1 .2 1.6 
12 18 3.5 5.1 
13 119 23.4 28.5 
14 144 28.1 56.6 
15 103 20.2 76.8 
16 84 16.5 93.3 
17 32 6.3 99.6 
18 2 .4 100.0 
Total 510 100.0 
CM n 
I
X
 S.D. = 2 
.1 
Table 7- Highest degree or diploma received 
Degree 
Received N % cum % 
Grade school 0 — — — — — — — — 
High school 484 94.9 94.9 
Technical school 13 2.6 97.4 
Bachelor's degree 12 2.4 99.8 
Master's degree 0 ---- 99.8 
Ph.D., M.D., or pro­
fessional degree 1_ .2 100.0 
Total 510 100.0 
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distribution of respondents is shown in Table 3. Again, more than 90 per­
cent of the respondents are either Protestant (N = 345) or Roman Catholic 
(N = 139) in terms of religious upbringing. The most significant differ­
ence between Tables 8 and 9 involves the 13 respondents who did not receive 
religious instruction as a child, a category irrelevant to Table 8. 
Table 8. Present religious preference 
Religion N % cum % 
Atheist/Agnostic 27 5.3 5.3 
Jewi sh 2 .4 5.7 
Protestant 334 65.4 71.1 
Roman Catholic 131 25.7 96.8 
Other 10 2.0 98.8 
Mi ssing 6 1.2 100.0 
Total 510 100.0 
Table 9. Affiliation of childhood religious instruction 
Religion N % cum % 
None 13 2.5 2.5 
Atheist/Agnostic 0 --- 2.5 
Jewish 2 .4 2.9 
Protestant 345 67.6 70.5 
Roman Catholic 139 27.3 97.8 
Other 7 1.4 99.2 
Missing _4 .8 100.0 
Total 510 100.0 
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Religious beliefs are very important (N = 144) or important (N = 216) 
to the majority of respondents, these two categories accounting for more 
than 70 percent of the responses (see Table 10). In contrast, less than 
10 percent of the respondents consider their religious beliefs to be 
Table 10. Importance of religion 
Importance N % cum % 
Very important 144 28.3 28.3 
Important 216 42.2 70.5 
Slightly important 114 22.4 92.9 
Unimportant 23 4.5 97.4 
Very unimportant 12 2.4 99.8 
Missing .2 100.0 
Total 510 100.0 
unimportant (N = 23) or very unimportant (N = 12). This self-reported im­
portance does not translate directly into regular attendance at religious 
services, however. As Table 11 shows, only 159 respondents (approximately 
30 percent) attend religious services one or more times a week. Even when 
Table 11. Frequency of religious service attendance 
Frequency N % cum % 
Never 16 3.1 3.1 
Funerals and weddings 49 9.6 12.7 
Several times a year 147 28.9 41.6 
Once or twice a month 136 26.6 68.2 
Weekly 133 26.1 94.3 
More than once a week 26 5.1 99.4 
Missing .6 100.0 
Total 510 100.0 
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attendance includes the category "once or twice a month," slightly less 
than 60 percent (N = I36) of the respondents are regular attenders. Six­
ty five respondents, or 12.7 percent, never attend religious services or 
attend only funerals and weddings. While some of the variation between 
the importance of religious beliefs and the frequency of religious service 
attendance can be accounted for by observing that those who attend ser­
vices regularly consider their religious beliefs to be important while 
those who do not attend services do not consider their beliefs important, 
this is, at most, a general trend. The partial correlation coefficient 
(r = .21, p = 0.000) may be accounted for, in part, by respondents like 
atheists who take their beliefs seriously and, therefore, do not attend 
services or respondents who consider attendance minimally related to their 
religious faith. 
The respondents' occupations were uniformly listed as "Student." Only 
three respondents identified other occupations as primary activities (work­
ing at parttime jobs while in college is excluded from this designation), 
two R.N.s and an educator. Table 12 shows the distribution of the respon­
dents' fathers' and mothers' occupations. The respondents' fathers' occu­
pations are concentrated in the higher prestige (and typically higher in­
come) categories. Professional (N = I36) and managerial (N = 87) posi­
tions and farm owner (N = 102) account for 63-7 percent of the fathers' oc­
cupations. Among the respondents' mothers, the principal occupation is 
homemaker (N = 211, or 41.3 percent), indicative of a traditional family 
lifestyle. In addition, almost one quarter of the respondents' mothers 
hold professional (N = 47), most typically R.N., managerial (N = 25), or 
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educator (N = 53) positions. 
Table 12. Parents' occupations 
Occupation Father's Mother's 
Rank^ N % N % 
Professional 136 26.7 47 9.2 
Educator 22 4.3 53 10.4 
Manager 87 17.1 25 4.9 
Foreman 20 3.9 0 
Farmer 102 19.8 9 1.8 
Clerical 7 1.4 75 14.7 
Craftsman/art i san 16 3.1 11 2.2 
Sales 37 7.3 25 4.9 
Services 11 2,2 27 5.3 
Homemaker 0 ---- 211 41.3 
Laborer 38 7.5 11 2.2 
Student 0 1 .2 
Not employed 5 1 .0 3 .6 
Deceased 27 5.3 9 1.7 
Missing 2 .4 3 .6 
Total 510 100.0 510 100.0 
^Source: National Opinion Research Center, 1972:88-102. 
Summary 
The respondents are young, highly educated, and typically from middle-
class homes, as measured by parents' occupations. With approximately 20 
percent of the sample coming from farming backgrounds, the sample is more 
rural than would be expected had the questionnaire been administered in 
an urban area such as is found on the East and West Coasts. The respon-
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dents consider religion to be important in their lives, but they are only 
moderately active in organized religious services. Both their religious 
training and present religious preference are in mainstream Christianity, 
predominantly in Protestant denominations (65.4 percent of the sample) but 
also in Roman Catholicism (25.7 percent of the sample). In general, the 
sample appears to be very middle-class, midwestern, and homogeneous. 
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CHAPTER V. RESULTS 
The results of this study are presented in this chapter in three sec­
tions. The first section contains the distribution of scores for the ma­
jor variables and scales. The second section contains the tests of the 
hypotheses. The third section contains ancillary results and the effects 
of social and demographic variables upon the major variables and variable 
relationships. 
Distribution of Major Variable Scores 
The hypotheses in this study test the relationships between four con­
cepts: (1) abortion-related socialization, (2) abortion-related experi­
ence, (3) ego-involvement with abortion decisions, and (4) abortion-rela­
ted extremism. Since these concepts are critical to this study, the 
scale distributions are presented below to provide additional information 
on the within-sample variation. This information is important because the 
absence of relevant existing measures has necessitated the development of 
original scales throughout the analysis. 
Abortion-related socialization 
The concept of abort ion-related socialization is measured by Questions 
16, "socialization importance," and 17, "socialization beliefs." Each 
scale measures a dimension of socialization, and the two are combined to 
create a third, general measure of "socialization." Each scale is a cum­
ulative measure of the total amount of socialization that respondents have 
experienced. Question 16 measures the importance of the source of social­
ization concerning abortion for respondents. Question 17 measures the 
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respondents' perceptions of how restrictive their socialization content 
concerning abortion was. Of the 11 sources of socialization identified in 
the questionnaire, seven are included in the scales measuring socializa­
tion. These sources (Questions 16 and 17, items A through G: Religious 
groups/Church; Education/School; Philosophy/ethics; T.V., Radio, News; 
Parents; Friends; Brothers/Sisters) are considered relevant (i.e., social­
ization sources that explicitly dealt with abortion) by at least 80 per­
cent of the sample. If a socialization source is excluded from analysis 
on Question 16, it is also excluded from analysis on Question 17. This 
procedure creates two seven-item, Likert-type scales ("socialization im­
portance" and "socialization beliefs"), which can be combined to form a 
total "socialization" scale. 
"Socialization importance," an indicator of how important a source of 
socialization has been in forming respondents' abortion beliefs, is mea­
sured by summing the importance of the sources to create a single score. 
The possible range of scores on each item is from 1 (not relevant) to 6 
(very important). The range for the scale, then, is from 7 (low relevance) 
to 42 (high importance). Due to missing responses, the actual range of 
responses is from 0 to 41, with a mean score of 28.3 and standard devia­
tion of 6.5 (see Table 13). Respondents' scores are distributed over 30 
of the scale's 34 values. 
"Socialization beliefs," an indicator of the total restrictiveness of 
socialization concerning abortion, is measured by summing the restrictive­
ness of the sources to create a single score. The range of scores on each 
item is from I (no restrictions) to 5 (totally restricted). The scale 
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range, then, is from 7 (no restrictions) to 35 (totally restricted). Due 
to missing responses, the actual range of scores is from 0 to 32, with a 
mean score of 19*7 and standard deviation of 5.6 (see Table 13). Respon­
dents' scores are distributed over 23 of the scale's 28 values. 
A weighted total "socialization" scale is produced by multiplying 
the "socialization importance" score by the "socialization beliefs" score 
for each socialization source and then summing the products. The range 
of scale scores is from 7 (low importance and low restriction) to 175 
(high importance and high restriction). Due to missing responses, the 
actual range of responses is from 0 to 164, with a mean of 83.3 and stan­
dard deviation of 31.5 (see Table 13). Respondents' scores include 126 
of the scale's 157 values. 
Abortion-related experience 
Experience with decisions about having or not having an abortion is 
measured using a single item. Question 20, and the distribution of re­
sponses is presented in Table 14. Inherent in both the form of the ques­
tion and individuals' experience with abortion-related decisions is the 
fact that only females can make this decision in response to their own 
assumed pregnancies. Thus, males participate in abortion-related decisions 
only in adjunctive capacities and are included with other female respon­
dents who are similarly participating in adjunctive capacities for the 
statistical analysis. In order to improve the statistical analysis (e.g., 
crosstabulation analysis), the number of categories with fewer than 50 
responses was minimized by collapsing responses into three categories: 
(1) no experience with abortion-related decisions, (2) experience with 
Table 13» Frequency distributions for socialization variables 
"Socialization importance" "Socialization beliefs" "Social ization" 
Val ue N % cum % Value N % cum % Value N % cum % 
37-41 32 6 6 151-175 7 1 1 
32-36 148 29 35 32-35 1 1 1 126-150 38 8 9 
27-31 168 34 69 27-31 36 6 7 101-125 98 19 28 
22-26 99 19 88 22-26 168 33 40 76-100 181 35 63 
17-21 41 8 96 17-21 187 37 77 51-75 117 23 86 
12-16 9 2 98 12-16 91 18 95 26-50 45 9 95 
7-11 6 1 99 7-11 10 2 97 7-25 9 2 97 
1-6 1 99 1 -6 4 1 98 1 -6 0 -- 97 
Missing 6 1 100 Missing 
_13 2 100 Missing 15 100 
Total 510 100 Total 510 100 Total 510 100 
Alpha = .71 Alpha = .79 
St. Alpha = .73 St. Alpha = .79 
Inter-i tern r = .28 Inter-i tem r = . 35 
Item > = 4.0 Item ) = 2.8 
Scale X = 28.3 Scale X = 19.7 Scale X = 83.3 
S.D. = 6.5 S.D. = 5.6 S.D. = 31.5 
Range = 0-41 Range = 0-32 Range = 0-164 
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Table 14. Frequency distribution for "experience" variable 
Males Females Total 
Experience N % N % N % cum % 
8. Yourself 0 - - - - 33 12.3 33 6.5 6.5 
7. Your spouse/ 
girlfriend 
30 12.5 0 — — — - 30 5.9 12.4 
6. Family member 8 3.3 17 6.3 25 4.9 17.3 
5. Close friend 20 8.3 73 27.1 93 18.2 35.5 
4. An acquaintance 5 2.1 3 1.1 8 1.6 37.1 
3. Stranger 0 - — — — 0 - - - - 0 - - - - 37.1 
2. Counseling 
client 
2 .8 1 .4 3 .6 37.7 
1. Never involved iZi 73.0 142 52.8 318 62.3 100.0 
Total 241 100.0 269 100.0 510 100.0 
abortion-related decisions made for another person, and (3) experience 
with abortion-related decisions made about oneself. The resulting response 
distribution for "experience" (recoded) (see Table 15) shows that 37 per­
cent of respondents have experience with abortion-related decisions, with 
six percent having personal experience. 
Table 15. Frequency distribution for "experience" variable, recoded 
Experience Group N % cum % 
Group 3 - Personal experience 33 6.5 6.5 
Group 2 - Other experience 159 31.2 37.7 
Group 1 - No experience 318 62.3 100.0 
Total 510 100.0 
85 
Ego-involvement with abortion decisions 
According to Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall (1965:65), "[e]go involve­
ment... is the arousal...of the individual's commitments or stands in the 
context of appropriate situations...." The operationalization of the con­
cept ego-involvement includes both the specific context and an indication 
of arousal, i.e., that the respondents wish to have their position ac­
cepted as appropriate. The issue of acceptance serves as a threshhold 
distinguishing between personal standards and a public commitment. 
The concept of ego-involvement with abortion decisions is measured 
by Question 19. Question 19 measures the degree to which respondents feel 
that their beliefs regarding the appropriateness of abortion in 14 differ­
ent circumstances should be the accepted standard of behavior. Each of 
the 14 context items has a range of scores from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very 
strongly). The scale range, then, is from 14 (low ego-involvement) to 
70 (high ego-involvement). The range of responses is from 14 to 70, with 
a mean of 50.9 and a standard deviation of 10.7 (see Table 16) . Respon­
dents' scores are distributed over 53 of the scales 56 values. 
Table 16. Frequency distribution for "ego-involvement" variable 
Value N % cum % 
65 - 70 47 9.2 9.2 Alpha = .90 
55 - 64 136 26.7 35.9 St. Alpha = .90 
45 - 54 202 39.7 75.6 Inter-item r = .39 
35 - 44 90 17.6 93.2 1 tern X = 3.6 
25 - 34 24 4.7 97.9 Scale X = 50.9 
14 - 24 JJ 2.1 100.0 S.D. = 10.7 
Total 510 100.0 Range = 14 - 70 
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Abortion-related extremism 
The concept of abortion-related extremism is measured by a variety 
of questions and scales. Because it is the primary dependent variable, 
it is important that abortion-related extremism be operationalized in a 
manner suitable for testing by the theories. Five measures of abortion-
related extremism are provided: (1) a combined measure, (2-4) three sub-
scales which divide extremism into the latitudes of rejection, noncommit-
ment, and acceptance, and (5) a second, independent measure of extremism -
government limits - with which to validate the analyses of abortion-rela-
ted extremism. 
In constructing the measures of latitudes of rejection, noncommit-
ment, and acceptance, as well as the combined measure of abortion-related 
extremism, the 14 items composing Question 18 are combined into summed 
scales. The latitudes are formed by separating the Likert-type items in 
Question 18 into three sections (agree or strongly agree, disagree or 
strongly disagree, and not sure) and then summing the responses in each 
section. As an example, in Diagram 3 a respondent agrees or strongly a-
grees with abortion in two contexts, disagrees or strongly disagrees with 
Context 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Score 2 1 2 
Diagram 3. An example of scoring for the latitude measures 
SA NS SD 
LATAC LATNC LATRJ 
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abortion in two contexts, and is not sure about abortion in one context. 
The scores for this respondent are: "latitude of rejection," 2; "latitude 
of noncommitment," 1; and "latitude of acceptance," 2. 
The variable "latitude of rejection" is created by assigning a value 
of 1 for each condition for having an abortion with which a respondent dis­
agrees or strongly disagrees and then summing these values to produce the 
"latitude of rejection" score (see Table 17). The possible range of scores 
is from 0 (rejects no abortion conditions) to 14 (rejects all abortion 
conditions). The actual range of scores is from 0 to 13, with a mean of 
Table 17. Frequency distribution for "latitude of rejection" variable 
Score N % cum % 
0 34 6.7 6.7 
1 76 14.9 21.6 
2 50 9.8 31.4 
3 65 12.7 44.1 
4 43 8.4 52.5 
5 49 9.6 62.2 
6 44 8.6 70.8 
7 63 12.4 83.1 
8 39 7.6 90.8 
9 20 3.9 94.7 
10 9 1.8 96.5 
11 6 1.2 97.6 
12 6 1.2 98.8 
13 6 1.2 100.0 
Total 510 100.0 
X = 4.5 S.D. = 3.1 
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4.5 and a standard deviation of 3.1. The distribution of scores for "lati­
tude of rejection" is presented in Table 17. 
The variable "latitude of noncommîtment" is created by assigning a 
value of 1 for each condition for having an abortion about which a respon­
dent is not sure of his/her feelings and then summing these values to pro­
duce the "latitude of noncommitment" score (see Table 18). The possible 
Table 18. Frequency distribution for "latitude of noncommitment" variable 
Score N % cum % 
0 110 21.6 21.6 
1 111 21.8 43.3 
2 110 21.6 64.9 
3 89 17.5 82.4 
4 40 7.8 90.2 
5 29 5.7 95.9 
6 11 2.2 98.0 
7 6 1.2 99.2 
8 0 ---- 99.2 
9 2 .4 99.6 
10 I .2 99.8 
11 0 ---- 99.8 
12 1_ .2 100.0 
Total 510 100.0 
X = 2.1 S.D. = 1.8 
range of scores is from 0 (commitment on all abortion conditions) to 14 
(commitment on no abortion conditions). The actual range of scores is 
from 0 to 12, with a mean of 2.1 and a standard deviation of 1.8. The 
distribution of scores for "latitude of noncommîtment" is presented in 
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Table 18. 
The variable "latitude of acceptance" is created by assigning a value 
of 1 for each condition for having an abortion with which a respondent a-
grees or strongly agrees and then summing these values to produce the 
"latitude of acceptance" score (see Table 19). The possible range of 
scores is from 0 (accepts no abortion conditions) to 14 (accepts all abor­
tion conditions). The actual range of scores is from 0 to 14, with a 
mean of 6.3 and a standard deviation of 3.5. The distribution of scores 
Table 19. Frequency distribution for "latitude of acceptance" variable 
Score N % cum % 
0 23 4.5 4.5 
1 15 2.9 7.5 
2 22 4.3 11.8 
3 40 7.8 19.6 
4 67 13.1 32.7 
5 68 13.3 46.1 
6 59 11.6 57.6 
7 45 8.8 66.5 
8 33 6.5 72.9 
9 37 7.3 80.2 
10 24 4.7 84.9 
11 27 5.3 90.2 
12 16 3.1 93.3 
13 30 5.9 99.2 
14 4 .8 100.0 
Total 510 100.0 
6.3 S.D. = 3.5 
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for "latitude of acceptance" is presented in Table 19. 
To create a combined measure of abortion-related extremism, the score 
for "latitude of rejection" is subtracted from the score for "latitude of 
acceptance," and the resulting score is the value of "extremism." This 
scale construction is as consistent with the latitude scales as is possi­
ble, minimizing differences in measurement that could complicate the com­
parison of distinct theories. The theoretical range of scores is from 
-14 (rejects all abortion conditions) to +14 (accepts all abortion condi­
tions). The actual range of scores is from -13 to 14, with a mean of 1.8 
and a standard deviation of 6.1. The distribution of scores for the vari­
able "extremism" is presented in Table 20. 
In Table 21, the correlations between the various measures of abor­
tion-related extremism are presented. The correlations between "extremism" 
and both the "latitude of rejection" (r = -.93) and the "latitude of ac­
ceptance" (r = .95) show that the measurements of latitudes and the vari­
able "extremism" are highly consistent. The correlations between the var­
iable "government limits" and the "latitude of rejection" (r = -.62), the 
"latitude of acceptance" (r = -.61), and the variable "extremism" (r = 
-.66) show a similar consistency. 
The variable "government limits" is measured by Question 23. The 
theoretical and actual range of scores is from 1 (no government restric­
tions on abortion) to 9 (the government should totally forbid abortion). 
The mean is 4.8, and the standard deviation is 2.3. This is a distinct 
measure of abortion-related extremism, being the only measure not created 
from Question 18. Considering that the issues raised in Questions 18 and 
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Table 20. Frequency distribution for "extremism" variable 
Score N % cum % 
-13 6 1 1 
-12 3 1 2 
-11 6 1 3 
-10 4 1 4 
-9 2 - 4 
-8 11 2 6 
-7 9 2 8 
-6 11 2 10 
-5 19 4 14 
-4 23 5 19 
-3 38 7 26 
-2 27 5 31 
-1 34 6 38 
0 32 6 44 
1 36 7 51 
2 23 5 56 
3 22 4 60 
4 25 5 65 
5 25 5 70 
6 30 6 76 
7 14 3 78 
8 26 5 84 
9 19 4 87 
10 20 4 91 
11 8 2 93 
12 22 4 97 
13 11 2 99 
14 4 1_ 100 
Total 510 100 
X = 1.8 S.D. = 6.1 
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Table 21. Correlations between abortion-related extremism variables 
LATRJ LATNC LATAC EXT GJ^ 
"Latitude of 
rejection" 
"Latitude of -.20 
noncotnmi tment" p=0.000 
"Latitude of -.76 -.35 
acceptance" p=0.000 p=0.000 
"Extremism" -.93 -.14 .95 
p=0.000 p=0.002 p=0.000 
"Government -.62 .06 -.61 -.66 
limits" p=0.000 p = N.S. p=0.000 p=0.000 
23 differ slightly (i.e., agreeing or disagreeing with conditions for 
having an abortion vs. response to the government regulation of abortion), 
the correlations between "government limits" and the other measures of 
abortion-related extremism indicate that these measures supplement and 
reinforce each other. The distribution of scores for the variable "gov­
ernment limits" is presented in Table 22. 
In summary, abort ion-related extremism Is a single concept with a 
primary measure (the variable "extremism"), the latitude subscales (from 
which the variable "extremism" is created), and a secondary measure, 
"government limits," which is a follow-up measure of the concept abortion-
related extremism. The critical tests of hypotheses are based upon the 
variable "extremism" and its subscale latitude measures. The variable 
"government limits" is used to verify the tests of the hypotheses and to 
identify the curvilinear properties of "ego-involvement." 
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Table 22. Frequency distribution for "qovernment limits' ' variable 
Score N % cum % 
1 - No regulation 33 6.5 6.5 
2 59 11.6 18.0 
3 84 16.5 34.5 
4 71 13.8 48.3 
5 48 9.4 57.7 
6 44 8.6 66.4 
7 94 18.5 84.9 
8 48 9.4 94.3 
9 - Totally restrict 24 4.7 99.0 
Missing 5 1.0 100.0 
Total iilO 100.0 
X = 4.8 S.D. = 2.3 
Test of the Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 
The first general hypothesis is that there is no relationship between 
abortion-related socialization and abortion-related experience. This is 
the first bivariate relationship testing between the three theories, al­
though in this case all three theories generate the same hypothesis. Al­
so, while there is a single measure of abortion-related experience, three 
measures of socialization are used (the importance of socialization 
sources, the restrictiveness of socialization beliefs, and a combined so­
cialization scale). In none of the three theories tested, is a relation­
ship between socialization and experience postulated. Experience with de­
cisions about abortion is not a byproduct or consequence of socialization 
concerning abortion. This is most evident in instances where a friend 
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seeks advice from a respondent. The respondent's socialization influences 
the friend's abortion-related experience only indirectly, so that, while 
spurious relationships are possible, there is no direct relationship be­
tween socialization and experience. Similarly, there is no basis for pre­
dicting a relationship between the variables "socialization importance" 
and "socialization beliefs" and the variable "experience." The empirical 
hypotheses for the relationships between the independent variables - "so­
cialization," "socialization importance," and "socialization beliefs" -
and the dependent variable "experience" are as follows: 
EH I : There is no correlation between "socialization" and 
"experience" scores. 
r = -.06 p = N.S. 
EH I : Accepted 
EH I : There is no correlation between "socialization im-
^ portance" and "experience" scores. 
r = .03 p = N.S. 
EH 1^: Accepted 
EH I, : There is no correlation between "socialization be­
liefs" and "experience" scores. 
r = -.07 p = N.S. 
EH Accepted 
The correlations between socialization variables and "experience" fail to 
achieve significance. The three theories are equally supported by the 
tests of Hypothesis I. 
Hypothesis 11 
The second general hypothesis of this study is that there is a posi­
tive correlation between abortion-related experience and ego-involvement 
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with abortion decisions. This is the second bivariate relationship test­
ing between the three theories. For each theory, the predicted relation­
ship between abortion-related experience and ego-involvement with abortion 
decisions is important, though not equally important. For social judgment 
theory, experience is correlated with ego-involvement unless the experi­
ence falls within the latitude of rejection. According to cognitive disso­
nance theory, experience changes attitudes (within defined situations), and 
participation in an experience evokes sufficient ego-involvement to moti­
vate an attitude change to maintain consistency. According to attribution 
theory, when respondents have relevant experience, there will be a nega­
tive correlation with ego-involvement. With an Issue as significant as 
abortion, experience will lead individuals to seek external correspondence 
rather than to have their previous beliefs established as the normative 
standard. To seek new information rather than to have one's personal be­
liefs supported is characteristic of reduced ego-Involvement. The em­
pirical hypotheses for the relationship between the Independent variable 
"experience" and the dependent variable "ego-involvement," as presented 
by social judgment and cognitive dissonance theories, on the one hand, and 
attribution theory, on the other, are as follows; 
Social judgment, cognitive dissonance Attribution 
EH II : The higher the "exper- EH 11': The higher the "experi-
ience" score, the high- ence" score, the lower 
er the "ego-involvement" the "ego-Involvement" 
score. score. 
r = .03 p = N.S. 
EH II : Rejected EH II': Rejected 
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The hypothesized relationship between abortion-related experience and 
ego-involvement with abortion decisions is not supported for any of the 
theories; the correlation between "experience" and "ego-involvement" fails 
to reach significance. The results of EH II and EH II' show that the two 
variables are unrelated, with the implication that all respondent experi­
ence categories are equally ego-involved. A t-test of differences in mean 
"ego-involvement" scores between abortion-related experience groups sup­
ports the presumed equal importance of respondents' attitudes. Both Group 
1 (no abortion-related experience, X = 50.8) and Group 3 (personal abor­
tion-related experience, X = 53.8) have mean "ego-involvement" scores high­
er than Group 2 (other abortion-related experience) mean (X = 50.3). How­
ever, no significant differences in means are found between the groups 
(see Tablé 23). The results of the t-test indicate that groups with and 
without abortion-related experience are comparably committed to their at­
titudes. 
Table 23. Differences in means for "ego-involvement" scores between 
experience groups 
Variable Experience Group Mean Difference t 
"Ego-involve­
ment" 
1-No experience 50.8 
2-Other experi- 50.3 
en ce 
.5 .47, p = N.S. 
1-No experience 50.8 
3-Personal ex- 53.8 -3.0 -1.64, p = N.S. 
perience 
2-Other experi- 50.3 
en ce 
3-Personal ex- 53.8 
perience 
-3.5 -I.8O, p = N.S. 
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Because the variable "ego-involvement" combines involvement with 
anti-abortion beliefs and involvement with pro-abortion rights beliefs, 
it is possible that systematic differences in ego-involvement are ob­
scured. The most important possibility is that "ego-involvement," as 
constructed, is a curvilinear variable (see Diagram 4). By distinguishing 
"Ego-involvement" 
70 (High) 
Abortion-
related 
experience 0 (Low) 
Group 1-None Group 2-Other Group 3-Personal 
Diagram 4. The curvilinear structure in the measurement of "ego-involve-
ment:" case 1, abortion-related experience 
between ego-involvement with anti-abortion beliefs and ego-involvement 
with pro-abortion rights beliefs, this problem may be resolved. To inves­
tigate this possibility, the variable "ego-involvement" is modified to 
identify respondents' abortion orientations (additional material on this 
issue begins on page 131). This is done in the following way. The scale 
"government limits" essentially measures respondents' abortion orienta­
tions; the range of responses is from 1 (no government restrictions on 
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abortion) to 9 (the government should totally forbid abortion). Hence, a 
low score (1 to 3) indicates a pro-abortion rights orientation, while a 
high score (7 to 9) indicates an anti-abortion orientation. This scale is 
recoded such that a score of 1, 2, or 3 = 1; 4, 5, or 6 = 0; and 7, 8, or 
9 = -1• This recoded "government limits" score is then multiplied by "ego-
involvement" (possible range from 14 to 70) to create an "ego-involvement 
(modified)" scale, with negative scores indicating a desire for the govern­
ment to regulate abortions, and positive scores indicating a desire for 
the government to place no restrictions on abortion (see Table 24). This 
Table 24. Frequency distribution for "ego-involvement (modified)" variable 
Score N % cum % 
-70 to -61 39 7.6 7.6 
-60 to -51 71 13.9 21.5 
Prohibit 
-50 to -41 31 6.1 27.6 
al 1 or 
most a- -40 to -31 11 2.2 29.8 
bortions 
-30 to -21 12 2.4 32.2 
-20 to -11 2 .4 32.6 
-10 to -1 0 — — 32.6 
Regulate 
abortion 
I 
0 
to 10 
167 
0 
32.7 65.3 
65.3 
11 to 20 3 .6 65.9 
No re­ 21 to 30 3 .6 66.5 
striction 
on abor­
tion 
31 
41 
to 40 
to 50 
16 
45 
3.1 
8.8 
69.6 
78.4 
51 to 60 78 15.3 93.7 
61 to 70 32 6.3 100.0 
Total 510 100.0 
X = .9 S.D. = 43.5 
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transformation changes the previously predicted curvilinear relationship 
into a predicted linear relationship (see Diagram 5). This procedure 
"Ego-involvement (modified)" 
Pro-rights +70 
Personal Other None 
Predicted 
correlation 
-70 Anti 
Diagram 5 -  The predicted linear relationship between "ego-involvement 
(modified)" and "experience" 
identifies a positive correlation between "experience" and "ego-involve­
ment (modified)" as evidence that, while members of all experience cate­
gories manifest similar intensities of ego-involvement (the conclusion 
of EH II and EH II'), respondents with personal experience favor no re­
strictions on abortion, and respondents without experience favor pro­
hibiting abortions. It is critical to note that "ego-involvement (modi­
fied)" can only be used to show support for the existence and direction of 
relationships between variables. Since the measure combines "ego-involve­
ment" and "government limits," the magnitude of the correlations cannot be 
attributed to "ego-involvement" per se. The empirical hypothesis is: 
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EH II : The higher the "experience" score, the higher the "ego-
® involvement (modified)" score. 
r = .19 P = 0.000 
EH llg: Accepted 
Empirical Hypothesis 11^ is supported. The combination of EH II and 
EH llg demonstrates that ego-involvement with abortion decisions is simi­
lar in intensity for respondents in all categories of abortion-related ex­
perience. Personal experience is not associated with greater ego-involve­
ment. However, there is a correlation between abortion-related experience 
and the anti-abort ion/pro-abort ion rights orientations of ego-involvement, 
which supports the contention that reality constraints imposed by immedi­
ate experience with a phenomenon (in this case, abortion decisions) do af­
fect the evaluative process. 
Hypothesis 111 
The third general hypothesis is that abortion-related socialization 
and ego-involvement with abortion decisions are positively correlated. 
This is the third bivariate relationship testing between the three theo­
ries, although in this case all three theories generate the same hypothe­
sis. Socialization is the second direct source of ego-involvement pre­
dicted, experience being the first. While a variety of peripheral social 
and personal variables are undoubtedly associated with ego-involvement, 
socialization concerning abortion has a •pTima faoie relationship with ego-
involvement with abortion. The more socialization and the more important 
the source of socialization for respondents, the more personally involved 
they are predicted to become. This prediction is compatible with all 
three theories, although the significance of the relationship varies. 
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According to social judgment theory, the relationship between socializa­
tion and ego-involvement is important. Socialization instills ego-involve­
ment, and, in combination, they result in more extreme latitudes of accept­
ance (narrower) and rejection (wider). For cognitive dissonance theory, 
there is only an implicit relationship between the variables. Socializa­
tion serves as a background against which individuals assess their behavi­
oral responses to specific situations. If, through whatever sources and 
experiences, individuals' beliefs are consistent with their behavior, there 
is no dissonance-induced tension requiring reduction. Consequently, so­
cialization is expected to be positively correlated with ego-involvement, 
unless there is a dissonance-producing experience. Attribution theory 
is similar to cognitive dissonance theory, although according to Tesser's 
(1976) formulation, when individuals have both socialization and experi­
ence with a phenomenon, experience will have the greater influence on ego-
Involvement and extremism. The concept ego-involvement is less critical 
to attribution theory, in which the dominating influence of experience 
over socialization is stressed. However, ego-involvement is a product of 
socialization. 
Positive correlations are predicted between the independent variables 
of "socialization," "socialization importance," and "socialization beliefs" 
and the dependent variable "ego-involvement." The empirical hypotheses 
for the relationships between socialization variables and "ego-involvement" 
are: 
EH III : The higher the "socialization" score, the higher the 
"ego-involvement" score. 
r = .09 p = 0.033 
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EH III : Accepted 
EH III ; The higher the "socialization importance" score, the 
® higher the "ego-involvement" score. 
r = .11 p = 0.014 
EH lllg: Accepted 
EH 11 lu* The higher the "socialization beliefs" score, the 
higher the "ego-involvement" score. 
r = .12 p = 0.007 
EH llljjî Accepted 
The third empirical hypothesis and its subhypotheses are supported, 
the correlations between socialization variables and "ego-involvement" 
are significant, although at very moderate levels. The possibility that, 
because "ego-involvement" combines anti-abortion and pro-abortion rights 
orientations, systematic differences are disguised (an issue raised in 
discussing Hypothesis II) again deserves investigation. If there is a 
systematic effect, using "ego-involvement (modified)" should identify it 
and result in higher correlations. 
The "ego-involvement (modified)" scale ranges from an anti-abortion 
(-70) to a pro-abortion rights (+70) orientation. Consequently, the cor­
relation between the socialization variables and "ego-involvement (modi­
fied)" Identifies the anti-abortion or pro-abortion rights orientation of 
the socialization. A positive correlation would indicate that high social­
ization was correlated with pro-abortion rights ego-involvement, while a 
negative correlation would indicate that high socialization was correlated 
with anti-abortion ego-involvement. This assumes that socialization has 
either an anti-abortion or pro-abortion rights orientation, otherwise 
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there is no basis for anticipating any correlation (this issue is pre­
sented in full beginning on page 111). Stating the hypothesis according 
to attribution theory, ego-involvement (modified) resulting from sociali­
zation is predicted to be restrictive, not being bound by reality con­
straints. The empirical hypotheses for the relationships between sociali­
zation variables and "ego-involvement (modified)" are: 
EH III : The higher the "socialization" score, the lower the 
^ "ego-involvement (modified)" score. 
r = -.41 p = 0.000 
EH '11Ç: Accepted 
EH III.: The higher the "socialization importance" score, the 
lower the "ego-involvement (modified)" score. 
r = -.18 p = 0.000 
EH Illy: Accepted 
EH III : The higher the "socialization beliefs" score, the 
® lower the "ego-involvement (modified)" score. 
r = -.34 p = 0.000 
EH III : Accepted 
e 
In all cases, the correlations between socialization variables and 
"ego-involvement (modified)" are significant and increase significantly 
2 2 the proportion of variance explained: (EH 111^ R = .17) - (EH III R = 
.01) = R^ of .16; (EH lllj R^ = .03) - (EH 111^ pf = .01) = R^ of .02; 
(EH lllg pf = .12) - (EH 111^ R^ = .01) = R^ of .11. The minimum increase 
in explained variance is 146 percent, for the association between "social­
ization importance" and "ego-involvement (modified)." These results sup­
port the prediction that the socialization variables have a restrictive 
quality, that increased socialization tends to be anti-abortion in nature. 
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The three theories' predictions regarding the relationship between 
socialization and ego-involvement are supported by hypothesis tests, al­
though the correlations are modest. This support is most important for 
social judgment theory, which relies upon ego-involvement resulting from 
socialization as a major determinant of the width of the various lati­
tudes. Both cognitive dissonance and attribution theories gain general 
support from these results, although, as noted before, the relationship 
between socialization and ego-involvement provides the general context 
within which respondents determine whether any attitude changes or self-
attribution are necessary due to inconsistency. 
Hypothesis IV 
The fourth general hypothesis is that abortion-related socialization 
Is positively correlated with abortion-related extremism. This is the 
fourth bivariate relationship testing between the three theories, although 
in this case all three theories generate the same hypothesis. This is 
the first hypothesis testing the dependent variable abortion-related ex­
tremism, the most Important variable for the theories being tested. For 
social judgment theory, the relationship between abortion-related social­
ization and abort ion-related extremism is more important than the associ­
ation between abortion-related experience and abortion-related extremism. 
Socialization establishes latitudes of rejection, noncommitment, and ac­
ceptance, which may be altered by experiences which occur within the lat­
itudes of acceptance or noncommitment. However, experiences that occur 
within the latitude of rejection are excluded axiomatically. Increased 
socialization serves to increase the inflexibility of the latitudes. 
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Further, unless socialization stresses ambiguity (i.e., noncommitment), 
the effect of increased socialization is also to increase the extremism 
of thé latitudes. 
For cognitive dissonance theory, the relationship between abortion-
related socialization and abortion-related extremism is similar to the re­
lationship between abortion-related socialization and ego-involvement with 
abortion decisions; socialization provides the context within which ex­
perience is evaluated to identify the need for attitude changes. A posi­
tive correlation between socialization variables and extremism variables 
is consistent with cognitive dissonance theory, but is not as important a 
theoretical link as is the association between abortion-related experience 
and abortion-related extremism. 
In Tesser's (1976) attribution theory, like cognitive dissonance the­
ory, the association between abortion-related experience and abortion-rela-
ted extremism is stressed. In contrast to dissonance theory, however, so­
cialization is identified by attribution theory as the source of extremism 
and experience is identified as a moderating factor. Consequently, it is 
important to attribution theory that an increase in socialization be cor­
related with an increase in extremism. 
Since the variable "socialization" has a range from 7 (very unim­
portant and no restriction) to 175 (very important and totally restricted), 
and the variable "extremism has a range from -14 (rejects all abortion 
conditions) to +14 (accepts all abortion conditions), a positive correla­
tion between concepts is identified by a negative correlation between em­
pirical variables. A similar reversal of correlation signs occurs for the 
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relationships between the independent variables, "socialization importance" 
and "socialization beliefs," and the dependent variable "extremism." (By 
testing the socialization subscales separately as "socialization impor­
tance" and "socialization beliefs," any ambiguity created by multiplying 
the item scores can be identified.) 
The empirical hypotheses for the associations between the independent 
socialization variables and the dependent variables, "extremism" and "gov­
ernment limits," are presented in three sections for greater clarity. Pre­
dicted relationships between the variable "socialization" and the varia­
bles "extremism" and "government limits" are presented in the first sec­
tion.^ Predicted relationships between "socialization importance" and the 
two dependent variables are presented in the second section, and predicted 
relationships between "socialization beliefs" and the two dependent vari­
ables are presented in the third section. 
EH IV ; The higher the "socialization" score, the lower the 
"extremism" score. 
r = -.33 P = 0.000 
EH IV: Accepted 
EH IV ; The higher the "socialization" score, the higher the 
® "government limits" score. 
r = .42 p = 0.000 
EH IVg: Accepted 
Both EH IV and EH IV^ are supported. Higher "socialization" scores are 
positively correlated with higher "extremism" scores. Higher "socializa­
tion" scores are also positively correlated with greater support for gov­
ernmental regulation of abortion. 
107 
EH IV : The higher the "socialization importance" score, the 
lower the "extremism" score. 
r = -.11 p = 0.016 
EH IV^: Accepted 
EH IV ; The higher the "socialization importance" score, the 
^ higher the "government limits" score. 
r = .20 p = 0.000 
EH IV^: Accepted 
Both EH IV|^ and EH IV^ are supported. The more important their sources of 
socialization are, the more extreme the respondents' attitudes concerning 
abortion are. Also, the more important their sources of socialization are, 
the more that respondents support governmental regulation of abortion. 
EH IV.: The higher the "socialization beliefs" score, the 
lower the "extremism" score. 
r = -.26 p = 0.000 
EH IVj: Accepted 
EH IV : The higher the "socialization beliefs" score, the 
® higher the "government limits" score. 
r = .33 p = 0.000 
EH IV^: Accepted 
Both EH IVj and EH IV^ are supported. The more restrictive the content of 
their socialization concerning abortion, the more extreme the respondents' 
attitudes concerning abortion are. Also, the more restrictive the content 
of their socialization concerning abortion, the more that respondents sup­
port governmental regulation of abortion. 
Further discussion of these results will follow the tests of associa­
tion between socialization and latitude variables. In passing, it is 
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noted that all six hypotheses regarding socialization variables and "ex­
tremism" and "government limits" are supported, and that the variable 
"socialization importance" is consistently the weakest predictor of the 
dependent variables. 
The associations between socialization variables and latitude varia­
bles vary, depending upon the specific latitude being tested. The higher 
the "latitude of rejection" score, the more abortion conditions are re­
jected. Socialization, the content of which typically is opposed to a-
bortion, would be positively correlated with a high latitude of rejection. 
This prediction is consistent with the generalization that socialization 
is restrictive (at least on the issue of abortion) and is the basis for 
predicting a positive correlation between socialization variables and the 
"latitude of rejection" and a negative correlation between socialization 
variables and the "latitude of acceptance." Further, presuming that so­
cialization is intended to instill attitudes that reduce ambiguity, it is 
predicted that socialization variables are not correlated with the "lati­
tude of noncommitment." The empirical hypotheses for the associations be­
tween the independent socialization variables and the dependent latitude 
variables are again presented in three sections for greater clarity. 
EH IV,: The higher the "socialization" score, the higher the 
"latitude of rejection" score. 
r = .36 p = 0.000 
EH IV^: Accepted 
EH IV : There is no correlation between "socialization" and 
® "latitude of noncommitment" scores. 
r = .00 p = N.S. 
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EH IV : Accepted 
9 
EH IV. : The higher the "socialization" score, the lower the 
"latitude of acceptance" score. 
r = -.26 p = 0.000 
EH IV|^; Accepted 
The three hypotheses concerning "socialization" and latitudes are sup­
ported. "Socialization" is correlated with an increased "latitude of 
rejection" score and a decreased "latitude of acceptance" score. As pre­
dicted, the "latitude of noncomitment" is not correlated with the varia­
ble "socialization." These correlations provide evidence that socializa­
tion increases extremism by reducing the number of acceptable alternative 
positions. 
EH IV.: The higher the "socialization importance" score, 
' the higher the "latitude of rejection" score. 
r = .17 p = 0.000 
EH IV.: Accepted 
EH IV.: There is no correlation between "socialization im-
portance" and "latitude of noncommitment" scores. 
r = -.03 p = M.S. 
EH IVj: Accepted 
EH IV. : The higher the "socialization importance" score, 
the lower the "latitude of acceptance" score. 
r = -.04 p = N.S. 
EH IV^: Rejected 
Only two of the three hypotheses concerning the importance of respondents' 
sources of socialization and latitudes are supported. Higher "socializa­
tion importance" scores are correlated with increased "latitude of 
no 
rejection" scores, and, as predicted, "socialization importance" is not 
correlated with "latitude of noncommitment." However, contrary to the 
prediction, "socialization importance" scores are not significantly cor­
related with narrower "latitudes of acceptance." 
EH IV.: The higher the "socialization beliefs" score, the 
higher the "latitude of rejection" score. 
r = .29 p = 0.000 
EH IVj: Accepted 
EH IV : There is no correlation between "socialization be-
liefs" and "latitude of noncommitment" scores. 
r = .03 p = N.S. 
EH IV : Accepted 
m 
EH IV : The higher the "socialization beliefs" score, the 
" lower the "latitude of acceptance" score. 
r = -.20 p = 0.000 
EH IV^: Accepted 
The three hypotheses concerning the restrictiveness of socialization and 
latitudes are supported. The more restrictive the abortion socialization, 
the wider the latitude of rejection and the narrower the latitude of ac­
ceptance. As predicted, "socialization beliefs" and "latitude of noncom­
mi tment" are not correlated. 
Eight of the nine hypotheses presented above are supported, and, a-
gain, "socialization importance" is found to be the weakest predictor of 
the dependent variables. In total, 12 of the 15 relationships between 
socialization variables and extremism variables are predicted to be cor­
related, and, of these, 11 correlations are, in fact, significant. The 
correlation predicted to be significant, but which failed to achieve 
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significance, involves the variable "socialization importance." While the 
combination of "socialization importance" and "socialization beliefs" ex­
plains a greater proportion of the variance in the extremism measures than 
does either variable alone, the contribution of these two subscales is 
quantitatively and qualitatively distinct. In all cases, the correlations 
between "socialization beliefs" and extremism variables are stronger than 
the corresponding correlations between "socialization importance" and the 
extremism variables. Further, "socialization importance" is not signifi­
cantly correlated with the variable "latitude of acceptance" and only ex­
plains a small portion of the variance in the variable "latitude of re-
jection" (R = .03). In contrast, "socialization beliefs" is significant­
ly correlated with both "latitude of rejection" and "latitude of accep-
tance," explaining a greater proportion of the variance in each (R = .08 
and .04 respectively) than does "socialization importance." Thus, it ap­
pears that "socialization importance" more accurately reflects the sig­
nificance of anti-abortion socialization sources. 
Biased measures, whether biased toward a pro-abortion rights or an 
anti-abortion orientation, are a significant concern. However, the issue 
of bias has not been addressed in the research measuring abortion atti­
tudes. The research and questionnaires used as models for this study 
(Bowers and Weaver, 1979; Ebaugh and Haney, 1980; Finlay, 1981; Tedrow and 
Mahoney, 1979) uniformly consider the extent to which abortion should be 
proscribed, without considering the prescription of abortion. Similarly, 
with the sources of abortion attitudes, an origin of bias can be identi­
fied. It is doubtful that any source of socialization pertinent to 
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society in general encourages or idealizes abortion (as sonne groups ide­
alize not obtaining an abortion). Consequently, any objective measurement 
of socialization sources' influence on individuals' attitudes will reflect 
an abortion orientation ranging from neutral to anti-abortion. To the ex­
tent that this socially exaggerated anti-abortion orientation is identi­
fied in a questionnaire, no problem exists. However, if a questionnaire 
is constructed, albeit unintentionally, so that only the possibility of 
opposition to abortion is measured, that orientation is imposed upon the 
findings, whether or not it is accurate. Where studies have been de­
scriptive, the effect of this bias on findings is minimal. However, when 
the relationships between variables are being analyzed, bias becomes a 
significant factor. Because the relationships between variables are anal­
yzed here, it is necessary to investigate the issue of scale bias. 
To test for possible anti-abortion bias in the variable "socializa­
tion importance," "extremism" is recoded into three approximately equal 
groups: Group 1, anti-abortion (with "extremism" scores of -14 to -5), 
Group 2, neutral (with "extremism" scores of -4 to +5), and Group 3, pro-
abortion rights (with "extremism" scores of +6 to +14). This recoding al­
lows t-tests of the socialization variables and constituent items (see Ta­
bles 25 and 26).^ The results of the t-tests demonstrate that the respon­
dents in the anti-abortion group have significantly higher "socialization 
importance" scores than do respondents in either the neutral or pro-abor­
tion rights groups (which do not differ significantly). The anti-abor­
tion group is also significantly different from the pro-abortion rights 
group on five constituent items: (1) the importance of religion, (2) the 
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Table 25. Differences in means for "socialization importance" scores be-
tween extremism groups 
Variable Extremism group Mean Difference t 
"SocialIzation 
importance" 
1-Anti-abortion 
2-Neutral 
30.0 
28.0 2 .0 2.22, P = 0.029 
l-Anti-abortlon 
3-Pro-abortion rights 
30.0 
28.0 2 .0 2.23, P = 0.028 
2-Neutral 
3-Pro-abortion rights 
28.0 
28.0 0 .0 0.05, P 
= N.S. 
importance of the mass media (T.V., Radio, and News), (3) the importance 
of parents, (4) the importance of friends, and (5) the importance of bro­
thers and sisters (see Table 26). Religion distinguishes between all 
three groups, with anti-abortion respondents considering it most important 
and pro-abortion rights respondents considering it least important. Dif­
ferences between groups on the Importance of religion as a source of abor­
tion-related socialization are the largest of those identified by the t-
tests, supporting the importance of religion for abortion attitudes. Mass 
media distinguish between pro-abortion rights respondents and both anti-
abortion and neutral respondents (who do not differ significantly). Pro-
abortion rights respondents consider the mass media to be the most impor­
tant source of abortion attitudes, and antl-abortlon respondents consider 
it to be least important. This again provides some evidence that experi­
ence, in this instance reality constraints identified In the News, moder­
ates extremism, in contrast to the exacerbating effect of socialization 
and religion on extremism. Parents as an Important source of abortion-re­
lated socialization also distinguish anti-abortion respondents from both 
Table 26. Differences in means for "socialization importance" scores by socialization source 
between extremism groups 
Socialization source Extremism group Mean Difference t 
Religion 1-Anti-abort ion 
2-Neutral 
5.2 
4.0 1.2 6.64, p = 0.000 
1-Anti-abortion 
3-Pro-abortion rights 
5.2 
3.4 1.8 9.09, 
p = 0.000 
2-Neutral 
3-Pro-abortion rights 
4.0 
3.4 0.6 3.42, 
p = 0.001 
Education 1-Anti-abort ion 2-Neutral 
4.1 
4.1 0.0 0.37, 
p = N.S. 
I-Anti-abortion 
3-Pro-abortion rights 
4.1 
4.3 -0.2 -0.92, 
p = N.S. 
2-Neutral 
3-Pro-abortion rights 
4.1 
4.3 -0.2 -2.08, 
p = 0.038 
Philosophy/ethics 1-Anti-abort ion 2-Neutral 
4.1 
3.9 
0.2 0.75, p = N.S. 
1-Anti-abort ion 
3-Pro-abortion rights 
4.1 
3.9 0.2 0.78, 
p = N.S. 
2-Neutral 
3-Pro-abortion rights 
3.9 
3.9 0.0 0.12, 
p = N.S. 
T.v., Radio, 
News 
J-Anti-abort ion 
2-Neutral 
1-Anti-abort ion 
3-Pro-abortion rights 
3.4 
3.7 
3.4 
4.0 
-0.3 
-0.6 
-1.40, 
-2.73, 
p = N.S. 
p = 0.007 
2-Neutral 
3-Pro-abortion rights 
3.7 
4.0 -0.3 -2.34, p = 0.020 
Parents 1-Anti-abort ion 2-Neutral 
4.9 
4.5 
0.4 2.43, p = 0.017 
1-Anti-abort ion 
3-Pro-abortion rights 
4.9 
4.3 0.6 3.01, 
p = 0.003 
2-Neutral 
3-Pro-abortion rights 
4.5 
4.3 0.2 1.00, 
p = N.S. 
Friends 1-Anti-abort ion 2-Neutral 
4.2 
4.4 -0.2 -0.99, p = N.S. 
1-Anti-abort ion 
3-Pro-abortion rights 
4.2 
4.6 -0.4 -2.10, p = 0.038 
2-Neutral 
3-Pro-abortion rights 
4.4 
4.6 -0.2 -1.85, 
p = N.S. 
Brothers/sisters 1-Anti-abort ion 2-Neutral 
4.0 
3.5 0.5 2.48, 
p = 0.014 
1-Anti-abort ion 
3-Pro-abortion rights 
4.0 
3.4 0.6 2.47, p = 0.015 
2-Neutral 
3-Pro-abortion rights 
3.5 
3.4 0.1 0.23, 
p = N.S. 
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neutral and pro-abortion rights respondents (who do not differ signifi­
cantly). Anti-abortion respondents consider their parents to be more im­
portant sources of socialization concerning abortion than do neutral or 
pro-abortion rights respondents. On the other hand, pro-abortion rights 
respondents consider friends to be a more important source of abortion at­
titudes than do anti-abortion respondents. Further, while pro-abortion 
rights and neutral respondents do not differ significantly concerning the 
importance of brothers and sisters as sources of abortion attitudes, both 
groups consider siblings to be a less important source than does the anti-
abortion group. The other two items (Philosophy/ethics and Education) do 
not distinguish between anti-abortion and pro-abortion rights respondents. 
Philosophy/ethics does not distinguish between any of the groups, and edu­
cation distinguishes only between neutral and pro-abortion rights groups. 
The scale items for "socialization beliefs," which measures how re­
strictive respondents believe their socialization concerning abortion was, 
may have a similar bias (the scale ranges from "no restrictions" to "to­
tally restricted") that would increase the correlation between "sociali­
zation beliefs" and variables that measure anti-abortion orientations, 
most notably "government limits" (how much the government should restrict 
abortions) and the "latitude of rejection." Consequently, it is not evi­
dent whether the stronger correlation between "socialization beliefs" and 
both "government limits" and "latitude of rejection" (when compared with 
the correlation between "socialization beliefs" and the "latitude of ac­
ceptance") represents a stronger relationship between theoretic concepts 
or simply more compatible empirical biases. Whether such biases are 
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avoidable or a consequence of the abortion issue is a subject to be con­
sidered in the summary of the hypotheses found in Chapter VI. 
Hypothesis 
The fifth general hypothesis is that abortion-related experience is 
positively correlated with abortion-related extremism. This is the second 
hypothesis testing the dependent variable abortion-related extremism and 
is a critical test of the specific theories. According to both cognitive 
dissonance theory and social judgment theory, a positive correlation 
exists between the two concepts. The rationale for this prediction is 
that attitudes provide justification for behavior. Specifically, accord­
ing to cognitive dissonance theory, choice (behavior) results in attitudes 
which reduce dissonance by reinforcing the choice (behavior). According 
to social judgment theory, experience reinforces attitudes (promoting ex­
tremism), and experiences that do not reinforce attitudes (i.e., that oc­
cur within the latitude of rejection) are simply discounted. On the other 
hand, according to attribution theory, an inverse relationship exists be­
tween experience and extremism. The rationale for this prediction is 
that, by imposing reality constraints upon the decision process, experi­
ence moderates extremism. 
The actual formulation of a test hypothesis, however, is complicated 
by the measurement of abortion-related extremism. Initially, according 
to attribution theory, it appears that abortion-related experience, by 
moderating extremism at both ends of the anti-abortlon/pro-abortion rights 
continuum, should be predicted to be associated with both a decreased ac­
ceptance of abortion and a decreased acceptance of abortion's legal 
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proscription; in other words, that abortion should be disapproved of but 
at least conditionally tolerated. The underlying assumption here is thai 
the distribution of beliefs concerning abortion represents a standard dis­
tribution on a continuum ranging from prohibiting abortion to not regula­
ting abortion (see Diagram 6). 
4 3 4 3 2 0 2 
Proscribe No legal 
abortion regulation 
Diagram 6. Initial prediction of the distribution of beliefs on the 
abortion-regulation continuum 
Experience with abortion-related decisions would be predicted to in­
crease the central tendency of the distribution, while reducing the lati­
tudes of the end positions (see Diagram 7). This prediction, however, is 
based on a misunderstanding of the abortion-regulation continuum. The full 
abortion-regulation continuum actually ranges from legally proscribing a-
bortion to legally prescribing abortion, with no legal regulation occupy­
ing the midpoint. For example, preventing the government from regulating 
abortions, while forcing it to pay for them, would impose an active govern­
ment support for abortion. This condition would be located at approximate­
ly "1" on the full abortion-regulation continuum presented in Diagram 8. 
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4 3 2 
Proscr î be 
abort ion 
0 2 3 4 
No legal 
régulât ion 
Diagram 7. Initial prediction of the effect of experience with abortion-
related decisions on the distribution of beliefs on the abor­
tion-regulation continuum 
When the continuum is corrected to reflect the full range of abortion regu­
lation, a hypothetical distribution would predict the distribution of be­
liefs to be skewed toward the prohibition of abortion, while a normal dis­
tribution would predict "no regulation" to be the modal response (see 
-4 -3 "2 -I 0 2 3 4  
Proscribe 
abortion 
No legal 
regulation . 
Prescribe 
abortion 
hypothetical distribution 
normal distribution 
Diagram 8 .  Normal and hypothetical distributions of beliefs on the full 
abortion-regulation continuum 
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Diagram 8). Consequently, a more reliable prediction is that, using a le­
gal proscription - no regulation continuum (the left half of the full a-
bortion-regulation continuum only), the distribution of beliefs will be 
skewed toward the no-regulation position. 
The moderating effect of experience predicted in accordance with at­
tribution theory would reduce extremism on the full abortion-regulation 
continuum and would be signified by respondents opposing government reg­
ulation to either require or prohibit abortions. Unfortunately, the items 
in the scale measuring "extremism" address only the past prohibitions and 
present conditions of abortion that are debated in the controversy over 
government regulation of abortion. Consequently, "extremism" scores that 
are moderated by experience are identified by a positive increase in the 
"extremism" score (which indicates an acceptance of abortion in a larger 
variety of situations). The result is that, in effect, the three theories 
cannot be distinguished by the relationships between "experience" and both 
"extremism" and "government limits." 
The empirical hypothesis for the relationship between "experience" and 
"extremism" is: 
EH V : The higher the "experience" score, the higher the "ex­
tremism" score. 
r = .15 p = 0.001 
EH V : Accepted 
"Government limits" has a range from 1 (no restrictions) to 9 (totally 
restricted). This is in contrast to "extremism," for which the highest 
value signifies opposition to restriction on the availability of abortion. 
Consequently, a negative correlation between "experience" and "government 
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limits" identifies a positive correlation between tlie concepts abortion-
related experience and abortion-related extremism. The empirical hypothe­
sis for the relationship between "experience" and "government limits" is: 
EH V ; The higher the "experience" score, the lower the 
® "government limits" score. 
r = -.18 p = 0.000 
EH V^: Accepted 
Both EH V and EH are supported. These results support all three 
theories, albeit rather modestly. To further identify the relationship 
between "experience" and "government limits," a t-test of mean "government 
limits" scores for experience groups is presented. It is predicted that 
respondents with personal abortion-related experience (Group 3) will ac­
cept the least government regulation (as measured by "government limits"), 
followed by respondents with other abortion-related experience (Group 2), 
with respondents with no abortion-related experience (Group 1) accepting 
the most government regulation. The results of the t-test are presented 
in Table 27, and Diagram 9 shows the distribution of responses to "govern­
ment limits" by experience groups. 
A bimodal distribution is clearly evident in Diagram 9, indicating 
that abort ion-related experience alone does not lead to an acceptance of 
abortion. The diagram also shows the shift (reduction) in means as the 
personalness of abort ion-related experience increases, a result verified 
by the group means presented in Table 27. Of the three t-tests of group 
means, all three means varied as predicted (X = 5.1 for the no abortion-
related experience group, 4.4 for the other abortion-related experience 
group, and 3.7 for the personal abort ion-related experience group). 
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although only two of the tests (the difference between Group 1 and Group 2 
and the difference between Group 1 and Group 3) are significant. It is 
evident that the dominant distinction is between respondents with no abor­
tion-related experience and those respondents with either personal or other 
abortion-related experience. The more direct confrontation with reality 
constraints experienced by respondents with personal abortion-related ex­
perience does not, in this instance, significantly reduce the acceptance 
of government limits on abortion. Thus, while experience is shown to 
moderate extremism (rather than intensify it), the effect appears to re­
sult from careful consideration of the issue and not from personal involve­
ment per se. 
Table 27. Differences in means for "government limits" scores between 
experience groups 
Variable Experience group Mean Difference t 
"Government 1-No experience 
limits" 2-Other experience 
1-No experience 
3-Personal experience 
2-Other experience 
3-Personal experience 
What is needed, and provided by the "latitude of rejection" and "lati­
tude of acceptance" variables, is a test that discriminates between the 
theories. According to social judgment theory, when individuals are ego-
involved with an attitude, the latitude of acceptance and noncommitment 
narrow, while the latitude of rejection widens. Since experiences that 
are inconsistent with one's attitudes are discounted, as a by-product of 
0.7 3.00, p = 0.003 
1.4 3.16, p = 0.003 
0.7 1.55, P = N.S. 
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ego-involvement, experience serves to reinforce attitude extremism. Ex­
periences that occur within the latitude of noncommitment may widen the 
latitude of acceptance or latitude of noncommitment; however, given the 
controversy surrounding the abortion issue, it is more likely that exper­
iences will occur within either the latitude of acceptance or latitude of 
rejection, reinforcing attitude extremism in either instance. 
According to cognitive dissonance theory, experience with a phenome­
non results in narrow latitudes of acceptance and noncommitment and a wide 
latitude of rejection, identical to the predictions of social judgment 
theory. Experience determines subsequent attitudes, which, in turn, re­
duce dissonance by justifying the action taken and by rejecting the appro­
priateness of all foregone alternatives (although such post-decision dis­
sonance reduction has only qualified support; see Ehrlich et al.t 1957; 
Canon, 1964; Freedman, 1965). Dissonance reduction, by justifying a spe­
cific behavior and rejecting all other possibilities, establishes a narrow 
latitude of acceptance, a minimal latitude of noncommitment, and a wide 
latitude of rejection. 
According to Tesser's (1976) attribution theory, experience with a 
phenomenon will result in a wider latitude of acceptance, a wider latitude 
of noncommitment, and a narrower latitude of rejection. Reality con­
straints imposed by the experience and the process of reaching a decision 
force a participant to consider the rewards and costs (both attained and 
foregone) of the decision. As a result of this analysis, the participant 
is able to identify important limitations in the choice made and alterna­
tive conditions or circumstances where other choices may be superior. 
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whether for self or for others. 
The distinct predictions concerning the width of the latitudes pro­
vide a test that discriminates between Tesser's attribution theory, on 
the one hand, and both social judgment and cognitive dissonance theories, 
on the other. The empirical hypotheses for the relationships between "ex­
perience" and the "latitude of rejection," "latitude of noncommitment," 
and "latitude of acceptance" are: 
Social judgment, cognitive dissonance Attribution 
EH V, 
EH V 
The higher the "experience" 
score, the higher the "lati­
tude of rejection" score. 
r = -.18 
EH Vy: Rejected 
The higher the "experience" 
score, the lower the "lati­
tude of noncommitment" 
score. 
r = -.09 
EH V^: Accepted 
EH V The higher the "experience" 
score, the lower the "lati­
tude of acceptance" score. 
r = .16 
EH Vj: Rejected 
E H  V , T h e  h i g h e r  t h e  " e x p e r i e n c e "  
score, the lower the "lati­
tude of rejection" score. 
p = 0.000 
EH Accepted 
EH V ,: The higher the "experience" 
^ score, the lower the "lati­
tude of noncommitment" 
score. 
p = 0.038 
EH V^,: Accepted 
EH V.,: The higher the "experience" 
score, the higher the 
"latitude of acceptance" 
score. 
p = 0.000 
EH V Accepted 
Two of the three hypotheses predicted by social judgment and cogni­
tive dissonance theories are rejected, while all three hypotheses predicted 
by attribution theory are supported. The actual indication of support for 
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attribution theory is provided by the valance of the correlations. If the 
correlations with the "latitude of rejection" and "latitude of acceptance" 
were reversed (that is, if EH r = + and EH r = -), the "latitude of 
rejection" would be wide and the "latitude of acceptance" narrow, support­
ing cognitive dissonance and social judgment theories. 
The possibility of a systematic bias in the variables, which has been 
substantiated in the previous hypothesis tests, must again be addressed. 
Of concern is the possibility that the values of "experience" (1 = no 
experience, 2 = other experience, and 3 - personal experience) are im-
plicitly measures of anti-abortion, neutral, and pro-abortion rights be­
liefs. Such a bias could result either from experience causing pro-abor­
tion rights beliefs or from interaction between experience and abortion be­
liefs. Partial correlations between the independent variable "experience" 
and the dependent variables "latitude of rejection," "latitude of noncom-
mitment," and "latitude of acceptance," controlling for degree of support 
for the Supreme Court decision on abortion {Roe v. WadSj 410 U.S. 113 
(1972)) (see Table 28) are presented in Table 29. This control variable 
is selected because it is completely independent of the items used to 
measure the latitudes. The result of this procedure is a pronounced de­
crease in the strength of the correlations. The correlation between "ex­
perience" and the "latitude of rejection" is no longer significant, and 
the significance of the other two correlations is reduced. However, the 
direction of the correlations remains unchanged; "experience" remains cor­
related with a higher "latitude of acceptance" score. 
While the results of these hypothesis tests (particularly EH V^, and 
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Table 28. Strength of agreement with the Supreme Court decision {Eoe v. 
Wccâe, 410 U.S. 113 (1972)) 
Response Score N % 
Strongly agree 5 91 17.9 
Agree 4 240 47.0 
Not sure 3 44 8.6 
Disagree 2 90 17.7 
Strongly disagree 1 40 7.9 
Missing 0 5 .9 
Total 510 100.0 
X = 3.5 S.D. = 1.23 
Table 29. Partial correlation coefficients between "experience" and "lati­
tude of rejection," "latitude of noncommitment," and "latitude 
of acceptance," controlling for agreement with the Supreme Court 
decision on abortion 
"Latitude of "Latitude of "Latitude of 
rejection" noncommi tment" acceptance" 
"Experience" r = -.05 r = -.10 r = .09 
p = N.S. p = 0.027 p = 0.034 
EH Vj,, which distinguish attribution theory from the other two theories) 
support attribution theory, they do not "disprove" social judgment and 
cognitive dissonance theory, it is possible, even likely, that specific 
individuals experience cognitive dissonance as a consequence of abortion-
related experience. The difficulty is in identifying those respondents 
who made abortion decisions that created dissonance. A specific event 
related to abortion is identified by 79 respondents as the cause of a 
change in their values concerning abortion. Of these 79 respondents, 26 
have reversed their values as a result of their abortion experience, a 
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change consistent with cognitive dissonance theory (and attribution theo­
ry) and inconsistent with social judgment theory. (The reactions of the 
53 respondents whose attitudes changed by degree - more or less strongly 
and unsure - are more consistent with changes in the width of latitudes 
predicted by social judgment theory.) However, of the 26 respondents who 
have reversed their values, six have had no abort ion-related experience, 
and nine have not provided any advice concerning abortion that contradicted 
their personal values. This leaves 11 repondents whose attitudes have 
changed in a manner consistent with cognitive dissonance theory predic­
tions. Thus, It does not appear that cognitive dissonance theory is ade­
quate to explain the formation of abortion attitudes for the sample as a 
whole. At the same time, there is sufficient support for cognitive disso­
nance theory in specific cases to prohibit discounting the theory en­
tirely. 
The tests of the hypotheses regarding abortion-related experience and 
extremism support attribution theory. However, an analysis of attitude 
change caused by specific abortion events provides support for both social 
judgment theory (value changes by degree) and cognitive dissonance theory 
(attitude reversals). Consequently, it is inappropriate to simply reject 
social judgment and cognitive dissonance theories. However, in the dis­
criminating test based upon the width of the latitudes, it is attribution 
theory which is supported. 
Hypothesis VI 
The sixth general hypothesis is that ego-involvement with abortion 
decisions is positively correlated with abortion-related extremism. This 
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is the final test of the dependent variable abortion-related extremism and 
is an important test of social judgment theory. While, according to cog­
nitive dissonance theory, ego-involvement and extremism are positively re­
lated, the relationship between these two concepts is central to social 
judgment theory and only a peripheral concern for cognitive dissonance 
theory. According to social judgment theory, the more ego-involved indi­
viduals become with specific attitudes, the more entrenched their atti­
tudes become. While this does not invariably result in a narrow latitude 
of acceptance, the intervention of external factors is required to main­
tain a wide latitude of acceptance. For social judgment theory, then, 
ego-involvement with abortion decisions is predicted to be associated with 
narrow latitudes of acceptance and noncommitment and a wide latitude of 
rejection. In contrast, while ego-involvement is not dealt with specifi­
cally in Tesser's (1976) attribution theory, ego-involvement (like exper­
ience) with a phenomenon is associated with a wide latitude of acceptance 
and narrow latitudes of rejection and noncommitment. In part, this pre­
diction is a matter of consistency; an individual who is ego-involved with 
activity concerning a phenomenon is anticipated to develop a consistent 
system of beliefs about that phenomenon. Since experience is associated 
with a wide latitude of acceptance, ego-involvement is also associated 
with a wide latitude of acceptance as a reinforcer of behavior. 
For all three theories, a direct correlation exists between "ego-in­
volvement" and both "extremism" and "government limits." 
EH VI : The higher the "ego-involvement" score, the lower the 
"extremism" score. 
r = .05 p = N.S. 
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EH VI: Rejected 
EH VI : The higher the "ego-involvement" score, the higher the 
® "government limits" score. 
r = .02 p = N.S. 
EH VIg: Rejected 
These two hypotheses are not supported; the desire to have one's own 
abortion attitudes accepted as normative is not significantly correlated 
with "extremism" or "government limits." Not only do the correlations be­
tween "ego-involvement" and these two variables fail to achieve signifi­
cance, to the extent that any correlations exist, they are positive rather 
than negative as predicted. Nonetheless, the lack of support for EH VI 
and EH Vl^ affects the theories equally. The test between social judgment 
theory (and cognitive dissonance theory) and attribution theory is based 
upon EH Vly (and EH Vl^ (and ^,), and EH VI^ (and j,), which hypothe­
size relationships between "ego-involvement" and the latitude variables. 
Social judgment, cognitive dissonance Attribution 
EH Vly: The higher the "ego-in- EH VI The higher the "ego-in-
volvement" score, "the volvement" score, the lower 
higher the "latitude of the "latitude of rejection" 
rejection" score. score. 
r = .12 p = 0.015 
EH Vl^: Accepted EH Vl^,: Rejected 
EH VI : The higher the "ego-in- EH VI The higher the "ego-in­
volvement" score, the ^ volvement" score, the lower 
lower the "latitude of the "latitude of noncommit-
noncommitment" score. ment" score. 
r = -.34 p = 0.000 
EH Vl^; Accepted EH Vl^,: Accepted 
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EH VI.: The higher the "ego-in-
« . . -H J . I I  A. \  volvement" score, the 
lower the "latitude of 
acceptance" score. 
EH VI.,: The higher the "ego-in-
0 A.U .i.1 volvement" score, the 
higher the "latitude of 
acceptance" score. 
r = .17 p = 0.000 
EH VIRejected EH VIj,: Accepted 
All three theories are supported by the results of EH Vl^ and EH Vl^, 
that "ego-involvement" is correlated with a narrow "latitude of noncommit-
ment." Results of EH Vl^ support social judgment and cognitive dissonance 
theories; attribution theory is supported by the significant correlation 
between "ego-involvement" and a wide "latitude of acceptance" (EH Vl^,). 
To this point, the results of testing EH VI and its subhypotheses support 
both social judgment theory (and cognitive dissonance theory, for which the 
relationship between ego-involvement and abortion-related extremism is 
only a peripheral concern) and attribution theory. However, in the previ­
ous hypotheses in which "ego-involvement" has been involved (Hypotheses 11 
and ill), the variable "ego-involvement (modified)" has been used to clari­
fy the relationship between the variables. As previously stated, because 
the variable "ego-involvement" combines involvement with both anti-abortion 
and pro-abortion rights beliefs, it is possible that it obscures systematic 
differences in ego-involvement. The most important implication to be drawn 
from the tests of EH Vlj^ through EH VI^ (and EH Vl^, through EH Vl^,) is 
the possibility that "ego-involvement," as constructed, is a curvilinear 
variable. Diagram 10 displays the results of EH Vl^, EH Vl^, and EH VI^ 
(and EH Vl^, through EH Vl^,) (although the "latitude of noncommitment" is 
not separately identified). 
Since the "ego-involvement" scale contains both an anti-abortion and 
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"Ego-i nvolvement" 
70 (High) 
Abortion-
related 
extremism 0 (Low) +14 
"Latitude of rejection" II Latitude of acceptance' 
Diagram 10. The curvilinear structure in the measurement of "ego-involve­
ment:" case 2, abortion-related extremism 
pro-abortion rights bias, it is capable of correlating significantly with 
other scales that contain a consistent bias. Since "extremism" and "gov­
ernment limits" include both anti-abortion and pro-abortion rights values, 
it is possible that the failure to obtain significant correlations with 
"ego-involvement" reflects the comparative neutrality of their measures, 
thus cancelling each other out. 
While control variables may clarify the relationship between ego-in­
volvement and extremism, they do not resolve the problem of curvilinear 
structure identified in Diagram 10. By distinguishing between ego-involve­
ment with anti-abortion beliefs and ego-involvement with pro-abortion 
rights beliefs through the use of "ego-involvement (modified)," this prob­
lem is resolved. By extending "ego-involvement" to include anti-abortion 
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involvement, the concept can be represented in a linear manner, as demon­
strated in Diagram 11. 
"Ego-involvement (modified)" 
Predicted 
correlation 
+70 Pro-rights 
-14 +14 
Anti Pro-r ights 
-70 Ant i 
'Extremism" 
Diagram 11. The linear structure of "ego-involvement (modified)" 
Replacing the original "ego-involvement" variable with "ego-involve­
ment (modified)" results in the following four empirical hypotheses. 
EH VI : The higher the "ego-involvement (modified)" score, the 
® higher the "extremism" score. 
r = .67 p = 0.000 
EH Vi^: Accepted 
Social judgment, cognitive dissonance 
EH VI,: There is no correlation be­
tween "ego-involvement 
(modified)" and "latitude 
of rejection" scores. 
EH VI 
Attribution 
The higher the "ego-in­
volvement (modified)" 
score, the lower the 
"latitude of rejection" 
score. 
r = 
.63 p = 0.000 
134 
EH Vl^: Rejected EH Vl^,: Accepted 
There is no correlation be- ' EH VI , 
tween "ego-involvement ^ 
(modified)" and "latitude 
of noncommitment" scores. 
EH Vl_: l_,: There is no correlation 
between "ego-involvement 
(modified)" and "latitude 
of noncommitment" scores. 
r = -.08 
Accepted 
p = M.S. 
EH VI ; EH Vl^,: Accepted 
EH VI, : There is no correlation be- EH VI The higher the "ego-in-
volvement (modified)" 
score, the higher the 
"latitude of acceptance" 
score. 
­
tween "ego-involvement 
(modified)" and "latitude 
of acceptance" scores. 
r = .63 p = 0.000 
EH Vl^: Rejected EH VI^: Accepted 
The first hypothesis is supported. The use of "ego-Involvement (modi­
fied)" raises the correlation between this variable and "extremism" to a 
significant level. "Government limits" is excluded from this analysis be­
cause it is used to determine the anti-abortion or pro-abortion rights 
direction of "ego-involvement (modified)." The most significant result of 
the use of "ego-involvement (modified)" for testing between the theories 
concerns its correlation with the "latitude of rejection." The correla­
tion Is now negative and significant, adding support for attribution theo­
ry. It appears that the correlation In EH Vl^ reflects a comparatively 
stronger relationship between ego-involvement with opposition to abortion 
and a wide latitude of rejection than is the relationship between ego-
Involvement with support for abortion rights and a narrow latitude of re­
jection. 
A second consequence of using "ego-involvement (modified)" Is that 
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the relationship between the variables, as predicted by social judgment 
and cognitive dissonance theories, are changed. The changes identified 
for EH VI and EH VI ,, when they are restated as EH VI and EH VI ,, pro-
c c' g g 
vide an example of the course of this change. For EH Vl^ (and EH Vl^,), 
the more ego-involvement respondents have, the less likely they are to 
have a wide latitude of noncommitment. This is a linear, inverse rela­
tionship (see Diagram 12). "Ego-involvement (modified)" creates a linear 
continuum between the extreme positions of opposing abortion and support­
ing abortion rights, with the "ego-involvement" approximately equal on 
all continuum points (see Diagram 11). In comparison to EH VI^ (and 
EH Vl^,), the expectation for "ego-involvement (modified)" (EH V1^ and 
EH VIg,) is a curvilinear relationship which results in no significant 
correlation between variables because both anti-abortion and pro-abortion 
rights respondents are predicted to have narrow latitudes of noncommit­
ment, and the abortion orientation of both groups is included in the 
scale (see Diagram 12). A similar curvilinear relationship is predicted 
by social judgment and cognitive dissonance theories for EH Vl^ and EH 
V ' h -
With one exception, the test results from Hypothesis VI and its sub-
hypotheses support attribution theory. The support for social judgment 
and cognitive dissonance theories is provided by EH Vl^. However, when 
"ego-involvement" is modified to separate anti-abortion and pro-abortion 
rights respondents, the resulting correlation supports attribution theory. 
It appears that the results of EH VIreflect a stronger correlation be­
tween opposition to abortion and a wide latitude of rejection than between 
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Diagram 12. A comparison of Empirical Hypotheses VI (and VI ,) and VI 
(and VIg,) 9 
support for abortion rights and a narrow latitude of rejection. These 
results are most important for supporting attribution theory and not sup­
porting social judgment theory, in which the focus is ego-involvement. 
Cognitive dissonance theory is not supported either; however, in this the­
ory there is less concern for the concept of ego-involvement. 
Ancillary Relationships 
A variety of ancillary relationships are addressed in this section. 
These ancillary issues do not alter the principal findings of this study. 
The tests to identify the theory according to which abortion-related ex­
tremism is best predicted have been completed, and attribution theory re­
ceived the strongest support. However, the magnitude of the correlations 
between the four basic variables is less than desired. Thus, while 
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attribution is, in this case, the more heuristic theory, it is possible 
that other variables are equally important, if not more so. To develop 
a more complete understanding of abortion-related extremism, three ancil­
lary issues are analyzed in greater detail. First, the relationship be­
tween religion and abortion-related extremism is analyzed. Second, with 
"life evaluation" the issue of whether respondents' attitudes are focused 
upon abortion per se or extended to grant fetal rights is analyzed. 
Third, with "family traditionalism" the issue of whether abortion atti­
tudes are associated with normlessness is analyzed. 
Due to sample homogeneity, any effects that age, marital status, 
number of children, or education may have on the public abortion contro­
versy are not identifiable In this study. The number of siblings (Table 
5) in the respondent's family is unrelated to the major variables and var­
iable relationships. There is less sample homogeneity concerning respon­
dents' parents' occupations; however, this variable is also unrelated to 
the major variables. 
Anci1lary i ssue; religion 
The only socio-demographic variables significantly correlated with 
the major variables are those concerning religion ("present religious 
preference," "affiliation of childhood religious instruction," "impor­
tance of religion," and "religious service attendance"). As is evident 
in Table 30, the magnitude of the correlations with the theory-related 
variables shows that the religion variables are distinct. The three var­
iables with which measures of religion are not correlated ("latitude of 
noncommitment," "experience," and "ego-involvement") are exceptions. The 
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Table 30. Correlations between abortion variables and religion variables^ 
"Present 
Abortion religious 
variables preference" 
"Aff illation 
of childhood "Religious 
religious "Importance service 
instruction" or religion" attendance" 
r -.28 r -.21 r = -.35 r -.47 
"Extremism" 
P 
= 0.000 P 0.000 P 
= 0.000 P 0.000 
"Latitude of r .27 r .26 r 
= 
.39 r .45 
rejection" P 0.000 P 0.000 P = 0.000 P 0.000 
"Latitude of r 
= 
-.01 r -.03 r = -.05 r -.01 
noncommi tment" P N.S. P 
-
N.S. P N.S. P N.S. 
"Latitude of r -.25 r 
= 
-.15 r -.27 r -.44 
acceptance" P 0.000 P 0.000 P 0.000 P 0.000 
"Government r .28 r = .21 r .31 r s .40 
1imi ts" P 0.000 P 0.000 P 0.000 P 0.000 
"Socialization" r 
.24 r .28 r .27 r .26 
P 0.000 P 0.000 P 0.000 P 0.000 
"Socialization r .09 r .20 r .25 r .16 
importance" P 0.017 P 0.000 P 0.000 P 0.000 
"Socialization r .18 r .27 r .12 r .11 
beliefs" P 0.000 P 0.000 P 0.003 P 0.008 
r -.04 r -.04 r -.01 r -.05 
"Experience" P 
= N.S. P N.S. P N.S. P N.S. 
r .03 r .13 r .10 r _ .00 
"Ego-irivoJvement" P 
= N.S. P 0.003 P 
= 0.023 P = N.S. 
"Ego-involvement r -.24 r -.17 r -.31 r -.40 
(modified)" P 0.000 P = 0.000 P 0.000 P 0.000 
The use of correlations with the ordinal ranking of religious groups 
replaces crosstabulation analysis because the scales result in more than 
50 percent of the valid cells having an expected frequency of less than 
five cases. This procedure, used with caution, is accepted by Abelson and 
Turkey (1959) and Labovitz (1970). 
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absence of correlations with "experience" is similar to the independence 
of "experience" from socialization variables. This is also true for the 
"latitude of noncommitment;" neither socialization variables nor religion 
variables are significantly correlated with it. The relationship between 
religion and the abortion controversy is clarified by one set of correla­
tions; "ego-involvement" is correlated with "affiliation of childhood re­
ligious instruction" and "importance of religion," but not with "present 
religious preference" or "religious service attendance." 
Aside from being correlated with the major variables, religion var­
iables have limited effects on the relationships between major variables. 
Only "religious service attendance" notably affects major variable rela­
tionships, reducing the correlations between the measures of socialization, 
ego-involvement, and extremism. The greatest change occurs between "so­
cialization importance" and "extremism," a relationship which fails to 
achieve significance when controlling for "religious service attendance" 
(a change from r = -.11, p = 0.008 to r = -.04, p = 0.195). 
Relying upon socialization, experience, and ego-involvement to ex­
plain variation in extremism is only minimally successful. As is evident 
from Table 31, a multiple regression of "socialization," "experience," and 
"ego-involvement" explains only 13 percent of the variance in the variable 
"extremism." When a regression using these independent variables is cal­
culated on "government limits" (probably the least biased measure of abor­
tion-related extremism), 20 percent of the variance is explained (see 
Table 32). Considering that cognitive, experiential, and emotive aspects 
of abortion are addressed with the major independent and dependent 
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variables, it is significant that the proportion of explained variance is 
not greater. However, the relative importance of the theory-related var­
iables becomes apparent through the regression analysis. In addition, it 
Table 31• Summary of stepwise inclusion of theory-testing variables in 
regression on "extremism" variable 
Step Variable 
Multiple 
R R2 
R^ 
Change 
Simple 
R B Beta 
1 "Socialization" .33 .11 .11 -.33 -.64 -.33 
2 "Experience" .36 .13 .02 .15 1.31 .13 
3 "Ego-involvement" .36 .13 .00 .05 .42 .07 
Table 32. Summary of stepwise inclusion of theory-testing variables in 
regression on "government limits" variable 
Step Variable 
Multiple 
R R2 
R^ 
Change 
Simple 
R B Beta 
1 "Socialization" .41 .17 .17 .41 .11 .40 
2 "Experience" .44 .20 .03 -.19 
CM 1 
-.17 
3 "Ego-involvement" .44 .20 .00 .02 -.11 -.01 
becomes possible to compare general measures with specific measures (see 
Tables 34 and 38) in order to determine the extent to which abortion-re­
lated extremism is predicted more accurately by specific current factors 
than by theory-related variables. 
An ancillary concern of this study is that the abortion controversy 
is predominantly structured by religious belief systems (as measured by 
"present religious preference," "affiliation of childhood religious 
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instruction," "importance of religion," and "religious service atten­
dance"). This is only an inferential test of the abortion controversy's 
structure. However, since the verification of religious belief systems is 
based upon logical validity, it is reasonable (though not necessarily ac­
curate) to anticipate that the specific information presented by a belief 
system's agents is consistent with that logic system. 
Evidence that the abortion controversy is significantly influenced 
by religion is provided by partial correlation coefficients (see Table 33). 
"Religious service attendance" (r = -.47, p = 0.000) and "importance of 
religion" (r = -.35, p = 0.000) have the highest correlations with "ex­
tremism." The third highest correlation is between "socialization" and 
Table 33- The five highest partial correlation coefficients between 
"extremism" and independent variables 
Independent Variable "Extremism" 
"Religious service attendance" r = -.47, P = 0.000 
"Importance of religion" r = -.35, P = 0.000 
"Socialization" r = -.33, P = 0.000 
"Present religious preference" 
O
O
 CM 1 n u P = 0.000 
"Socialization beliefs" r = -.26, P = 0.000 
"extremism" (r = -.33, p = 0.000). The fourth highest correlation is be­
tween "present religious preference" and "extremism" (r = -.28, p = O.OOO). 
The fifth highest correlation is between "socialization beliefs" and "ex­
tremism" (r = -.26, p = 0.000). With the two highest correlations and 
three of the five highest correlations involving religion variables, it is 
clear that religious belief systems are central to the abortion 
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controversy. 
To further clarify the importance of religion in the abortion contro­
versy, a multiple regression analysis using "extremism" as the dependent 
variable is employed. It is predicted that religion variable scores 
("present religious preference," "affiliation of childhood religious in­
struction," "importance of religion," and "religious service attendance") 
will explain the greatest proportion of variance in "extremism" scores. 
The following variables were included in the equation: sex of the respon­
dent, "present religious preference," "affiliation of childhood religious 
instruction," "importance of religion," "religious service attendance," 
mother's and father's occupations, "experience," "ego-involvement," "so­
cialization," "socialization importance," "socialization beliefs," the 
Srole anomia scale, a scale measuring respondents' involvement with groups 
active in the abortion controversy,^ and two scales measuring respondents' 
beliefs in the legal rights of the fetus (one dealing with the fetus and 
parents, the other including third parties, such as physicians). Using a 
forward (stepwise) inclusion, "religious service attendance" emerged on 
step number one (R = .22) (see Table 34). "Importance of religion" e-
merged on step four, and "present religious preference" emerged on step 
six. The finding that step one explained 22 percent of the variance in 
"extremism," of 31 percent explained by all variables in the equation, 
supports the position that religion variables are extremely important for 
understanding the abortion controversy. 
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Table 34. Summary of stepwise inclusion in regression on "extremism" 
variable 
Step Variable 
Multiple 
R R2 
R^ 
Change 
Simple 
R B Beta 
1 "Religious ser­
vice attendance" .47 .22 .22 -.47 -1.85 -.37 
2 "Socialization beliefs" .51 .27 .04 -.26 -0.21 -.19 
3 "Experience" .53 .28 .01 .15 1.10 . 1 1  
4 "Importance of religion" .54 .29 .01 -.35 -0.53 - .08 
5 
"Involvement 
with abortion 
groups" 
.54 .29 .01 -. 16 -0.74 -.11 
6 
"Present re-
1igious pref­
erence" 
.55 .30 .01 -.28 -0.56 - .08 
7 
"Ego-involve­
ment" .55 .31 .01 .04 0.48 .08 
Anci1lary issue; 1ife evaluation 
A second concern is whether attitudes about abortion reflect a con­
cern for the welfare and life of the fetus or simply a response to abor­
tion per se. If there is attitude consistency, concern for the well-being 
and life of the fetus should be correlated with opposition to abortion. 
If, however, the attitudes concerning fetal well-being and abortion are 
inconsistent, then it becomes questionable to what extent respondents' at­
titudes represent integrated, rational thought systems. Such thought sys­
tems are a vital presupposition of attitude theories. 
"Life evaluation" is a scale measuring acceptance of parents' legal 
responsibility for protecting the life and health of the fetus or newborn 
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infant (Question 24, Items A, C, D, and E). As is evident in Table 35, 
this variable, which ranges from 1 (low acceptance of parents' legal re­
sponsibility) to 5 (high acceptance of parents' legal responsibility) has 
satisfactory reliability and a wide distribution of scores. Consistency 
Table 35. Frequency distribution for "life evaluation" variable 
Score N % cum % 
5 33 6.5 6.5 Alpha = .80 
4 128 25.1 31.6 St. Alpha = .80 
3 164 32.2 63.8 Inter-item r = .34 
2 134 26.2 90.0 Item X = 2.9 
1 50 9.8 99.8 Scale X = 2.9 
Missing J .2 100.0 S.D. = 1.09 
Total 510 100.0 R a n g e  = 0 - 5  
in beliefs supports the prediction that those who oppose abortion will 
support fetal rights and, concomitantly, parental responsibility. How­
ever, a t-test for differences in mean scores for extremism groups does 
not find significant differences between anti-abortion and pro-abortion 
rights groups (see Table 36). The only significant difference is between 
the neutral group and the pro-abortion rights group. This finding pro­
vides evidence that abortion beliefs are not inherently consistent with 
fetal well-being. 
And 1lary issue; family traditional ism 
The final ancillary Issue is the concern that abortion attitudes may 
reflect respondents' sense of powerlessness. A generalized sense of 
powerlessness, as measured by the Srole Scale, was not significantly 
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Table 36. Differences in means for "life evaluation" scores between 
extremism groups 
Variable Extremism group Mean Difference t 
"Life 
Evaluation" 
1-Anti-abort ion 
2-Neutral 
2.9 
3.0 -0.1 -0.98, P = N.S. 
1-Anti-abort ion 
3-Pro-abortion 
rights 
2.9 
2.8 0.1 1.01, 
P = N.S. 
2-Neutral 
3-Pro-abortion 
rights 
3.0 
2.8 0.2 1.49, 
P = 0.005 
associated with abortion-related extremism. In the stepwise regression 
on "extremism" (see Table 34), the Srole Scale never emerged as a signif­
icant variable from which to predict the "extremism" score. However, 
Kaldenberg (1980) notes that specific measures of powerlessness may have 
stronger associations with the dependent variable than do general measures 
of powerlessness. Thus, the possibility remains that a sense of power­
lessness and threat related more directly to abortion factors is associat­
ed with "extremism." The primary concern is that if respondents abortion-
related extremism scores are associated with their feelings of powerless­
ness, then theories concerning attitudes are ineffectual. 
"Family traditionalism" is a scale measuring support for the family's 
importance for society and for the family as a source of morality ((Ques­
tion 15, Items B, E, and F). This variable, which ranges from 1 (low 
support for family Importance) to 5 (high support for family Importance), 
Is independent of the abortion controversy and the previous variables (see 
Table 37). Using the variable "family traditionalism" makes It possible 
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to test whether peripheral issues are significantly associated with abor­
tion-related extremism. "Family traditionalism" is significantly correla 
ted with "extremism" (r = -.22, p = 0.000) and "government limits" (r = 
•35» p = 0.000). The use of simple correlations does not identify the 
Table 37- Frequency distribution for "family traditionalism" variable 
Score N % cum % 
4 7 1.4 1.4 
5 3 .6 2.0 
6 9 1.8 3.8 
7 30 5.9 9.7 Alpha = .50 
8 47 9.2 18.9 St. Alpha = .51 
9 59 11.6 30.5 Inter-item r = .26 
10 86 16.8 47.3 Item X = 3.5 
11 99 19.4 66.7 Scale X = 10.4 
12 92 18.0 84.7 S.D. = 2.13 
13 53 10.4 95.1 R a n g e  = 4 - 1 5  
14 19 3.7 98.8 
15 6 1.2 100.0 
Total 510 100.0 
relative contribution of "family traditionalism" toward explained vari­
ance, however. Consequently, the best measure of each concept is included 
in a final regression to predict abortion-related extremism. The varia­
bles included In the regression are: "government limits," the least biased 
dependent variable, "socialization," "experience," "religious service at­
tendance," "life evaluation," and "family traditionalism." The regression 
results (see Table 38) show that, by including these additional varia­
bles ("religious service attendance," "life evaluation," and "family 
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traditionalism") in the analysis, the proportion of explained variance in­
creases by 13 percent (from 20 percent in Table 32) to 33 percent. Fur­
ther, while "socialization" explains the greatest proportion of variance, 
"religious service attendance" and "family traditionalism" explain greater 
variance than does "experience." "Life evaluation" explains only one per­
cent of the variation in "government limits." It is quite evident that 
factors peripheral to abortion per ae are significantly associated with 
abortion-related extremism, and, further, that abortion-related extremism 
is not inherently associated with an extension of opposition to abortion 
to include support for the life and/or well-being of the fetus. 
Table 38. Summary of stepwise Inclusion in regression on "government 
1imits" variable 
Step Variable 
Multiple 
R R^ 
R^ 
Change 
Simple 
R B Beta 
1 "Socialization" .41 .17 .17 .41 .76 .28 
2 "Religious ser­
vice attendance" .51 .26 .09 .40 .17 .24 
3 "Family tradi­
tional ism" .54 .29 .04 .35 .74 .19 
4 "Experience" .56 .32 .02 -.19 -.18 -.14 
5 "Life evalua­
tion" .57 .33 .01 .21 .10 .10 
Summary 
In this chapter, the results of the theories being tested by way of 
six sets of hypotheses are discussed, and in a seventh section three an­
cillary issues are analyzed. Regarding the first set of hypotheses, it 
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was found that abortion-related socialization and abortion-related experi­
ence are not significantly correlated. In connection with the second set 
of hypotheses, it was found that abort ion-related experience and ego-in-
volvement with abortion decisions are not significantly correlated. How­
ever, when ego-involvement was modified (using "government limits") to 
create a linear variable, a significant correlation was found between 
abortion-related experience and ego-involvement as modified. Concerning 
the third set of hypotheses, it was found that abortion-related socializa­
tion and ego-involvement with abortion decisions are significantly corre­
lated. The inverse correlation found between abortion-related socializa­
tion and ego-involvement (modified) suggests an anti-abortion orientation 
in socialization. With reference to the fourth set of hypotheses, sig­
nificant correlations were found between abortion-related socialization 
and abortion-related extremism. The nature of the bias in socialization 
measures is clarified by the extremism subscales (the latitudes of accep­
tance, noncommitment, and rejection). The critical test between the three 
theories is provided through the fifth set of hypotheses. Abortion-rela­
ted experience was found to be significantly correlated with abortion-re­
lated extremism. Specifically, the more personal the involvement with 
abortion decisions, the less extreme the respondents' attitudes concerning 
abortion. The latitude subscales were employed to provide the critical 
test between the three theories, with the result that attribution theory 
is supported by the reduced latitude of rejection and increased latitude 
qf acceptance associated with increased abortion-related experience. The 
results of the sixth set of hypotheses are that ego-involvement with 
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abortion decisions is not significantly correlated with "extremism." The 
relationship between ego-involvement and the latitudes is more complex, 
providing support for all three theories. However, when ego-involvement 
was modified to eliminate its curvilinear properties and used, consistent 
support for attribution theory was provided by the direction of the cor­
relations. 
In the section concerning ancillary issues, three factors are ana­
lyzed. The first factor is the importance of religion for predicting 
abort ion-related extremism. In some instances, religion variables were 
found to be more important than the theory-related variables for pre­
dicting abortion-related extremism. Secondly, it was found that, in many 
cases, the respondents' concern was with abortion per se and not with the 
full range of fetal well-being and life issues. Thirdly, it was found 
that abortion-related extremism is significantly correlated with concern 
for the quality of the family, again, to a greater magnitude than would 
be predicted using the theory-related variables. 
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CHAPTER VI. DISCUSSION OF SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS 
In this chapter, the significant results of this study are presented. 
The implications of this study for both social-psychological conceptions 
of attitude structures and the abortion controversy are addressed. In 
the final section of this chapter, the implications of this study and 
suggestions for future research are offered. 
Implications of the Results 
The implications of this study for understanding both attitude struc­
tures and the abortion controversy are interrelated. It is through the 
identification of relationships between attitude extremism and specific 
attitudes and experience (both directly and peripherally related to abor­
tion) that characteristics of attitude structures become evident. By 
testing between three theories, not only is the strength of relationships 
between variables measured, but the theoretical explanation of why any 
relationship does or does not exist is tested. This produces theoreti­
cal 1y- integrated research. 
Discussion of the hypotheses 
The test results for General Hypothesis I, that abortion-related 
socialization and abortion-related experience are not correlated, require 
little additional comment. Abort ion-related socialization and abortion, 
related experience are independent concepts, a finding that provides equal 
support for the three theories. 
The test results for General Hypothesis II, that abortion-related 
experience and ego-involvement with abortion decisions are positively 
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related, are important for two reasons. First, these two concepts are not 
significantly correlated, contrary to predictions of all three theories. 
Second, additional analysis demonstrates that systematic relationships are 
obscured when pro-abortion rights and anti-abortion ego-involvement are 
combined into a single scale. When ego-involvement with an anti-abortion 
orientation is distinguished from ego-involvement with a pro-abortion 
rights orientation, correlations between "ego-involvement (modified)" and 
the other variables become significant, or stronger where they are already 
significant. However, what began as a problem of bias in a single measure 
became an issue of bias in most of the concept measures, and, in reality, 
a general issue for the measurement of attitudes concerning controversial 
topics. For each concept measure, it is possible to identify the bias 
and successfully test the theories by modifying the relevant variable. 
This may appear to simply reflect problems in scale design, which may ac­
count for some of the difficulties. However, the problem is not limited 
to scales that combine anti-abortion and pro-abortion rights orientations. 
As noted in the discussion of "socialization beliefs" (EH IV^ and EH IV^) 
in the preceding chapter, since the items composing this scale range from 
"no restrictions" to "totally restricted," it is not evident that strong­
er correlations with any other measures sharing this bias (the range of 
values from "no restrictions" to "totally restricted" does not measure any 
variation in score for those respondents who oppose abortion) demonstrate 
stronger relationships between theoretical concepts rather than compatible 
biases. This is a problem inherent in controversial areas (rather than 
a problem limited to methodological strategies) because alternative 
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measures: (1) may not exist, (2) may be unrealistic, if they can be cre­
ated, or (3) may introduce new issues and even more bias into the scale 
than originally existed. The fundamental nature of this bias in the abor­
tion controversy is identified in the distinction between the full abor­
tion-regulation continuum (identified in Diagram 8) and the continuum that 
typifies the current abortion controversy (identified in Diagram 6). 
Thus, characteristics of controversies (as controversies are publicly cre­
ated and altered) may influence research by determining which concerns, 
and, consequently, which questions are relevant. Individuals, groups, or 
environmental factors that influence the definition of the controversy's 
concerns control the controversy to a considerable extent. 
The test results for General Hypothesis III, that abortion-related 
socialization and ego-involvement with abortion decisions are positively 
related, provide support for all three theories, although the finding of 
a positive correlation between these two concepts is most important for 
social judgment theory, in which ego-involvement is stressed. The use of 
the variable "ego-involvement (modified)" markedly increases the strength 
of the correlations. 
The test results for General Hypothesis IV, that abortion-related 
socialization and abortion-related extremism are positively related, again 
provides support for all three theories. However, the support for social 
judgment theory and attribution theory is more important than that pro­
vided for cognitive dissonance theory, in which socialization is a minimal 
concern. It appears that these results, in conjunction with the results 
of tests of Hypothesis V, contradict one attribution theory prediction. 
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Tesser (1976) predicts that experience will have a greater influence on 
extremism than will socialization. The finding that stronger correlations 
exist between abortion-related socialization and abortion-related extrem­
ism than between abortion-related experience and abortion-related extrem­
ism seems to contradict this prediction. Actually, religion and sociali­
zation are associated with more extreme beliefs, while experience is asso­
ciated with less extreme beliefs. Religion and socialization are presuma­
bly influences on individuals' lives prior to an abortion-related experi­
ence. This is supported by a t-test for differences in mean "ego-involve­
ment" scores between groups with no abort ion-related experience, other a-
bortion experience, and personal abortion experience, in which no signifi­
cant differences were found (see Table 23). Thus, it is apparent from 
their "extremism" scores that abortion-related experience is important for 
individuals. However, since the majority of respondents do not have abor­
tion-related experience, it is reasonable that socialization and religion 
have the strongest correlations with extremism for the total sample. 
The test results for General Hypothesis V, that abortion-related ex­
perience and abortion-related extremism are positively related, are the 
most important for discriminating between the three theories. According 
to cognitive dissonance and social judgment theories, abortion-related ex­
perience is positively correlated with abortion-related extremism and, 
more precisely, abort ion-related experience is associated with narrow 
latitudes of acceptance and noncommitment and a wide latitude of rejec­
tion. However, the converse pattern (experience correlated with wide lat­
itude of acceptance and narrow latitudes of noncommitment and rejection) 
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predicted with attribution theory is supported. 
As a general explanation of the abortion controversy, cognitive dis­
sonance theory is not supported. Actually, a one-point-in-time question­
naire is a marginal test of cognitive dissonance. Concurrently, the cen­
tral premise of cognitive dissonance theory, that experience determines 
attitudes, combined with the finding that experience is associated with 
accepting a variety of behaviors, indicates a fundamental contradiction. 
There is evidence that, for a limited number of individuals, dissonance 
reduction may have occurred; nonetheless, cognitive dissonance theory is 
not supported as a general explanation of the abortion controversy. 
The test results for General Hypothesis VI, that ego-involvement 
with abortion decisions is positively correlated with abortion-related 
extremism, are also important for discriminating between the theories, 
especially between social judgment theory and attribution theory. Accord­
ing to social judgment theory, ego-involvement is associated with abor-
tlon-related extremism and, more precisely, ego-involvement is associated 
with a wide latitude of rejection and narrow latitudes of noncommitment 
and acceptance. Again, the converse pattern (ego-involvement correlated 
with wide latitude of acceptance and narrow latitudes of noncommitment and 
rejection) predicted with attribution theory is supported. On the basis 
of the results of General Hypotheses V and VI, social judgment and cogni­
tive dissonance theories are not supported as general explanations of the 
abortion controversy, and Tesser's (1976) attribution theory of attitude 
polarization is supported as a general explanation of the abortion contro­
versy. 
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Support for attîtude polarization 
The results of the tests of the hypotheses consistently support Tes-
ser's (1976) attitude polarization theory. Also, where discriminating 
tests distinguish between the theories, the results do not support social 
judgment or cognitive dissonance theories. The most significant hypoth­
esis test results are: (1) that abortion-related experience is associated 
with a wide latitude of acceptance of abortion conditions and with a nar­
row latitude of rejection of abortion conditions, and (2) that ego-involve­
ment with abortion decisions is not significantly correlated with "extrem­
ism," while it is associated with a wide latitude of acceptance. In both 
social judgment and cognitive dissonance theories, individual involve­
ment with an attitude is conceptualized as a source of motivation for self-
concept or ego-defensiveness. In contrast, Tesser suggests that, when 
individuals' self-concepts are involved, they seek external "veridicality." 
More simply stated, on issues of personal importance, individuals may de­
sire accurate information about reality more than they need to have their 
beliefs reinforced. Tesser's (1976) conceptualization of individual in­
volvement with an attitude is supported by the finding that ego-involve­
ment with abortion decisions is not associated with "extremism" but is 
associated with a wide latitude of acceptance. Thus, respondents' in­
volvement with abortion decisions is not associated with accepting only 
a narrow range of abortion conditions which reinforce their personal de-
cisions. 
However, it is evident from Diagram 9 that experience is not invari­
ably associated with attitude moderation. Nonetheless, a rationale for 
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the existing association between experience and moderate attitudes must 
be identified. This rationale involves the integration of belief systems, 
schema, and cognitive development. 
In the absence of contradictory motivations and unanticipated con­
siderations, a belief system is likely to present simplistic and uncom­
promising attitudes sufficient to meet individuals' routine needs. Be­
liefs that individuals consider salient to a phenomenon can be manipula­
ted (Salancik and Conway, 1975) by altering the believers' schemata. The 
manipulation of belief salience by altering schemata results in thought, 
which leads to increased attitude polarization (Tesser and Leone, 1977; 
Tesser and Cowan, 1977). 
Brickman (1978) argues that we evaluate the internal and external 
correspondence of a phenomenon against our expectations before accepting 
it as real. Until a phenomenon is accepted as real, the people involved 
are not required to cope realistically with it. It is experience, then, 
which motivates individuals to cope with every aspect of a situation, in­
cluding those which have been idealized or inadequately resolved by a be-
1ief system. 
The point is that all roles, in a game, in an experiment, or 
in the outside world, are unreal at first and become pro­
gressively, ineluctably more real through our own behavior 
and other people's responses. They do not start out as real. 
Only over time do people come to feel that they are really 
professors or really married (Brickman, 1978:9). 
Similarly, according to Kohl berg (1969, 1976), the moral reasoning 
that underlies the development of personally-acceptable strategies is re­
lated to experience with relevant phenomena. Cognitive development is 
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characterized by emerging structural changes in the person's 
logic-value system as a function of the developing individ­
ual's interaction with her or his social environment 
(D'Augelli and O'Augelli, 1977:49). 
An individual remains at one level of cognitive development until judg­
ments concerning a phenomenon become sufficiently unsatisfactory that the 
individual is motivated to seek new, and more complex, evaluative criter­
ia. In reviewing cognitive development research, Tsujimoto and Nardi 
(1978:236) observe that, while empirical evidence does not support an 
invariant and progressively more complex developmental sequence, "it 
does support the weaker claim that the movement is generally upward and 
generally one stage at a time." At each stage, individuals develop cog­
nitive structures (schemata) that establish evaluative criteria and 
standards of evidence. When individuals change to subsequent (and more 
informat ion-intensive) stages, their cognitive structures and, therefore, 
self-concepts must also change. Similarly, for Tesser's theory, indi­
viduals may defend their self-concepts until they become involved with 
an experience that they can neither avoid nor resolve satisfactorily with 
their current self-concepts. When such dissatisfaction exists, external 
veridicality (which may provide new information that results in a more 
satisfactory resolution) becomes more important to individuals than sup­
port for previous judgments. Willingness to seek new information or 
change schemata depends upon a variety of factors, including: (1) indi­
viduals' tolerance of dissatisfaction, (2) individuals' analytic ability 
their age, cognitive ability, evaluative skills, decision making time, 
and availability of information). 
Bringing these notions to bear on the abortion controversy, whenever 
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a pregnancy (real or imagined) occurs under circumstances anticipated by 
individuals' existing schemata, the level of cognitive development and 
corresponding judgments should be satisfactory. In this situation, a 
religious belief system may stress, or be interpreted by its adherents to 
stress, obedience to rules (Kohlberg's conventional level). Moral judg­
ment (Kohlberg, 1969) and moral conduct (Hogan, 1973) reinforce belief 
systems. In contrast, when a pregnancy occurs outside the expectations 
of individuals' schemata or their understanding of their belief system, 
situational contexts and individuals' characteristics may equal the im­
portance of the belief system and individuals may be motivated to identify 
new evaluative criteria. The incongruent event may force individuals to 
distinguish 
between 'views in principle' (how we think we would act or 
how we think we ought to act) and 'views in fact' (those 
often unconscious views upon which we actually act) (Tsu-
jimoto and Nardi, 1978:236). 
Some individuals may simply accept their behavior as unethical; alternate­
ly, some individuals may be motivated toward postconventional cognitive 
development. (Sullivan and Quarter (1972:158) demonstrate that adopting 
postconventional schemata does not imply losing one's religious beliefs; 
principled absolutists combine strong religious orientations, concerns 
for others, idealism, tolerance for ambiguity, and a strong need for in­
dependence.) 
The previous explanation of this study's results has significant 
implications both for attitude theories and for understanding the abortion 
controversy. The implication for attitude theories is that support for 
an attitude theory may be conditional. Social judgment theory or 
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cognitive dissonance theory (when the qualifications are fulfilled) may 
be supported if individuals are unable or unwilling to intentionally 
change their cognitive structures. Tesser's attitude polarization theo­
ry is supported when individuals do change their cognitive structures. 
The implication for understanding the abortion controversy is that some 
of the hostility in the abortion controversy may result from differences 
in cognitive structures, particularly judgmental criteria and standards 
of evidence. Many individuals may not have the cognitive structure nec­
essary to reach informat ion-intensive judgments or to understand the 
principles governing such judgments when they are made by others. An 
example of an evaluative criterion that may vary in relevance between 
cognitive structures is the importance of "quality of life" in abortion 
decisions. Consequently, individuals with differing evaluative criteria 
may be unable to understand each other's judgmental process, let alone 
respect each other's decisions. 
Abortion and the anci1lary issues 
Another significant finding of this study is that respondents' sup­
port for abortion rights or opposition to abortion is not significantly 
associated with support for (legally) protecting the life and health of 
the fetus from dangers other than abortion. While this issue is 
peripheral to testing the three theories, it is important for understand­
ing the limitations of these theories. With research, correlations 
between abortion attitudes and numerous independent variables, including 
gender, religious preference, church attendance, education, sexual val­
ues, sex-role perceptions, age, occupational prestige, conventionality. 
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and importance of children (Bowers and Weaver, 1979; Ebaugh and Haney, 
I98O; Finlay, I98I; Rosen and Martindale, 1978; Tedrow and Mahoney, 1979) 
are identified. That these correlations exist is indisputable; however, 
the processes whereby the independent variables come to be associated with 
abortion attitudes (assuming that the relationships are not spurious) are 
not theoretically established. The purpose of an attitude theory is to 
explain attitude formation, attitude change, and the consequences of atti­
tude structures. When research has an inadequate theoretical foundation, 
not only is the reason for identified associations unknown, the very mean­
ing of these associations is suspect. Considering that, as in this study, 
two closely-related issues (opposition to abortion and support for fetal 
life and health) are not significantly associated, according to what the­
oretical foundations is the use of diverse variables such as "general 
conventionality" or parents' occupations (Finlay, 1981) justified? The 
use of such variables is generally unchallenged, even obligatory, though 
rarely theoretically defended. The finding of an absence of an associa­
tion between opposition to abortion and support for fetal rights made in 
this study requires that the validity of the notion that individuals have 
monolithic schemata be challenged. In this case, individuals do not ap­
pear to manifest logical consistency. Precisely what is meant when indi­
viduals oppose or support abortion or identify themselves as "pro-choice" 
or "pro-life?" The meaning is not self-evident. For example, is the op­
position to abortion per ss or to killing the fetus? The issue being 
raised is the necessity of distinguishing between the logical relationship 
between attitudes and the cognitive structure of individuals' attitudes. 
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While cognitive structure is addressed using the theories in this study, 
the focus is upon how that structure is changed (i.e., variation in lati­
tude widths, seeking external veridicality, reducing inconsistency) and 
not upon why variables related logically are not related in individuals' 
schemata. By what processes are "attitude perimeters" (the demarcations 
distinguishing which phenomena are relevant to a cognitive structure) es­
tablished? Under what conditions will logically-consistent attitudes re­
lated to a cognitive structure remain unincorporated? This issue is evi­
dent in the prayer at a "pro-life" convention to have the Lord "send the 
enemy to the pit of destruction" (English, 1981:16), in fire-bombing abor­
tion clinics, and in throwing flammable liquids on clinic staff (Prescott, 
1978). Similarly, of the 75 senators voting on both abortion and capital 
punishment legislation during 1974, 18 senators supported abortion and 
opposed capital punishment, and 35 senators opposed abortion and supported 
capital punishment (Prescott, 1978). Justifications for these actions 
may exist in each case; however, on the issue of "right to life," each of 
the above cases reflects inconsistency. 
Abortion as £ focal issue 
The absence of a relationship between opposition to abortion and sup­
port for fetal rights has several possible explanations. One explanation 
is that, at least for this sample, opposition to abortion is limited to 
abortion per se and not concerned with the fetus to a significant degree. 
A second possible explanation is that the issue of parental responsibility 
for the life and health of the fetus is an issue outside the respondents' 
attitude perimeters. Raising this issue in the questionnaire may have 
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served as a reality constraint on respondents' abortion attitudes. Thus, 
having opposed abortion earlier in the questionnaire, but not desiring 
to be culpable for problems in anticipated pregnancies, respondents could 
not support fetal rights. This explanation is highly speculative but is 
included to reinforce a point. Simply increasing the specificity of the 
variables and, through questions, identifying relevant collateral issues 
and implications will not necessarily increase the accuracy with which 
individuals' existing cognitive structures are measured. Asking questions 
directs respondents to establish attitudinal linkages which may not have 
existed previously. A third possible explanation for the absence of a 
relationship between opposition to abortion and support for fetal rights 
is that abortion is not only an issue in and of itself but also serves as 
a focal point for a wider variety of moral and social confrontations. 
While it is likely that a combination of these (and other) factors is 
involved, results from this study, like those from Rosen and Martindale 
(1978), support the third explanation. Two variables external to the issue 
of abortion ("religious service attendance" and "family traditionalism") 
are significantly associated with "extremism." "Socialization," "reli­
gious service attendance," and "family traditionalism" explain a greater 
proportion of the variance in "extremism" than does either "experience" or 
"life evaluation." Finlay (I98I) reports compatible results, that sexual 
conventionality, sex-role conventionality (for women only), and general 
conventionality have the strongest correlations with abortion attitudes. 
Attitude perimeters Support for the explanation that abortion 
serves as a focus for a variety of issues, however, does not explain the 
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development of cognitive schemata and processes whereby attitudes/attitude 
objects are included within or excluded from attitude perimeters. What 
does develop schemata between categories if not individuals' desires for 
consistency? Abortion attitudes are explicit; they are not unrecognized 
social patterns. In and of themselves, norms, values, and socialization 
beg the issue; attitudes are neither self-generating nor self-perpetuating. 
Even were attitudes to be based upon unrecognized social patterns, some 
human activity must verbalize and organize these social patterns if they 
are to be conveyed interpersonally. That is, unrecognized social patterns 
may influence social behavior, but, by definition, they cannot be atti­
tudes . 
Further, the norms and values shaping the abortion issue have an ex­
tensive history. For example, in 1869, Pope Pius IX rejected the doctrine 
of "ensoulment" (that the soul enters the fetus at a point after concep­
tion but prior to birth), thereby prohibiting Roman Catholics from seeking 
abortions as a matter of Canon Law for the first time (Bui lough and Bul-
lough, 1977). However, while the same norms and values have persisted, 
the social and legal acceptance of abortion has fluctuated dramatically. 
In Connecticut in 1821, the first legislation restricting abortion was 
passed in this country, and, by 1950, abortion, except to save the life of 
the mother, was prohibited in 4] jurisdictions {Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1972)). 
Individuals' attitudes, in and of themselves, are inadequate for ex­
plaining social phenomena such as the abortion controversy. Further, at­
titude theories are insufficient for explaining the social significance 
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of individuals' attitudes for three reasons (in addition to standard ar­
guments concerning social constraints, opportunities to act, etc.). 
First, distortions in initial information from which all future evalua­
tions and changes originate are not accounted for. Typically, the start­
ing point in attitude theories is individuals' current conditions, and 
then the nature of future changes is projected, as if all initial condi­
tions are equal. This assumption is specious because socialization a-
gents' conscious decisions to support only predetermined positions may 
direct others' initial socialization. Second, the evaluative criteria 
to which individuals are socialized are not explained in attitude theo­
ries. Evaluative criteria are standards of logic, faith, empirical tests, 
identification of evidence, locus of control, and assignment of responsi­
bility by which individuals evaluate new information and modify their cog­
nitive structures. Information that is not presented In accordance with 
individuals' evaluative criteria may simply be discounted because infor­
mation content is a secondary determinant of legitimacy. Thus, arguments 
about the importance of information content which do not account for e-
valuative criteria may be largely ineffectual in changing attitudes. 
Third, in attitude theories there is no extrapolation between individual 
and social levels of abstraction, so that social phenomena are explained 
in attitude theories as aggregates of individuals' experiences. Thus, 
individual, rather than social, characteristics are used to explain social 
phenomena. In this approach, the organization of norms and values is not 
explained, neither is the coordination of individuals' acts to achieve 
social and legal changes. Aggregate individuals' behavior, as the sole 
165 
or even principal cause of social activity, is not consistent with percep­
tions of public confrontations such as the abortion controversy, in which 
opposing groups are clearly defined, members are recruited, and authority 
to impose sanctions is sought. 
Commitment to attitudes and social systems When attitudes are 
conceptualized as autonomous cognitions, independent of the sources of 
attitude organization and coordination, the reasons why individuals adopt 
attitudes and affiliate with groups are essentially independent issues. 
As Borhek and Curtis (1975:viii) point out, "[t]he central problem is not 
whether ideas are socially conditioned, but how humans come to be so firm­
ly attached to them and how that attachment functions in social organiza­
tion." This Is not, in any respect, a rejection of attitude theories. 
Rather, it is an attempt to integrate attitude theories with explicitly-
stated assessments of individuals' cognitive consistency and with the so­
cial systems through which interrelated attitudes (i.e., belief systems) 
are organized, coordinated, and perpetuated. This involves a recognition 
that attitudes serve ends selected by the organizations which foster those 
attitudes. Regardless of whether any individual needs are fulfilled by 
those attitudes (providing individual motivation to accept the attitudes), 
individuals' acceptance of those attitudes fulfills social system func­
tions (providing individual motivation to support the social system). 
When the basic content of attitudes and evaluative criteria is perceived 
as a product of social systems intent on self-perpetuation, individual and 
social system beliefs become an integrated issue. To gain individual com­
mitment, the social system's belief system must address issues that are 
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critical to individuals' self-concepts. However, once those beliefs are 
incorporated into individuals' self-concepts, support for the social sys­
tem is assured, unless individuals are forced by circumstances to reeval­
uate their self-concepts. 
The significance of religion The religion variables in this study 
are significant at two levels. First, the finding that religion is impor­
tant for understanding abortion-related extremism is significant. Second, 
religion integrates individuals' attitudes and social systems, helping to 
explain the organization of norms and values as well as the coordination 
of individuals' acts to achieve specific goals. 
The religion variables are obviously very important for understanding 
the abortion controversy. The four religion measures employed have suffi­
ciently different correlations with the theory-testing variables to show 
that they measure distinct phenomena (see Table 30). However, while the 
religion variables are distinct, they are also significantly correlated 
with most of the theory-testing variables. The most notable exceptions -
the absence of significant correlations with the "latitude of noncommit-
ment" and "experience" - are easily explained. Particularly since "exper­
ience" includes aiding in abortion decisions made by other women, it is 
reasonable that religious values, training, and attendance are not corre­
lated with "experience." Further, to the extent that religious activities 
encourage a fear of sexuality among youth, such as those who participated 
in this study, there would be an increased risk of pregnancy (Saxton, 
1980). The absence of correlations between religion variables and the 
"latitude of noncommitment" is likely to reflect the emphasis within 
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religious context upon identifying and fulfilling moral standards. 
The importance of religion for predicting abortion-related extremism 
is even more evident in the magnitude of the correlations between "ex­
tremism" and "religious service attendance" (r = -.47), "importance of 
relgion" (r = -.35), and "present religious preference" (r = -.28). As 
is shown in Table 33, these three religion variables have the first, 
second, and fourth highest correlations with "extremism." Even when a 
stepwise regression was run on "extremism" so that interaction between the 
religion variables was minimized, the same three variables emerged on 
steps one, four, and six, while accounting for 24 percent of the 31 percent 
of explained variance. Clearly, the measurement of one specific current 
behavior - religion - is as central to understanding abortion attitudes as 
are the attitude theories tested in the body of this study. 
Given, then, that religion variables correlate significantly with 
individuals' attitudes, how is it that individuals' attitudes are influ­
enced by social systems' value structures? One approach is to focus di­
rectly upon the internalization of explicit norms and values. However, 
for this study to be focused upon the internalization of specific relig­
ious tenets would completely change its emphasis. A much more significant 
reason for not focusing on internalized norms and values is that general 
measures of religion are used as standard control and independent varia­
bles, resulting in strong correlations with diverse variables, yet the 
process by which this occurs is not addressed. 
The second important contribution of religion for understanding the 
abortion controversy, then, involves the attempt to explain why general 
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measures of religion are correlated with individuals' attitudes. It is to 
this end that religious knowledge systems and belief systems have been in­
corporated into this study. If "present religious preference" consistent­
ly had the highest correlations with the other variables, it would be ap­
propriate to argue that specific denominational positions (and, therefore, 
norms and values) are the central issue for understanding the influence of 
religion. Without question, the positions of specific denominations and 
churches influence adherents' attitudes and must be included in a total 
evaluation of the importance of religion. Nonetheless, in this study 
"present religious preference" was only the third most effective religious 
predictor of "extremism." 
The contention throughout this study has been that norms, values, 
and beliefs are organized by social groups into belief systems. Further, 
when belief systems are combined with systems for collecting and verifying 
knowledge (knowledge systems), the resulting knowledge belief system 
(religious belief system, in this case) will significantly influence the 
cognitive structure of all of its adherents. That is to say that all 
Christians will share certain similarities regardless of denominational 
differences and that variation in adherents' attitudes reflects differ­
ences in commitment to the knowledge belief system, as much as differ­
ences in doctrine. This may be reflected in the differenpes in the corre­
lations between "present religious preference" and "importance of relig­
ion," on the one hand, and the theory-related variables, on the other. 
By establishing what types of information and what forms of analysis are 
legitimate, belief systems not only create norms and values for existing 
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phenomena but also provide their adherents with cognitive parameters which 
influence attitudes that emerge in new interaction. Thus, individuals' 
attitudes may be integrated with social systems through the internaliza­
tion of an approach to knowledge rather than solely through norms and val­
ues. In some instances, integration with the social system may require 
ignoring entire categories of information, which is qualitatively distinct 
from learning information. A basic similarity of attitudes may emerge not 
from a shared set of prescriptive beliefs but from the rejection of one 
position, regardless of the absence of alternatives, or even a carefully 
considered evaluation of empirical realities. 
In this study, as in most studies of abortion, the focus becomes the 
extent of opposition to or support for abortion. In essence, respondents 
need only oppose alternatives provided, they need not generate realistic 
alternatives or preventatives. Consequently, in this study, the strong 
correlations between religion variables and "extremism" scores may reflect 
the rejection of abortion and arguments supporting abortion, without con­
taining prescriptive elements. The significance of religious belief sys­
tems for the abortion controversy is that they are based primarily upon 
rational abstract relationships rather than empirical evidence. If abor­
tion is identified as unacceptable as a matter of doctrine (rational ab­
straction), empirical circumstances and preventative alternatives are ir­
relevant to the moral necessity of preventing abortion. Empirical data 
may support the moral necessity, but the data can never "disprove" the 
doctrine. Thus, adherents need never develop attitudes concerned with how 
to realistically eliminate the demand for abortion; it is sufficient to 
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oppose abortion. Individuals' attitudes become consistent with the val­
ues of the social system by mutual disapproval rather than from shared 
productive cognitions. 
The effect of threat When either the leadership or a significant 
proportion of the social system's members perceive a threat to their be­
liefs, both individuals' self-concepts and the belief system to which they 
belong are involved. The degree of perceived threat to self-concept and 
the belief system depends upon the negotiability of internal reality and 
the extent of institutionalization. For an uninstitutionalized belief 
system and its adherents, a threat to any belief is a threat to the entire 
belief system. 
In the association between "family traditionalism" and opposition to 
abortion, a relationship between a generalized feeling of threat to both 
morality and the family and opposition to abortion can be identified. Ac­
cording to Mohr (1978), the anti-abortion movement of the late 19th cen­
tury (when abortions were first uniformly and punitive]y sanctioned) de­
veloped from a combination of three factors. First, the incidence of a-
bortion was rising. Estimates by doctors practicing between I85O and 1888 
ranged from one abortion for every five live births to one abortion for 
each live birth (Mohr, 1978:82). Second, the anti-abortion movement was 
supported by the American Medical Association, a group already possessing 
social and political power but which could increase that power by regula­
ting abortion. Third, there existed a social climate dominated by change, 
ambiguity, and threat. The growth of cities and the industrialization of 
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America supplanted the agrarian social system. The continued immigration 
of foreign women who had large families, in contrast to the decreasing fer­
tility of "American" women (from 7.04 children per woman in 1810 to 3.56 
children per woman in 1900), raised ethnic and genetic concerns (Mohr, 
1978:82). The feminist/suffrage movement appeared to be the rebellion of 
women against their fathers, husbands, and families. The values of the 
past were being challenged, and the anti-abortion movement identified 
these changes as symptoms of one problem, abortion. By prohibiting abor­
tion, traditional values could be restored. 
After a period of exceptional stability during the 1950s and early 
1960s (which preceded Roe v. Wads 410 U.S. 113 (1972) and Doe v. Bolton 
410 U.S. 13 (1972)), the social climate has again become dominated by 
change, ambiguity, and threat. Perceptions of the breakdown of the tra­
ditional family encompass the divorce rate, women's liberation, the Equal 
Rights Amendment, gay rights, and the sexual revolution. Restricting 
abortion is seen by some as a means of restoring traditional values. 
Many Influential government officials have expressed the at­
titude not only that teenage sexual activity is deplorable 
and immoral but also that adolescents should be forced to 
accept the responsibility for their actions - for government 
to provide contraceptive information or to pay for abortions 
would be to condone and even encourage immorality (Saxton, 
1980:444-445). 
Basically, legalized abortion represents society's acceptance 
of a practice considered morally wrong by certain groups. 
Their moral values, once the dominant values of American so­
ciety, have been challenged and in some instances replaced 
as the result of the sexual revolution. Because the moral 
values are no longer accepted by society, the groups seek 
to enforce them through law (Wilson et al.3 1977:356). 
Because of the visibility of legal abortion, media coverage, and 
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campaigns by groups concerned with abortion, abortion is perceived to be 
on the rise. Also, organized religion, political action committees, and 
groups such as Moral Majority have become associated with abortion-related 
activities. To the degree that Mohr (1978) accurately identifies social 
conditions that led to the late-igth century anti-abortion legislation by 
threatening individuals' self-concepts and belief systems, similar condi­
tions may underlie current anti-abortion efforts. 
Technology A sense of generalized threat may be focused into de­
bate concerning a single issue because that issue is defined as pivotal 
or because it is so Identified by a social system's representatives. How­
ever, this possibility is unlikely and incomplete at best. A change in 
social conditions may influence when a controversy develops but has less 
influence on what issue will be involved. With the abortion controversy, 
this is obscured because sexuality is such a pervasive component of "mor­
ality," abortion, family life, liberation movements, and the sexual revo­
lution. 
Nonetheless, an issue becomes a focal point by virtue of its influ­
ence on behavior. According to Borhek and Curtis (1975), it is on issues 
raised by technology that fundamentally different belief systems come Into 
confrontation. A technology enabling Individuals to choose between tra­
ditional and nontraditional behavior represents a threat to the tradition­
al "natural order," which individuals previously accepted as unalterable. 
The effect of technology is to challenge fundamental justifications for 
past behavior. People must then ask whether traditional values were ac­
cepted as moral simply because no realistic alternatives existed. When, 
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through technology, alternatives exist, are pre-alternative values de­
fended because they represent our "moral tradition?" In essence, are tra­
ditional values objectively superior in view of alternatives that pre­
viously were not realistically available? Belief systems' legitimacy and 
individuals' self-concepts, when established prior to the advent of tech­
nological alternatives, are dependent upon traditional values, which jus­
tify past behavior and fulfill ego-defensive needs. A simple example of 
the impact of technology is that abortion was not significantly regulated 
until doctors understood conception and gestation to the degree that they 
could not identify any point at which the fetus was more biologically 
"alive" than it was at the previous instant (Mohr, 1978). However, the 
influence of technology is much more pervasive and important. Unless in­
dividuals totally disregard specific pregnancy and fetal conditions, am­
niocentesis (prenatal diagnosis) extends the issue of abortion from tra­
ditional morality, or the "right to life," to one of the quality of life. 
The ability to identify absolutely that a fetus has Tay-Sachs disease, 
trisomy (mongolism), spina bifida cystica, anencephaly, or other congeni­
tal defects (Juberg, 1978) raises questions of individual and social re­
sponsibility that did not exist when such detection was impossible. When 
fetal complications are combined with maternal health complications (e.g., 
cancer, heart disease, cystic fibrosis, diabetes mellltus, sickle cell 
anemia, multiple sclerosis, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, etc.) or preg­
nancies resulting from rape or incest (Juberg, 1978), maternal and fetal 
rights to life and quality of life Issues become Ineludlbly and Irrevoca­
bly contradictory. Similar, but less overt, conflicts of interest pervade 
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all abortion decisions. 
The medical considerations identified above are indicative of the 
inherent consequences of technology. First, active choices must be made 
concerning issues that previously were matters of conjecture. Second, 
technology is based upon specialized knowledge and the precise application 
of techniques in specific situations. The development of a technology 
requires the simultaneous development of a paradigm (Kuhn, 1970), in which 
the relationships between phenomena manipulated by that technology are 
explained. A consequence of the new paradigm is that, through the identi­
fication of phenomena, relationships, and decisions that did not have to 
be considered previously, the technology fosters terminology and issues 
that may be irrelevant to traditional belief systems. For example, blood 
is blood when making a witch's brew; however, it is now known that blood 
contains 62 immunological and biochemical systems applicable for estab­
lishing paternity (Krause et al., 1976). It is possible for such techno­
logical expertise to be incorporated into a traditional and more general 
belief system, although specialization is more typical and such an ex­
change is less likely if elements of the belief system are threatened. 
However, because technology involves "doing" (i.e., achieving some goal), 
belief systems may be brought into opposition when, through technology, 
a matter of conjecture is resolved by demonstration. The aura of power 
in a technique's methodology may be sufficient to result in its adoption 
by a belief system's adherents either in substance or in appearance. 
When, through technology, goals are achieved and the validity of theoretic 
knowledge is tangibly demonstrated, a third consequence of technology 
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results. When issues encompassed by a belief system are addressed by way 
of a technology, the belief system's agents seek support for this tech­
nology. Seeking consensus is understandable, but the belief system's 
knowledge structure and the technology's knowledge structure may be incom­
patible. This is uniformly true when religious belief systems and scien­
tific technology are combined. The point is that belief systems' adher­
ents will seek evidential support from technology without accepting the 
technology's theoretic paradigm. The result is that technological evi­
dence may be used to support the belief system but not to alter the belief 
system from its pre-technological position. 
This is not to say that traditional (i.e., pre-technological) be­
liefs are wrong or passé. In the abortion controversy, "right to life" 
is a principal issue which supersedes technology. The procedure identi­
fied here as invalid is the failure to incorporate theoretic linkages and 
findings that do not support the traditional belief system when techno­
logical findings are used. Either the theoretic belief system is accepted 
without scientific/technological support, or all of the evidence, whether 
It supports or refutes the initial belief system, must be incorporated 
into the subsequent belief system. A single example of this invalid use 
of evidence is that opponents of abortion sometimes argue that abortions, 
being operations, are dangerous. Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) writes: 
The Supreme Court in 1973 did not automatically make abortions 
safe - it only made them legal. Dr. Mathew J. Bulfin, a Flor­
ida gynecologist and President of the American Association of 
Pro-Llfe Obstetricians and Gynecologists, reports a remarkable 
increase in the number of his own patients suffering from se­
vere medical complications following legally obtained abor­
tions (Grassley, 1977:8A). 
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Richard Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services, who sup­
ports a constitutional amendment prohibiting abortion and is on record as 
saying that he would lobby for such an amendment in his present position 
(Behavior Today, 1981:2), directed a change in the presentation to be 
made by the National Centers for Disease Control (Associated Press, 1981b: 
3A). At Schweiker's request, the testimony of Dr. Willard Cates, Jr., 
chief of abortion surveillance (testimony which included evidence of the 
beneficial effect of abortions), was replaced by a shorter statement 
given by Dr. Carl Tyler, which omitted any mention of abortion benefits. 
In contrast to these presentations, Cherniak and Feingold (1973:46) found 
a mortality rate of 1.5 per 100,000 suction abortions compared to a mor­
tality rate of 23 per 100,000 pregnancies in New York City. Shapiro 
(1977:173) reports abortion mortality rates between 1.7 and 2.6 per 
100,000 women for abortions performed during the first eight weeks of 
pregnancy, rising to 4.7 deaths per 100,000 women when abortions are per­
formed during the eleventh and twelfth weeks. Dr. Cates, Jr.'s report 
noted that, prior to the legalization of abortion, it was not unusual for 
half of all beds in gynecological units in large public hospitals to be 
occupied by women suffering from complications of illegal abortions (Des 
Moines Register, 1981). Schweiker's manipulation of research results is 
a deliberate attempt to use selected information to support his beliefs, 
while ignoring the fact that the same research technology that supports 
some of his beliefs discredits other of his beliefs. 
When technologies which provide alternatives are developed, the al­
ternatives themselves become focal issues over which contrasting belief 
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systems are likely to conflict. Authority within each belief system is 
modified such that, as the technology becomes more refined, authority 
becomes less dependent upon theoretic knowledge or a particular relation­
ship to the knowledge and more dependent upon an ability to understand and 
employ the technology. While authority within a belief system may find a 
technology threatening, the technology is, nonetheless, needed because, 
through it, goals of the belief system are achieved. Thus, technologies 
increase the possibility of controversies (an external influence on be­
lief systems) and differentiate authority within belief systems. Finally, 
as technologies become more refined, belief systems' laymembers may be­
come "technologically illiterate." Members may be unable to use or com­
prehend technological terminology and methods. Simultaneously, the inevi­
tability of the "natural order" and the absoluteness of traditional values 
are disrupted. Consequently, the technology and its alternatives are per­
ceived as fundamental threats to individuals' self-concepts and belief 
systems. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
This study is so limited in scope, compared to the issues addressed, 
that identifying several areas or issues for further research, as if some­
how the topic had been narrowed, borders on being pretentious. However, 
the results and interpretations obtained in this study would be clarified 
through an examination of a number of specific research Issues. Alterna­
tive theories (especially social comparison theory) could be used to test 
for ability to explain the abortion controversy. Another area of study 
involves identifying the conditions which motivate individuals to seek 
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new information, even when this requires changing their cognitive struc­
tures. In general, social comparison involves seeking information about 
unique experiences for which individuals have no schemata, and is a dis­
tinct issue. Content analysis studies of belief systems could be used to 
identify the systems' knowledge structures and evaluative criteria. In 
conjunction with content analysis studies, studies of individuals' atti­
tudes and behaviors could be employed to identify the influence of belief 
systems upon individuals' cognitive structures. The relationship between 
abortion attitudes and the sanctity of life has not been researched suf­
ficiently, and, through it, underlying values which are not evident when 
considering abortion might be explained. Specific life issues that could 
be investigated include capital punishment, euthanasia, starvation, paren­
tal abuse, war, self-defense, and suicide. 
Efforts to create truly value-neutral abortion attitudes and experi­
ence scales are also needed, if abortion is to be understood. A final, 
extremely ambitious, area of study would be to identify the full range of 
variables associated with abortion attitudes. These include personal ex­
perience, socialization, beliefs, religion, sexual relations, sex educa­
tion, and so on. The obvious difficulty with such a study is that both 
its size and extremely personal nature would seriously limit sample re­
sponse. Nonetheless, such a study would be Invaluable for really under­
standing abortion attitudes. 
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POSTSCRIPT 
In closing, there are several issues which deserve consideration as 
assessments of this research project. These considerations address in­
sights concerning the nature of research projects which analyze social 
phenomena as complex and controversial as is the topic of abortion. 
The first consideration involves commitment to the theories selected 
for testing. While attribution theory is accepted as the best of the 
three theories for predicting abortion-related extremism, it is accepted 
only because of its statistical significance. The correlations between 
the four theory-related variables are typically below .20, and the ex­
plained variance is typically below four percent. Socially, then, the 
explanatory power of attribution theory is minimally significant, at 
best. Alternative scaling procedures might improve the explained variance 
but are as likely to involve "patching up" the data analysis to fit the 
theory as to actually demonstrate the validity of the theory. Frankly, 
the theories selected may simply be either irrelevant or ineffective in 
explaining abortion-related extremism. Considering the strength of the 
correlations between religion variables and abortion-related extremism, 
the theories used just are not persuasive. An alternative approach that 
deserves consideration is reference group theory. Reference group theory 
integrates individuals' attitudes with social phenomena (i.e., groups), 
and reference groups are an established source of socialization. In this 
study, the socialization scales are based upon reference groups which may 
be relevant to the respondents' abortion attitudes. Consequently, 
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reference group theory appears to be an alternative theory with consid­
erable potential for explaining abortion attitudes. 
The second major area of consideration involves measurement prob­
lems encountered in this study. The abortion-related extremism measure 
that is most consistent with Sherif and Hovland (1961) may be "government 
limits." By recoding the scale so that both 1 (no abortion restrictions) 
and 9 (prohibition of abortion) have a value of 5 and the midpoint on the 
scale has a value of 1, both extreme positions are treated equally. This 
alternative deserves careful reanalysis. 
The principal measure of abortion-related extremism Is not symetri-
cal, and extreme anti-abortion and pro-abortion rights scores do not re­
flect similarly restrictive, though antithetical, response patterns. 
This is reflected in the Guttman appearing scale used to measure "ex­
tremism." The critical problem that results is evident in the curvilin­
ear variables and the subsequent development of "ego-Involvement (modi­
fied)." Clearly, In an area as complex as the abortion controversy, un­
less the Initial questionnaire Is developed with extreme precision, the 
subsequent data analysis will become overwhelming due to the necessity of 
scale modifications and recoded variables. Moreover, carefully con­
structing the scales and questionnaire may not guarantee symetrlcal 
scales. As was noted in Chapter V, the full abortion-regulation continu­
um ranges from totally prescribing to totally proscribing abortion. The 
use of extremes, as identified by Sherif and Hovland (1961), may only be 
possible on that continuum, a continuum that Is not a realistic assess­
ment of the abortion controversy. It is a serious question whether the 
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alternatives provided in the "extremism" scale reflect researcher bias 
by failing to identify pro-abortion rights extremeness, or whether the 
scale accurately measures the social parameters of the abortion contro­
versy. In short, is it possible to make extremism measures both symetri-
cal and realistic? When researching such a controversial issue, the pos­
sibility of researcher bias influencing the construction of the question­
naire is a ubiquitous hazard, in spite of the researcher's commitment to 
objectivity. 
The problems and difficulties associated with studying controver­
sial topics should be understood as cautions when beginning and imple­
menting research. Controversial topics are likely to be topics with im­
plications that sociological analysis can help to identify and interpret. 
The challenge is to use objective measures and theories which clarify and 
explain the issue in socially meaningful terms. 
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FOOTNOTES 
^ Two examples of statements typifying religious knowledge systems, and 
showing how the theoretic relationship supersedes empirical phenomena, 
are from the Reverend Jerry Falwell, as reported in Brata and Duncan 
(1981:150-151): 
Theology, to me, is an exact science. God is God. The 
Bible is the inspired, inherent word of God. And if every­
one accepts the same theses and the same equations, they 
will arrive at the same answer (150). 
Later in the same interview, Falwell addresses more explicitly the pre­
eminence of theoretic knowledge over other forms of knowledge and, by 
implicat ion, empi rical phenomena. 
The basic tenet of former evangeVioat Christianity, now 
what I call fvndjcmentdliBt Christianity, is that we have 
one basic document on which we predicate everything we be­
lieve, our faith, our practice, our life-style, our homes, 
et cetera, government - is the inherency of scripture, 
not only in matters of theology, but science, geography, 
history, et cetera - totally and entirely, the very word 
of God (151). 
^ in those cases where there were missing responses (approximately 50), 
the missing values were assigned the median score for each scale item. 
This scale (ego-involvement with abortion decisions) was unique in its 
high number of missing values, and to include so many low ego-involve-
ment scores could possibly influence the results. 
3 
"Extremism" and "government limits" are scored with opposition to abor­
tion low and high respectively. Consequently, both hypotheses predict 
that, as socialization scores increase, acceptance of abortion alterna­
tives wi11 increase. 
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While correlations show linear relationships, if the distribution of 
scores is not standard, significant differences between response cate­
gories may be disguised. In this case, the use of t-tests shows that 
only one of the three groups has a significant mean difference. Con­
sequently, the linear relationship identified by the correlation re­
sults from the magnitude of the correlation at one extreme of the re­
sponse distribution. 
^ Involvement with abortion groups is measured by Question 26, which is 
composed of seven items. Each item measures the extent of involvement 
with different forms of activity concerning abortion. The item scores 
are summed and divided by the number of items to create a scale ranging 
from 1 (low involvement with abortion groups) to 5 (high involvement 
with abortion groups) (see Table 39). 
Table 39- Frequency distribution for "involvement with abortion groups" 
variable 
Score N % cum % 
5 12 2.4 2.4 
4 17 3.3 5.7 
3 67 13.1 
CO G
O 
2 195 38.2 57.0 
1 209 41.0 98.0 
Missing 10 2.0 100.0 
Total 510 100.0 
X = 1.82 S.D. = 0.966 
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APPENDIX A. COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE 
196 
of Science and Technolo Ames, Iowa 50011 
Dear Student:  ^
This Is a study about attitudes concerning abortion and ex­
periences with situations In which decisions on whether or not to 
have an abortion are made. By participating in this study you 
can provide valuable information about this topic. At present, 
much of our knowledge about abortion attitudes comes from vocal 
groups appearing in the news. The purpose of this study is to 
leam more about abortion attitudes by seeking a wide range of 
respondents. Including those who have not or do not wish to make 
a public Issue of their attitudes and experiences. Everyone's 
opinions are Important for this study. 
This questionnaire takes approximately 20 minutes to com­
plete and includes several types of questions about abortion. 
This is a sensitive and personal issue, and every effort will be 
made to ensure the confidentiality of your responses. There are 
no identifying numbers on this questionnaire. Please do NOT 
write your name on this questionnaire. Your participation in 
this study is voluntary, and you may return this questionnaire 
unmarked or keep it if you choose. 
If you have any questions, you may ask them at this time or 
contact me later by letter or phone. My telephone number is (515) 
294-4612. Thank you for your time and effort. Without your help 
this study would not be possible. 
Sincerely, 
Stephen L. Goettsch 
Department of Sociology 
and Anthropology 
419 East Hall 
Iowa State University 
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What was your age in years on your last birthday? 
What is your sex? Female Male 
What is your present marital status? 
A. Never married 
B. Engaged but never married 
C. Married (first time) 
D. Married and widowed 
E. Married and divorced 
F. Married but spouse has left 
G. Remarried after death of spouse 
H. . Remarried after divorce from spouse 
How many children do you have? » IF YOU HAVE CHILDREN, 
How many sons? 
How many daughters? 
How many brothers do you have? 
How many of them are older than you? _____ 
How many sisters do you have? 
How many of them are older than you? 
How many years of education do you have? 
What is the highest degree or diploma you have received? 
A. Grade school 
B. High school 
C. Technical school degree or Associate of Arts 
D. Bachelor's degree 
E. Master's degree 
F. PhD, MD, or other professional degree 
What is your present religious preference? 
A. Atheist, agnostic 
B. Jewish 
C. Protestant 
D. Roman Catholic 
E. Other, please specify 
What kind of religious instruction did you receive as a child? 
A. None 
B. Atheist, agnostic 
C. Jewish 
D. Protestant 
E. Roman Catholic 
F. Other, please specify 
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11. How important to you are your religious beliefs? 
A. Very important 
B. Important 
C. Slightly important 
D. Unimportant 
E. Very unimportant 
12. How often do you attend religious services? 
A. Never 
B. Only for funerals and weddings 
C. Several times a year 
D. Once or twice a month 
E. Weekly 
F. More than once a week 
13. In which of the following categories would you place your occupation, 
your father's occupation, and your mother's occupation? 
Your Father's Mother's 
occupation occupation occupation 
A. Student 
B. Professional (MD, Veter­
inarian, Lawyer, etc.) 
C. Manager 
D. Educator 
E. Farmer . 
F. Homemaker 
G. Clerical 
H. Sales 
I. Foreman 
J. Craftsman/artisan 
K. Laborer 
L. Services (waiter, cook, 
bartender, etc.) 
M. Not employed 
N. Deceased 
14. Please give the title or job description for each person listed below. 
A. Your occupation ; 
B. Father's occupation; 
C. Mother's occupation: 
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15. For each of the following questions, please check the response that 
best matches how strongly you agree or disagree. 
A. There is little use writing to public 
officials because often they are not 
really interested in the problems of 
the average person. 
B. The family is the most important 
group in creating a good society. 
C. School teachers and experts know 
more about what a child needs than 
the child's family. 
D. Nowadays a person has to live pretty 
much for today and let tomorrow 
take care of itself. 
E. Parents have to protect their child­
ren from the breakdown of morals in 
America. 
F. The law should not attempt to 
impose moral standards on people. 
G. In spite of what some people say, 
the lot of the average person is 
getting worse, not better. 
H. The family is the last place where 
the average person can still have 
some control. 
I. It is hardly fair to bring children 
into the world with the way things 
look for the future. 
J. It is important that the law limit 
the authority of parents over their 
children. 
K. These days a person doesn't really 
know whom he or she can count on. 
L. The family is no longer teaching 
children the important values. 
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THIS PAGE CONTAINS TWO TABLES, for each of the sources of values 
listed below, please mark the appropriate response in each column (that 
is two marks per source). 
16. First, for each of the sources of values listed below, please 
Indicate how important it has been for you in forming your 
beliefs about abortion. IF you did not have any experience with 
the group or if the group did not bring up the issue of abortion 
while you were an active member, PLEASE MARK THE SPACE "NOT RELEVANT." 
17. Second, for each of the sources of 
values listed below, please estimate 
how much it would like to restrict 
the availability of abortions. 
SECOND FIRST 
A. Religious groups/ 
Church 
B. Education/school 
C. Philosophy/ethics 
D. T.v.,Radio,News 
E. Parents 
F. Friends 
6. Brothers/sisters 
H. Other relatives 
I. Spouse 
J. Children 
K. Counseling 
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THIS PAGE CONTAINS TWO TABLES, For each of the reasons for an 
abortion, please mark the appropriate response in each column (that 
is two marks per reason). 
18. First, please check how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the 
following reasons for having an abortion. 
19. Second, for each of the reasons for 
an abortion, how strongly do you 
feel that your answer should be jthe 
accepted standard for having an abortion? 
FIRST 
A. No abortion for any 
reason. 
B. Only to save the life 
of the mother. 
C. If the fetus is known 
to be deformed. 
D. In the case of incest 
or rape. 
E. For medical necessity, 
determined by a doctor. 
F. For psychological 
necessity, determined 
by a doctor. 
6. If the mother is below 
age 16. 
H. If the mother is 
unmarried. 
I. If other forms of 
contraception fail. 
J. If the child is not 
wanted By the parents. 
K. If the couple cannot 
afford the child. 
L. On demand if the person 
pays. 
M. On demand even if the 
government must pay. 
N. No regulation of any 
form. 
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Please check any and all of the situations in which you have had to 
make or to help someone else make a decision to have o£ not have an 
abortion. FOR EXAMPLE: if you have been pregnant but never considered 
having an abortion, you would not check "A. for yourself" because 
you did not choose between having and not having an abortion. On the 
other hand, if a friend believed that she was pregnant and you helped 
her decide whether or not to have an abortion, you would check "D. 
a close friend" even if she later found that she was not pregnant. 
A. for yourself 
B. for your spouse or girlfriend 
C. for a member of your family 
D. for a close friend 
E. for an acquaintance 
F. for a stranger 
G. for a counseling client 
H. NEVER involved in an abortion decision 
If you have ever had to make a decision about having an abortion for 
yourself or for your partner, did you feel that you were forced to 
make the decision that you did? 
A. Never had to make such a decision about abortion. 
B. No, I felt I could choose either to have or not have an abortion. 
C. Yes, I was pressured by my partner. 
D. Yes, I was pressured by my family. 
E. Yes, I was pressured by health considerations. 
F. Yes, I was pressured by money needs. 
G. Yes, I was pressured by other concerns (please explain): 
Have you ever helped someone either to have or to not have an abortion 
when that action would contradict your own values? (That is, have you 
told someone they would be better off to have an abortion when you 
personally would not choose one, or have you told someone not to have 
an abortion when you would choose to have one? 
A. Never advised anyone about an abortion. 
B. No 
C. Yes 
D. Other (please explain) : 
Please mark a point on the line below that shows how much you think 
abortions should be limited by the government. 
T O T A L L Y  ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '  N O
FORBIDDEN RESTRICTIONS 
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24. Please check the response that shows how strongly you agree or disagree 
with each of the following statements. 
A. Mothers should be legally responsible 
for birth defects caused by negli­
gence (e.g., drugs, alcohol, smoking). 
B. The government should make welfare 
payments to poor pregnant women for 
nutrition. 
C. Mothers should be legally responsible 
for birth defects caused by diseases 
for which the women could have been 
immunized. 
D. Parents should be legally responsible 
for the death of their children if 
the death results from a disease for 
which the child could have been 
immunized. 
E. If the pregnancy results from an 
error by the doctor or pharmacist, 
the parents should be able to sue 
for money to help raise the child. 
F. Mothers should be legally responsible 
for a miscarriage caused by negligence. 
6. Doctors should be legally responsible 
if a miscarriage is caused by the 
medicine used to treat some other ill­
ness. 
25. In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled (A) 
during the first three months of pregnancy 
the State cannot stop a woman from having 
an abortion, (B) during the second three 
months the State can regulate how an abor­
tion is performed but not prevent it, and 
(C) during the final three months, the 
State may regulate or prevent an abortion. 
A. How strongly do you agree or disagree 
with the Supreme Court decision? 
B. This Supreme Court decision is impor­
tant for the United States. 
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Please check the response for each activity that represents your 
involvement with any group or groups concerned mainly with abortion. 
This involvement may be with either groups that favor abortion or 
groups that are opposed to abortion. 
A. Attend public rallies or speeches 
concerned with abortion 
B. Visit a meeting or office of a 
group concerned with abortion 
C. Contribute money to a group con­
cerned with abortion 
D. Contribute time to a group con­
cerned with abortion 
E. Write your congressional repre­
sentative or newspaper about 
abortion 
F. Join a group concerned with 
abortion 
6. Speak publicly about abortion 
Have your values concerning abortion ever changed? 
A. Yes (IF YES) 
B. No (Skip to item 28) 
II. How did they change? 
A I hold the same values but 
more strongly now. 
B I hold the same values but 
less strongly now. 
C I have reversed my position 
on abortion. 
D I do not know what my values 
about abortion should be now. 
III. Can you identify an event or exper­
ience that caused the change? 
A Not sure what caused the change 
B The change was gradual and not 
caused by specific events. 
C Yes, a specific event related 
to an abortion caused the change. 
D Yes, a specific event caused 
the change but not an event 
related to an abortion (e.g.,a 
lecture or a religious event). 
E Yes, other (please explain) 
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28. What was the total income in your household for 1979? If you are not 
financially independent (e.g., your parents are paying your expenses) 
what is the total income of those paying your expenses? 
Total income for 1979. 
29. Are there any comments that you would like to make or is there any 
more information that you would like to add? If so, please use this 
space to make your comments. 
Thank you very much for your assistance on an important but sensitive issue. 
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APPENDIX B. HUMAN SUBJECTS COMMITTEE APPROVAL 
L\il 
•.NfOR.nAT iCN. ON THE USE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS I N  RtbtAKUM 
IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY 
i)PIe|9&e follow trie dccompanyîng instructions for completing this form.) 
0 207 Title or project (p.case type): Dissertation research. The Lffect of Experience 
on Attitude Polarization: Does Experience Reduce Cognitive Rigidity. 
f 2J I agree to provide the proper surveillance of this project to Insure that the rights 
and welfare of the human subjects are properly protected. Additions to or changes 
in procedures affecting the subjects after the project has been approved will be 
Submitted to the committee for review. ju , 
Stephen L. Goettsch 
Typed Nameo of Principal Investigator Date Sigrfature of Principal Investigator 
419 East Hall 294-4612 
Campus Adoress Campus Telephone 
©Signatures of others (If any) Date Relationship to Principal Investigator 
Dr. E. A. Powers 3/28/80 Ma lor nrnf<»«or.,-» 
ATTACH an addition*! page(s) (A) describing your proposed research and (0) the 
subjects to be used, (C) indicating any risks or discomforts to the subjects, and 
(û) covering ar,\/ topics checked below. CHECK all boxes applicable. 
i i Medical clearance necessary before subjects can participate 
! I Sumpîes (blood, tissue, etc.) from subjects ^ j-
I i Ad;nin I strat i on of substances (foods, drugs, etc.) to subjects ACCEJVSD 
I i Physical exercise or conditioning for subjects 
! ; Deception o f  subjects 
[ j Subjects unocr 14 years of age and(or) Subjects 14-17 years of age 
i i Subjects in isc i cut ions 
i j Research must be approved by another Institution or agency 
f 5.J ATTACH ofi exampIe of the material to be used to obtain Informed consent and CHECK 
wnich type will be used. 
[[j Signed informed consent will be obtained. 
m Modifiée informed consent will be obtained. 
©Month Day Year Anticipated date on wnlch subjects will be first contacted: Apr 11 IQBQ 
© 
Anticipated dale for last contact with subjects: Apr 25 iq«n 
7 .J I' Applicable: Anticipated date on which audio or visual tapes will be erased and(or) 
identifiers will be removed from completed survey Instruments: 
© Month Day Year Signature ofyHead or Chairperson Date Department or Administrative Unit 
/// /'> ( ' " /-// V'/ 
'dJ <- //Y/' / A 
"(^ §^  Decision of the ^ iiiversity Committee on the Use of Human Subjects ïn Research; 
[Tj project Approved [2] Project not approved No action required 
u. MflpWu 
Naip.fî o!" Conini c ce-': Cra •'-persor; 'Da te Slonature of CommitTi ree Cna i  rperson 
